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SUMMARY 
Centre-right failure in new democracies: the case of the Romanian Democratic 
Convention 
This thesis asks why some centre-right formations have been more successful than others  
in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It does  so by examining a single 
centre-right formation – the Romanian Democratic Convention.  It adds to an existing body 
of literature that covers the development of political parties in post-Communist Central and 
Eastern Europe and to the small number of studies focusing on centre-right parties in the 
region.  Specifically it adds to the literature on party success and failure and to that on 
Romanian party and electoral politics.  The Romanian Democratic Convention is chosen to 
add new insights: it is unusual because it is a study of organisational failure and because 
there is a geographical imbalance in the published studies of the politics of the region 
towards the Visegrad states.     
The thesis acknowledges existing academic debate about the competing influences of 
historical legacies, agency and structural factors in relation to post-Communist 
democratisation.  It aims to identify what led the Convention to first establish itself but then 
fail to consolidate and eventually to collapse. It draws on a range of sources: semi-
structured interviews; contemporaneous newspaper reports; published diaries and 
autobiographies and a number of secondary sources.  The thesis is structured thematically, 
examining the role of legacies and critical events in shaping long term behaviour by 
politicians (chapters three and four); organisational factors and the influence of operational 
objectives (chapter five); the search for a broad and integrative ideology (chapter six).   
The conclusions in chapter seven suggest that successfully crafting a new, broad political 
formation requires a degree of pragmatism, directive leadership and political 
entrepreneurship that was missing from the Democratic Convention because it was shaped 
by Romania’s transition from Communism, by its organisational structure and by 
differences within its leadership elite so that competing operational objectives could not be 
reconciled when the formation entered government.   
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Preface 
The material for this thesis has been derived from a range of published sources and from 
face-to-face interviews conducted by the author.  The published sources are set out in the 
bibliography and a list of interviews is included as Appendix 3.  Section 1.8 describes the 
sources used and the approach taken with them.  None of the work was derived from joint 
working with another person. 
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 Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The key research question addressed in this thesis is why, in new democracies, some 
formations on the centre-right succeed and others fail.  It does so using the example of a 
single organisation – the Romanian Democratic Convention.1  The thesis adds to an 
existing body of literature which examines the development of political parties in post-
Communist Central and Eastern Europe and to the small number of studies that focus on 
centre-right parties in the region.  Specifically it adds to the literature on party success and 
failure and to that on Romanian party and electoral politics.  The Romanian Democratic 
Convention is chosen deliberately to add new insights to the existing literature as it is 
unusual in being a study of organisational failure and because there is a geographical 
imbalance in the published studies of the politics of Central and Eastern Europe towards the 
Visegrad states (Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics).    This thesis 
identifies the ‘centre-right’ as a distinct party family and within that family it examines the 
factors influencing why, in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, some 
centre-right parties fail while others succeed.  However, it aims to draw conclusions which 
have relevance to the study of political parties in a wider context than just one region and 
one party family.2   
The thesis acknowledges existing academic debate about the competing influences of 
historical legacies, agency and structural factors in relation to post-Communist 
democratisation.  Within that framework it aims to identify what led the Convention to first 
establish itself as a major competitor in Romanian electoral politics but then fail to 
capitalise on its position and eventually to collapse.  
The principal aim of this first chapter is to provide a road-map to the rest of the thesis by 
summarising the key issues to be explored and to survey the existing literature on the topics 
                                                            
1To aid understanding, full party names translated into English are used throughout the text.  The Romanian 
alphabet also includes a number of letters which do not appear in English and to aid understanding these have 
been transliterated into the nearest English equivalent. 
2In this thesis, Central and Eastern Europe is taken to mean those states which were part of the Soviet bloc in 
Europe but not part of the Soviet Union. See section 1.2 below. 
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covered.  It begins by summarising the existing literature on the development of parties, 
particularly in relation to Central and Eastern Europe and it addresses the issue of how to 
define success and failure in relation to political parties.  The applicability of the 
terminology of ‘left’ and ‘right’ to the politics of the region has provoked some debate and 
this chapter goes on to establish what is meant by ‘centre-right’ in the context of this study. 
This thesis contends that there are lessons in the story of the Romanian Democratic 
Convention that can be applied more widely than just to Romanian politics so the chapter 
goes on to explain why Romania is often seen as exceptional within the region in terms of 
its political and social development and why the Democratic Convention forms a valid case 
study.  It offers a framework for grouping parties into families which will help to 
contextualise subsequent discussions and the chapter concludes by setting out the 
hypotheses to be tested and the methodological approach taken. 
1.1  The existing debate 
The organisational structure and development of political parties and the nature of party 
systems and competition are all subjects which have attracted significant academic 
attention.  Studies relating to party alliances are less numerous but this thesis does not aim 
to address the literature on alliances directly. Rather, the Democratic Convention is used to 
illustrate broader problems inherent in establishing successful political formations on the 
centre-right. As a result, the text in the following sections refers extensively to the literature 
relating to political parties because that is the way in which the literature itself is framed. 
The assumption underpinning this thesis is that elements of the literature on party success 
and failure can be drawn upon to inform a debate about successful strategies for centre-
right formations. This is addressed more fully in the sections below on the Democratic 
Convention as a case study and on definitions of success and failure. 
The wave of democratisations that followed the collapse of Soviet power in Europe gave 
further impetus to the study of party systems and competition within them, providing new 
test cases for existing theories and a set of unique conditions in which to establish new 
theses.  
11 
 
Lipset and Rokkan offered the classic theory of party system development in Western 
Europe, suggesting that parties were established around entrenched social cleavages with 
the formations ‘freezing’ into a pattern that endured for decades afterwards.3  However, an 
often highlighted problem with transplanting Lipset and Rokkan’s formulation on to 
Central and Eastern Europe is the absence of the kind of social cleavages and pre-existing 
institutions of civic society which underpinned the development of political parties in 
Western Europe.4  Additionally, the democracies of the region are still relatively youthful 
and so the party systems that apply in their early years may be far from fully and 
permanently formed.  Studies have also pointed to the unique strains of the transition from 
Communism to liberal democracy which lead to further questions about the applicability of 
a cleavage based approach.5 
Established studies of Western Europe have been built upon by specialists in post-
Communist politics to provide an expanding body of works on party systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe, i.e. the nature of the environment within which parties compete, usually 
defined by reference to the number of parties competing.6  The factors influencing the 
organisation and development of the formations within those systems have in general been 
less well studied – this is particularly true for the centre-right of the political spectrum.7  
This study acknowledges the importance of research into party systems as providing a 
context for the study of parties and their responses to the systemic environment, however, it 
does not seek to measure the validity of competing theories about party system 
                                                            
3Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives, The 
Free Press, Toronto, 1967. 
4Herbert Kitschelt, The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, Politics & Society, Vol. 20, no. 
1, 1992. 
5The notion of Eastern Europe’s triple transition from Communism was originally developed by Claus Offe, 
highlighting the impact of the transformation of political and economic structures in the region together with 
the need to engage in state-building processes.  Claus Offe, Capitalism by democratic design, Social 
Research, vol. 71, no. 3, 2004, pp. 501 – 528. Kuzio has suggested that nation building and state building 
should be treated separately, creating a ‘quadruple transition’.  Taras Kuzio, Transition in Post-Communist 
States:  Triple or Quadruple?, Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 168 – 177. 
6These include Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems, Competition, 
Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, 1999;  Peter Mair, Party System 
Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997 and Attila Agh, The Politics of Central Europe, Sage, 
London, 1998.  Giovani Sartori’s 1976 work, Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis, ECPR, 
London, (2005 reprint) is the lodestone for this field of study. 
7As is referred to below, studies of parties as organisational entities have predominantly focused on parties of 
the left, particularly within the field of Central and Eastern European parties. 
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development; instead it aims to assess the factors determining the development of political 
formations as individual entities.   
The question of why some parties in European democracies fail has been surprisingly 
neglected by academic analysis.8  One reason for this is perhaps identified by Jonathan 
Hopkin in his study of Spain’s Democratic Centre Union (UCD) when he highlights the 
lack of examples of party collapse between that of the British Liberal Party in the 1920s 
and of his own chosen case study half a century later.9  However, a small number of studies 
have attempted to address the issue of party development in Central and Eastern Europe.   
Kopecky, for example, proposes that, early in the transition to democracy, incumbent 
parties will possess greater incentives towards cohesion; that parties with leftist roots will 
build more solid grass-roots organisations; and parties existing at the time of the 
revolutions should display signs of greater continuity than those emerging subsequently as 
elite initiatives.10  Kopecky suggests that parties generally in the region will pursue catch-
all electoral strategies because opportunities to create stable links with voters will be very 
limited (resulting from the absence of pre-formed partisan attachments, the high levels of 
social homogenization and the existence of other means of expressing political opinion).  In 
addition to (and perhaps as a result of) their loose electoral constituencies, Kopecky 
suggests parties in the region will compensate for weak links into society by emphasising 
the importance of strong leadership.  All of these elements are traceable in Romania’s first 
decade of post-Communist democracy.  The limitation of Kopecky’s analysis for this study 
is that it does not offer any indication of why one centre-right formation should succeed 
over another one. 
Beyond Central and Eastern Europe, Jonathan Hopkin, in his case study of Spain’s UCD, 
points to the significance of institutionalisation in securing the success of a party.  Hopkin 
                                                            
8A notable exception is Lawson and Merkle’s 1988 survey which was nevertheless principally seeking 
systemic explanations for the posited decline of ‘traditional’ parties and the rise of ‘new’ political movements.  
Kay Lawson and Peter Merkle, When Parties Fail, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988. 
9Jonathan Hopkin, Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain, Macmillan, London, 1999.  Hopkin 
points out that examples of the collapse of established parties in western democracies have grown in more 
recent years, for example parties in Italy and the Canadian Progressive Conservatives. 
10Petr Kopecky, Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe, Party Politics, vol. 1, no. 4, 1995, 
Sage, London. 
13 
 
builds on the work of Angelo Panebianco to examine the development of political parties in 
new democracies.  He locates his study within the debate over the applicability of ‘rational 
choice’ behavioural models to party elites.   He suggests that two factors – the availability 
of alternative incentive sources and the degree of dispersal of control over resources - 
determine the ability of elites to overcome barriers to co-operation.  The interplay of ‘exit’ 
options (the availability of more attractive strategies) and ‘voice’ (the ability of an actor to 
influence strategy by speaking out) are seen as key elements that determine choices made 
by actors.  Similar incentives operate for supporters of a party as exist for elites.  This thesis 
finds strong echoes of Hopkin’s framework in the story of the Democratic Convention and 
in particular in the relationship between the historic parties and the civic society groups that 
were leading actors within the Convention and their choices of strategic priorities.  This is 
set out in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
Paul Webb and Stephen White draw together several explanatory factors to account for the 
trend in the most recent wave of democratic transitions towards low party membership and 
high levels of electoral volatility which in turn increase the risks of party failure:  the 
changing nature of mass communications; increased access to alternative forms of political 
activism; the professionalisation of parties; and the existence of a very different cleavage 
context from those that have gone before.11  Drawing on similar influences, Mair has also 
sought to summarise the key reasons why parties in newly democratic systems struggle to 
find stability.12  Set-up costs, barriers to entry to the political market and exit from existing 
formations are lower:  voter (and sponsor) loyalty is fluid; institutional factors such as the 
allocation of state resources, access to the media and electoral systems are less well formed; 
and potential actors are likely to be more willing to enter the party arena rather than seek 
alternative routes to achieve political goals.  ‘Market’ information regarding voter 
preferences - in the form of reliable polling or past voting data - is also less clear, 
potentially increasing the significance of political entrepreneurship in securing success for 
political parties.  As with Kopecky’s analysis, the outlines of these theories fit the 
Romanian picture but the conditions they describe apply to all parties.  As a result they do 
                                                            
11Paul Webb and Stephen White, Political parties in new democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009. 
12 Peter Mair, Party System Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997. 
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not help to illustrate the factors that create a successful party or an unsuccessful one.  The 
following sections of this chapter, and in particular section 1.5 therefore examine a range of 
region, country and party related explanatory frameworks in order to develop testable 
hypotheses. 
1.2  Why post-Communist Europe? 
This thesis treats the Romanian Democratic Convention as a case study of centre-right 
political formations within Central and Eastern Europe. As mentioned above, the CEE 
region is taken to be those states that were formerly part of the Communist bloc but were 
not part of the Soviet Union and which moved from Communist to liberal democratic forms 
of governance in 1989. Thus, it does not seek to include comparisons with the former 
Soviet states themselves or with the former Yugoslav states, or the political formations 
from those states. The reasons for this are partly pragmatic: this definition of the region is 
widely used in academic literature and it provides a manageable number of comparators. It 
is also partly because the states do share enough common features to make a meaningful 
unit of comparison: they all entered and left Communist rule at similar times; they emerged 
into similar environments (in that their political elites generally perceived that they Central 
European states whose natural ‘home’ was within established Euro-Atlantic structures; and 
the politics of their transition featured a dominant anti-Communist/successor-Communist 
axis.13  
Studies of democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe have tended to emphasise the 
nature of the former regimes as significant in determining the development path of the new 
political systems.  Pridham and Lewis, for example, acknowledge four factors shaping the 
development of party systems in new European democracies14, including the dynamics of 
                                                            
13Slovakia is a more problematic case given the greater salience of the national question. As such, Slovakian 
comparisons are not widely used here. For Slovak politics generally see Karen Henderson, Slovakia: The 
Escape from Invisibility, Routledge, London, 2002. For the centre-right in Slovakia see Tim Haughton and 
Marek Rybar, All Right Now? Explaining the Successes and Failures of the Slovak Centre-right, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20 (3), September 2004, pp. 115-132  
 
14Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis, (eds), Stablising Fragile Democracies, Routledge, London, 1996.  The 
study examines democratic transitions in southern Europe as well as the more recent collapse of Communist 
rule in CEE. 
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the transition, the role of competing political elites and the degree to which parties develop 
links with society, but they emphasise the importance of historical inheritance and the 
problem of ‘coping with the past’.  Kitschelt analysed differing post-Communist political 
structures in terms of legacies derived from the former regimes and developed perhaps the 
classic historical legacy typology for the politics of the region.15   
In large part this emphasis on the Communist legacy of the new Central and East European 
democracies has derived from what marks out this wave of democratisations as different 
from previous ones.16  The new democratic systems were being formed in the absence of 
any meaningful civil society structures or even clearly defined socio-economic 
differentiation.  The rupture with the previous system was dramatic and immediate rather 
than seeing a gradual opening of access to power for previously excluded groups.  And the 
democratic transitions were part of a complete system change which encompassed 
transformation of economic structures and relationships as well as political ones.  But 
subsequent investigation has raised some important questions about the power of these 
legacy-based explanations: how well do they account for differences in party development 
between and also within countries; and how enduring are the effects of Communist rule as 
the countries of the region move further away from their Communist pasts? 
Attempts to look for other explanatory factors have included focusing on the role of 
constitutional design.  Attention has been placed in particular on the choice of electoral 
system and the degree of ‘presidentialism’ apparent in the constitutional settlement.17    
Stephen Saxonberg has, for example, directly addressed the impact of constitutional design 
on centre-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe.  He hypothesises that parliamentary 
systems aid the cohesion of centre-right parties while presidential systems promote 
splintering around personality-led formations.18  However, there are inevitable difficulties 
in determining the direction of the causal link – do the systems shape the nature of political 
                                                            
15Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Systems. 
16Offe’s notion of the triple transition – see above. 
17See for example Frances Millard, Elections, Parties and Representation in Post-Communist Europe, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2004 and Ray Taras, Post-Communist Presidents, Cambridge Unversity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996.  
18Steven Saxonberg, The Influence of Presidential Systems: Why the Right is so Weak in Conservative Poland 
and so Strong in the Egalitarian Czech Republic?, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 50, no. 3, 2003. 
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contestation or do the actors involved in the transition craft systems which best meet their 
needs?  It is also apparent that such approaches cannot fully account for the differences that 
arise between parties under the same system – in Romania for example, parties such as the 
Social Democrats, the Democrats and eventually the National Liberals appear to display the 
characteristics of a stable party capable of surviving transfers of leadership while other 
parties have been faction-ridden and prone to disintegration.  Saxonberg addresses this 
issue by suggesting that the Polish Social Democrats survived the divisive effect of the 
presidential system by virtue of their inherited strengths.  However, if this is the case it 
inevitably leads to the question of whether it is factors other than the constitutional 
framework which determine the development of both sides of the political spectrum.   
The Democratic Convention’s failure to cross the electoral threshold for parliamentary 
representation in 2000 is cited by Ucen and Surotchak as the direct cause of the formation’s 
demise – an outcome that is particularly ironic since it was changes by the Convention-led 
government which raised the threshold above the level of votes they received.19 Electoral 
arrangements meant that there was little scope for ‘mid-term’ feedback from the electorate 
for parties.  Local elections were held in the same year as the general election and in 1996 
and 2000 the earlier elections were held less than four months before the start of the 
national campaign leaving little time for reaction.  As the Convention drifted towards defeat 
in 2000, it is possible that it was lulled into false sense of security by victory in special 
election for Bucharest mayor in the autumn of 1998.20 Despite the missed signals, this 
study will show that the Convention’s fate was sealed well in advance of the 2000 elections 
by deeper organisational flaws.  For all of these reasons, this analysis does not place great 
emphasis on the role of constitutional factors in determining the fate of the Democratic 
Convention, although it provides a context for some of the most important turning points in 
the Convention’s development. 
                                                            
19  Peter Ucen in Peter Ucen and Jan Surotchak (eds), Why we lost – explaining the rise and fall of the 
Center Right parties in Central Europe, 1996-2002, International Republican Institute, Bratislava, 2005. 
20  The Convention candidate won 41.6% of the vote in the first round, more than double the score of 
his nearest rival.  The Social Democrat candidate took less than 20% of the vote and finished in third place.  
Toamna se numara voturile, Evenimentul Zilei, 28 October 1998. http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-
articol/613183/Toamna-se-numara-voturile/ accessed 27 October 2009. 
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Those seeking an alternative to historical-structural approaches have also examined the 
primary role in political developments of elite actors.  Agency based analysis stresses the 
key role that leaders can play in shaping political outcomes as a result of decisions made in 
a ‘rational choice’ context.  There are clear difficulties with relying too heavily on such 
explanations – implicit in purely rational choice models is clarity of ‘market’ information 
and the willingness of actors to engage in ‘outcome optimising’ behaviour, two factors 
which appear to be missing in the confused context of dramatic political transitions.  
Modifications to this approach stress the significance of ‘critical junctures’ which lock 
actors into a decision path which appears rational only if viewed in the context of the 
importance of this initial key moment.21  This thesis acknowledges both of these 
approaches in deciding on the propositions it seeks to test.  
1.3  Understanding the centre-right 
Studies of parties on the political left have tended to monopolise existing studies of post-
Communist Central and East European politics perhaps because so many recovered 
phoenix-like from initial electoral oblivion. Communist parties and formations on the post-
Communist left were frequently reduced to marginality with little electoral support in the 
founding elections across the region.  However, by the mid 1990’s parties of the left had 
returned to power in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic sparking a substantial 
academic interest in the re-emergence of these Communist Successor parties.  The most 
prominent works dealing with the recovery of Communist successor parties both assert the 
primary importance of the political environment prior to democratisation and the past 
record of state-society relations in determining the nature of the successor parties’ appeal.22   
Implicit in the extensive study of the Communist successor left is a sense of surprise at the 
recovery of those parties.  In fact, although it was hardly apparent from most of the 
founding elections in the region, the newly democratised CEE offered a more hostile 
                                                            
21For an outline of critical juncture and path dependence analysis applied to parties and government formation 
see Bale, Boston and Church, Natural because it had become just that, Australian Journal of Political Science, 
40/4, 2005.  
22Andras Bozoki and John Ishiyama (eds), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, 
M.E. Sharpe, 2002; Anna Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002. 
18 
 
environment to parties on the centre-right.  The left parties inherited considerable political 
assets in the form of experienced leaders, organisational structures and institutionalised 
loyalty.  By contrast, opposition leaders were inexperienced and became hampered by 
association with radical and painful economic transformation.  Additionally, the impact of 
five decades of Communist rule was to create societal contexts that were hugely different 
from those into which successful centre-right parties were born in Western Europe a 
century earlier:  society was more homogenous; there were no interest groups to defend that 
were linked to a pre-existing market economy; and civic society institutions such as the 
church were often weak or barely existent.  Finally, there was a widespread assumption 
among western commentators that the dissolving of the Communist glue would un-stick 
older conflicts and lead to an upsurge in anti-democratic, recidivist nationalism in the 
region.23  Furthermore, the reality of radical economic transformation was a painful one for 
electorates that were largely dependent on employment in out-dated and inefficient 
industries or an over-blown state bureaucracy.  In these circumstances it might be assumed 
that the successful creation of stable and dominant centre-right parties would be the 
exception rather than the rule.  Thus far, only the Czech Republic’s Civic Democrats and 
Fidesz of Hungary have achieved this goal among the region’s centre-right parties and it is 
still too early to tell whether they have attained long-term stability.24 
The relative lack of published research into the development and fate of centre-right parties 
is perhaps not surprising when one considers the comparable level of research into centre-
right parties in Western Europe which also lags well behind the volume of work on parties 
of the left.  In the only published book-length work dedicated solely to centre-right parties 
in the region, Szczerbiak and Hanley offer an explanation: 
The reasons for this paucity of research appear to be both pragmatic, reflecting the 
personal preferences and interests of individual researchers, and methodological, 
reflecting intrinsic problems of definition and comparison.  Whereas communist 
successor parties, for example, constitute an easily identifiable bloc, defining who is 
                                                            
23One such example being Misha Glenny’s Rebirth of History, Penguin, London, 1990. 
24Subsequent to the period of this study the Democrat Party also appears to have achieved stability and a 
dominant position on the centre right in Romania. 
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on the centre-right from amid an array of nationalist, conservative, Christian, liberal 
and populist groupings is a much more difficult task.25 
The first potential difficulty to overcome in assessing the performance of the centre-right is 
thus how to define it in a post-Communist context since Conservatism and frequently 
nationalism were integral strands of the former Communist regimes in the CEE region.  
Chan points out that maintenance of the status quo was not an option for the post-
Communist right since left wing parties laid stronger claim to agendas of social concern 
and evolutionary change.26  As well as identifying ‘Communist conservatives’ who operate 
on the post-Communist left, Chan focuses on economics to distinguish between competing 
right wing ideologies which are either nationalistic and ambivalent to marketisation or 
those which adopt western style neo-liberalism.   
Chan points out that opposition to Communism is generally a common feature of centre-
right parties and Vachudova offers ‘vigorous opposition to Communism’ as the key 
identifier of centre-right or ‘moderate right’ parties in the region.27  Hanley identifies three 
ideological strands shared by centre-right parties in the region:  anti-communism; 
conservatism (in which he includes nationalism and populism); and liberalism.  He 
acknowledges the ideological fault-line between liberalism and conservatism but points out 
that large successful West European parties tend to overcome these differences and 
combine both elements and that the relationship between these two groups can be seen as 
critical to the success of the centre-right in Central and Eastern Europe.  Thus a broad 
consensus emerges which separates conservative Communist-successor parties on the one 
hand and extreme nationalists on the other from a broad centre-right which is the focus of 
this research.  The centre-right encompasses moderate nationalist and traditionalist appeals, 
Christian democracy, social liberals and economic liberals.  Anti-Communism is a strong 
                                                            
25Aleks Szczerbiak and Sean Hanley (eds), Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist East-Central Europe, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2005 page 1. 
26Kenneth Chan in Paul Lewis (eds), Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe, 
Frank Cass, 2001. 
27Like Chan, Vachudova identifies a strain of conservatism that has been co-opted by the post-Communist left 
and she also points to parties operating in the newly formed states of the region which prioritise nationalism.  
Milada Vachudova, Centre-Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe, Party Politics, vol. 
14, no. 4, 2008, pp. 387 – 405. 
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common theme as is a belief in liberal democracy and other ‘Western’ values evidenced 
through support for EU membership and often NATO.  
Some studies have explored the links between party family and organisational form. 
Kopecky suggests that successor parties on the left in post-Communist states are more 
likely than parties on the right to develop mass membership bases.28  Hanley’s study of the 
Czech centre-right does not contradict this view but indicates that the success of the Civic 
Democrats is in part due to its strong and committed activist base and professional 
organisation.29  Enyedi, examining the Hungarian case, sees centre-right parties there 
operating with slimmer organisational structures, individualised leadership and elevation of 
the ‘party in public office’.30 
The main focus of comparative work dealing with parties on the centre-right has been on 
Europe’s Christian Democratic parties.  Van Hecke and Gerard, for example, take as their 
theme the trend of electoral defeats for a number of large, established and traditionally 
centrist Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe in the 1990s.  They assert that the 
end of Communism was followed by the growth in significance of European issues and 
migration, pressuring Christian Democrats to respond to neo-liberal economic ideas on the 
one hand and far-right nationalists on the other.31  Frank Wilson also explores the 
challenges facing the centre-right at the end of the 20th Century and focuses in particular on 
the impact of the breakdown in class voting.32  These factors may well shed some light on 
the general challenges facing the centre-right in Central and Eastern Europe but they barely 
help to explain why centre-right parties have remained the non-socialist alternative of 
choice for so many voters in the region.  And nor do they immediately answer why some 
parties have been more successful than others. 
Milada Vachudova locates the development trajectories of the region's right wing parties in 
legacy explanations.  She sees the key variable as the presence or absence of an opposition 
                                                            
28Petr Kopecky, Developing Party Organisations.  
29Sean Hanley, New Right. 
30Zsolt Enyedi, Searching for the Right Organization: Ideology and Party Structure in East-Central Europe, 
Party Politics 2008 14: 455-477. 
31Steven van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (eds), Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the end of the 
Cold War, Leuven University Press, 2004. 
32Frank Wilson, The European Centre-Right at the end of the Twentieth Century, MacMillan, 1998. 
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to the former regimes in the years prior to their collapse since dominant moderate right 
wing parties in the region all emerged from pre-1989 opposition movements.  Vachudova's 
argument is important for two reasons - firstly because it challenges established theories 
that only Communist successor parties inherited useable political histories; secondly 
because, as a by-product of her main argument, she constructs a thesis which accounts in 
part for the success of the Romanian Social Democrats by virtue of their ability to capture a 
conservative political narrative.33 
An alternative approach is offered by Szczerbiak and Hanley.  Szczerbiak and Hanley’s 
collection utilises four country-based case studies in an attempt to explore these issues from 
new angles.  In particular, their work emphasises the role of elite decision making within 
parties and responses to critical political junctures in preference to historical-structural 
approaches.  Paul Lewis summaries the approach as, “direct[ing] attention to the emergence 
of the post-communist countries as a prime arena of political activity – and thus as a sphere 
of behaviour subject to major uncertainties and the influence of human volition.”34   Ucen 
utilises Szczerbiak and Hanley’s theoretical framework to suggest three clusters of reasons 
for a succession of centre-right defeats across Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st 
Century:  the political costs of governing and introducing unpopular reforms; party 
organisational weaknesses; and poor communications and electoral strategies.35   
1.4  Romanian Exceptionalism 
The devastating impact of Ceausescu’s eccentric regime attracted the attention of a number 
of Western analysts prior to 1989 and its uniquely violent ending sparked a surge of further 
interest.  Communist Romania was widely viewed as among the least free and most 
economically backward states in the region, the ruling party compensating for its lack of 
policy successes by procuring the imagery of national chauvinism to maintain its political 
legitimacy.  Classic studies of Romania’s society which emphasised these themes were 
                                                            
33Milada Vachudova, Integration, Security and Immigration:  The European Agendas of Eastern Europe’s 
Right Wing Parties, Council of European Studies Paper, Chicago, March 2002. 
34Paul Lewis in Szczerbiak and Hanley, page 147 
35Peter Ucen in Ucen and Surotchak (eds), page 16 
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produced by Katherine Verdery and Michael Shafir and these approaches have retained a 
significant influence over perceptions of the country’s subsequent political development.36  
The collapse of the Communist regime in Romania provided some of the most dramatic 
images of a dramatic year as seemingly entrenched ruling parties fell from power across 
Central & Eastern Europe in 1989.  The –literal – flight of President Nicolae Ceausescu 
from the roof of the Communist Party Central Committee building in Bucharest marked the 
end of a repressive and highly personalised regime.  The overthrow of Ceausescu and the 
events that followed have generated a tremendous volume of literature in both English and 
Romanian.37  These works have varied considerably in perspective and quality and include 
eye-witness accounts by participants, near-contemporary analysis from journalists and more 
considered academic studies.38 The leading actors in the revolution have published their 
own accounts.  A parliamentary enquiry was heavily influenced by partisan concerns and 
resulted in official and dissenting reports.39  Journalists published contemporary accounts 
and academics more learned analyses, although both of these latter genres share an 
unfortunate tendency to place too great an emphasis on rumour and unsubstantiated 
interpretations from the narrow perspective of individual participants.  Among the most 
thorough and dispassionate studies of the fall of Ceausescu is Peter Siani-Davies’ work 
which provides this study with valuable analysis of the genesis of post-Communist 
Romanian politics.40  
Post-Communist Romania saw the development of a party system unlike a number of its 
neighbours in the north and west of the region in that the left endured as the dominant force 
                                                            
36Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's 
Romania. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991 and Michael Shafir Romania:  Politics, Economics 
& Society, Frances Pinter, London, 1985. 
37Examples of works exploring the nature of revolution include: Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled 
Revolution, Praeger, New York, 1991; Ruxandra Cesereanu, Decembrie ’89, Polirom, Bucharest, 2004; 
Andrei Codrescu, The Hole in the Flag, Wiliam Morrow, New York, 1991.  Ratesh was head of Radio Free 
Europe’s Romanian service; Cesereanu is an academic based in Cluj whose work focuses on the cultural 
impact of Communism in Romania; Codrescu is a journalist and author who returned to Romania from the 
United States in December 1989 to report on and participate in the revolution. 
38Romanian politics has attracted the attention of scholars from other European states – notably France and 
Germany – but on the whole this study does not cover sources in languages other than English and Romanian. 
39The author of the (National Salvation Front) government report, Sergiu Nicolaescu, published his findings 
as Lupta Pentru Putere, Decembrie 1989, Editura All, Bucharest. 
40Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, Cornell University Press, 2005. 
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throughout the first decade and a half of democracy.  The principal opposition to the left 
was provided by an effective centre right in three of the first five General Elections but 
numerous alternative competition structures could have developed.  The split between 
President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman in 1991 at a time when the centre-
right was divided and weak could have resulted in a left-left competition pattern, especially 
given the collectivist impulses consistently demonstrated by Romanian citizens.  Much has 
been made of the salience of nationalist appeals in Romanian politics and with the 
nationalist right securing second place in the 2000 elections, a left-far right structure could 
also have endured.41  As happened elsewhere in the region, the founding election of the 
democratic Romanian state saw the election of numerous small parties to parliament and a 
fractured opposition structure could have developed.  Similarly, the fourth option often 
referred to as the Mexican model, could have seen the left entrench itself into a monolithic 
position devoid of effective opposition.42  The range of these possible options and the lack 
of stability in Romania’s party system illustrate some of the challenges faced in 
establishing a typology for party systems in new democracies. 
Assessment of democratic development and the emergence of parties and party competition 
in Romania has tended to draw heavily on the significance of the country’s Communist 
legacy.43  Linz and Stepan classify the Ceausescu regime as Sultanistic and they trace 
forward a heavy influence into a post-Communist political structure which is personality-
focused with weak parties.  Ceausescu’s regime suffocated civic society and internal 
opposition, easing the path of Iliescu to power since there were no alternative opposition 
structures and the Front leadership came to embody the ‘anti-Sultan’ image which endured 
for a substantial period beyond the immediate post-revolution period.44  Wagner 
acknowledges this classification and points out that post-Communist political development 
                                                            
41See the various works of Tom Gallagher in particular for an exploration of the strengths of the far right in 
Romania (cited below). 
42See Mary Fischer in Daniel Nelson, Romania After Tyranny, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, page 52. 
43As have studies of broader socio-political developments.  See for example Badescu & Sum’s study of 
Communist and pre-Communist legacies and their influence on the development of civil society in Romania.  
Gabriel Badescu and Paul Sum, Historical Legacies, Social Capital and Civil Society: Comparing Romania 
on a Regional Level, Europe-Asia Studies, 57/1, Jan 2005. 
44Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1996. 
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has tended to ‘revolve around the marshalling of the legacies of the past.’45  Richard Hall 
identifies a common political culture across ideologies which originates in the Communist 
era with low levels of civic participation, a lack of long-term partisan commitment and 
strong anti-incumbency feelings derived from a tendency to blame those in power.46 
Mungiu-Pippidi locates the continuation of Communist successor formations in power after 
the downfall of Ceausescu in three sets of causes:  historical factors resulted in a lack of an 
urban left tradition (leading the Communists to adopt more parochial appeals) and the 
absence of an organised resistance to Ceausescu; the nature of the transition led to the 
ascension of ex-Communists to leadership of the revolutionary National Salvation Front; 
and structural causes resulted in a highly centralised post-Communist system and strong 
public support for collectivism and strong leadership.47 
Tismaneanu, too, traces the legacy of Ceausescuism in Romania’s political exceptionalism, 
creating: “…a lingering climate of distrust, deception and fear…prolonging authoritarian 
patterns of leadership and domination exerted by the ruling elite.”48 
The theme of Romania’s exceptionalism is sustained in much of the comparative analysis 
of post-Communist development in the region.  Neighbours to the north and west saw 
broad-based opposition movements win founding elections in the new democracies with 
former Communists banished to the electoral margins, democratic institutions were 
entrenched and the construction of civil society and a market economy began.  In Romania, 
by contrast, democratic transition came late with a popular uprising spreading from 
Timisoara to Bucharest and beyond at the very end of the year of revolutions.  Remarkably, 
the Communists appeared to retain control of the state by acquiring leadership of the 
revolution and winning the first two democratic polls.  Democratisation faltered as 
opposition forces were subject to violent attacks in the early post-Ceausescu years, and 
economic change, too, was chronically slow.  Tismaneanu, again, locates the reasons for 
the opposition’s weakness in the absence of any preceding dissent: 
                                                            
45F. Peter Wagner in Henry Carey (ed), Romania Since 1989, Lexington, Lanham, 2004, page 49 
46Richard Hall in Henry Carey, pp. 215 - 228 
47Alina Mungiu-Pippidi in Bozoki and Ishiyama (eds), pp. 188 - 205 
48Vladimir Tismaneanu in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds), Politics, Power and the Struggle for 
Democracy in South East Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
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Immediately after the 1989 revolution, unlike post-Leninist Hungary and Poland, 
Romania had no enlightened, reform-oriented faction within the party elite to 
negotiate a transition.  [The Party] had no collective leadership, no inner party life 
and no genuine feedback from lower to higher echelons.49 
Grzymala-Busse characterises Romanian politics as only partly reformed.  She suggests 
that the less complete the break with the old regime, the less the successor party has to 
reform and weak opposition parties are likely to follow.50  In a similar vein, Kitschelt has 
suggested that the more repressive the out-going Communist regime, the greater the 
durability of the successor parties (which implies a knock-on effect on the strength of 
opposition parties).51  As already mentioned, Vachudova has also formulated a typology for 
right wing parties drawing on regime legacy factors.   
1.5  The Democratic Convention as a case-study 
Given the breadth of assumptions that Romania is an exceptional case within the region, 
why does the Democratic Convention represent a credible case-study?   
Its nearest direct comparator would appear to be Solidarity Electoral Action which also 
failed in its efforts to build enduring organisational structure to dominate the centre-right 
political space in Poland. The fate of the Convention contrasts with that of FIDESZ in 
Hungary and the Civic Democrats in the Czech Republic which, thus far at least, appear to 
have established stable organisational structures and to have established a dominant 
position on the centre-right. It has less in common with the broad ‘movement parties’ such 
as Civic Forum (the Czech Republic) and the Union of Democratic Forces (Bulgaria) since 
it was not born directly out of popular protests against the Communist regime in 1989. 
Rather it was deliberately created at a later date as an alliance by existing party elites as a 
means of countering perceived electoral weakness compared to the left. Like Solidarity 
Electoral Action it was brought together by non-party actors (the Solidarity Trades Union 
in the Polish case, the democracy and human rights campaign group the Civic Alliance in 
                                                            
49Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for all Seasons, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, page 233. 
50Anna Grzymala-Busse, pp. 19 - 68 
51Herbert Kitschelt, Formation of Party Systems 
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the case of the Democratic Convention). But, inductively, it would appear that the 
Convention should not have suffered the same internal political tensions as Solidarity 
Electoral Action because of the need in the latter organisation to meld the demands of a 
trades union with liberal market-oriented reformers: it is to be expected that its greater 
ideological cohesion would have made it a more united and enduring structure.  
As a case study the Convention also contrasts with the (apparently successful) strategic 
approaches adopted by FIDESZ and the Civic Democrats: the Convention opted for 
collaboration rather than competition among centre-right formations. Does the fate of the 
Convention suggest that competition between centre-right parties is more likely to lead to 
the dominance of one stable formation while collaboration weakens the centre-right’s 
ability to cohere in the medium term? It is for these reasons that the Democratic 
Convention makes a distinctive and instructive case study among the centre-right 
formations of the CEE region.    
The Convention was formed following the overwhelming victory of the Communist-
successor National Salvation Front in the parliamentary elections of May 1990 and the 
election of the Front’s candidate – Ion Iliescu – as state president.  It initially provided a 
vehicle for liberal, Christian Democratic, social democratic and ethnic Hungarian 
opponents of the post Communist left and contested the elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 
before dissolving in the wake of catastrophic defeat.52  It was the main challenger to the left 
in Romania from its inception until the National Liberals broke away to contest the 2000 
elections alone.  Formed as an electoral alliance it experienced the challenges associated 
with bringing together existing parties and formations into a single vehicle and although 
merger into a single party was occasionally contemplated it remained a coalition throughout 
its existence.  It experienced victory and defeat in national elections and although there was 
internal tension (which ultimately proved highly significant) between advocates of different 
political strategies, there is no doubt that the main protagonists shared a common view of 
the Convention’s prime objective – to be a formation that was sufficiently broad to achieve 
                                                            
52The combination of parties making up the Convention varied over time.  The composition and 
organisational structure of the Convention is explored in detail in chapters 2 and 5. 
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electoral success at national level. As such it provides a convenient, time limited, case 
study of the development dynamics of a centre-right formation. 
The limited number of works which examine the failure of the Convention have tended to 
focus on the proximate causes of the collapse of the formation, particularly its performance 
in government from 1996 to 2000.  Michael Shafir, for example, suggests four explanations 
for the collapse of support for the Convention: that it promised too much to too many; that 
its economic performance was disastrous; that it was the victim of a fluctuating protest 
vote; and that the far-right Greater Romania Party became ideologically more attractive 
because of a growing idolisation of pre-war nationalist leaders.53  Within this relatively 
small body of work there has been almost no attempt to examine the reasons for and the 
effects of the Convention’s choice of organisational structure.  Pavel and Huiu describe the 
Convention’s internal structures in some detail but theirs is a largely narrative account 
aimed in the main at determining whether the Convention existed in a ‘real’ or a ‘virtual’ 
form outside of elections and whether it ceased to exist at all in any meaningful sense after 
the 1996 election victory.54  Roper offers a study of the views of local party leaders 
regarding the performance and future development of the Convention but it does not seek to 
place its findings in a broader context.55  Lazaroiu’s contribution identifies a number of 
possible explanations for the Convention’s defeat in the 2000 elections, but it does not 
explore why the Convention’s organisational structure was unable to cope with the strains 
of governing.56  The journal Sfera Politicii has published a number of insightful articles, 
particularly focusing on aspects of the formation’s collapse but these are generally (well 
informed) opinion pieces rather than derived from systematic research.57 
                                                            
53Michael Shafir, The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 elections in Romania, Romanian Journal of 
Society and Politics, 1/2, November 2001. 
54Dan Pavel and Iulia Huiu, Nu Putem Reusi Decat Impreuna, Polirom, Bucharest, 2003, particularly Chapter 
six. 
55Steven Roper, From opposition to government coalition:  unity and fragmentation in the Democratic 
Convention of Romania, East European Quarterly 31/4, January 1998.  The study’s findings are somewhat 
undermined by the refusal of the National Peasant Party to co-operate, resulting in the Convention’s leading 
party being excluded from the survey.  
56Sebastian Lazaroiu authored the Romanian case study in Ucen and Surochak, Why We Lost. 
57See in particular Sfera Politicii 87/88, their special edition dealing with the 2000 elections, published by 
FSC, Bucharest, 2001. 
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The proximate cause of collapse – the Convention’s dramatic loss of popular support in the 
late 1990’s – is clearly an important part of the formation’s story.  Political capital is 
difficult to acquire and is easily degraded and participation in coalition government is 
potentially very expensive.58  A party will be obliged to make concessions on policy and 
the allocation of resources (such as ministerial posts) to partners (potentially undermining 
the support of a party’s electoral constituency, sponsor organisations and activists who are 
motivated by policy concerns and elites motivated by acquisition of office).  It may also 
suffer from its participation in unpopular policy decisions and difficult coalition 
management issues that are only partially under its control.  However, participation in 
government is not itself a direct cause of party failure – even in a regional context, 
numerous parties have survived the experience of governing.  Rather it is a derivative factor 
with permanent damage arising from more fundamental issues.  This research aims to 
identify the underlying weaknesses faced by the Democratic Convention which resulted in 
it suffering such a spectacular haemorrhage of political capital in the period. From this it 
will draw broader conclusions about the causes of party development and failure in the 
arena of post-Communist politics. 
1.6 Defining success and failure 
To determine the success – or failure - of a party or formation it is also necessary to define 
the criteria by which this assessment can be made, although this is not always done 
clearly.59  In this case (a study of organisational failure), the measure used is essentially an 
absence of success. Success for a political formation being defined in the terms used by 
Szczerbiak and Hanley: where a formation achieves dominance of its electoral constituency 
and maintains that dominance over a substantial period of time. The Democratic 
Convention failed in these terms as can be seen in Table 1 below. It survived to contest just 
three national elections, failing to win parliamentary representation at the third. It was 
dominant among the centre-right parties in both 1992 and 1996 but never won more than 
                                                            
58See Kaare Strom, Wolfgang Muller and Torbjorn Bergman, Rulers, Rules and Coalitions, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008. 
59In her study of Communist-successor parties, Grzymala-Busse (cited above), for example, does not define 
the criteria of success that she uses, instead taking it as given that the Polish and Hungarian parties were 
successful and the Czech and Slovak parties were not.  
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half of the broader ‘democratic opposition’ vote (votes won by all the centrist, pro-
democratic parties that opposed Iliescu’s Social Democrats) which was its natural political 
space. 
Table 1:60  Democratic Convention and centre-right vote (%) in Parliamentary 
(Chamber of Deputies) elections  
 1992 1996 2000 
Democratic Convention* 20.0 30.2 5.0 
Total ‘centre-right’# 27.0 35.0 12.3 
Total ‘democratic opposition’+ 44.6 52.2 31.9 
Total opposition** 62.3 78.5 63.4 
* As Democratic Convention 2000 in the 2000 elections 
# All national, centre-right formations (eg, does not include micro parties and ethnic minority formations) 
+ Centrist and centre-right formations (excluding micro parties) 
** Votes cast for all parties other than the Social Democrats (ie including the far left and the far right, 
independents and regional and ethnic parties.) 
Classic examinations of party organisational forms tend to be rooted in the era of mass 
parties that followed the onset of mass democracy in Western Europe and North America.61  
Changes over time in established democracies and the appearance of new democracies have 
led to challenge and re-assessment of some of the basic assumptions of these classic works.  
Katz and Mair, for example, suggest the passing away of the mass party  as links between 
parties and civil society, as well as membership and participation decline.62    Yet, parties 
remain an integral element of liberal democracies.  Even in post-Communist Europe where 
some leaders of the mass popular movements that brought down Communist regimes flirted 
with a ‘post-party’ politics, party systems rapidly established themselves as the standard.63  
Furthermore, they did so with relatively low levels of party membership from the outset 
and without the benefit of institutionalised resilience that has seen parties in Western 
                                                            
60Details of election results are taken from Essex University’s election result archive: 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc . 
61See for example, Robert Michels, ibid and Mosei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the organization of political 
parties, New Brunswick, 1982 (first published 1902). 
62Richard Katz and Peter Mair, Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy, Party Politics, 
1995, vol 1, number 1, pp. 5-28, Sage, London. 
63See Sean Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe, Routledge, Abingdon, 2008, particularly Chapter 4 for 
a description of how initial ‘anti-party’ sentiments in the Czech Civic Forum were rapidly overtaken by 
events. 
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Europe survive the erosion of their traditional bases of support.64  This lack of grounding in 
society may well have contributed to the volatility of party systems in the first post-
Communist decades but, despite this, some formations on both the left and the right 
throughout the region have stabilised to create sustained patterns of party competition.  
Indeed, some formations appear to have opted for an organisational strategy that 
deliberately eschewed the creation of a mass membership – an approach not limited to  
parties in Central and Eastern Europe, as studies of Italy’s Forza Italia show.65 
The search for the role of organisational factors in explaining individual party success and 
failure has been further clouded because authors have focused largely on the impact of 
organisation on party systems rather than how individual formations organise themselves 
within party systems (and the impact this might have on their performance).  Thus the 
familiar ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ party models apply to groups of parties and carry the 
assumption that these offer new ‘ideal types’ that parties trend towards because of 
competitive pressures or social trends in the environment within which they operate.   
Panebianco’s model, mentioned above, suggest parties can marshal the resources at their 
disposal to maximise their opportunities and he suggests that dominant elites push parties 
towards organisational stability in order to consolidate their position.66  But why do some 
formations opt for apparently sub-optimal organisational forms?67  After all, electoral logic 
                                                            
64It should be noted that one study of Romanian parties since 2000 shows an against-the-trend level of party 
membership growth which is most probably explained by the role of rent-seeking in membership recruitment.  
See unpublished conference paper by Alexandra Ionascu and Sorina Soare, Cultivating Large Membership 
Rolls, the Romanian Case, September 2008, Free University of Brussels.  Spirova also identifies what she 
calls a ‘higher level of organisational development’ among Bulgarian parties – a trait she attributes to the 
influence of the Bulgarian Socialist Party in shaping the behaviour of its competitors and to the significance 
of local elections in the system which prompts local elites to recruit and organise to create local power bases.  
Maria Spirova, Political Parties in Bulgaria, Party Politics, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2005, pp 601 – 622.  
65See Caterina Paolucci, From Democrazia Cristiana to Forza Italia and the Popolo della Liberta: Partizan 
change in Italy, Modern Italy, Vol. 13, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 465-480.  Paolucci describes a process 
whereby the party leadership at the centre sought to reduce the influence of local supporters ‘clubs’ in order to 
reduce the risk of factionalism, a move which contributed to a 40% drop in party membership between 2001 
and 2006. 
66Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties, Organisation and Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1988, esp. Chapter 3. 
67Kay Lawson has suggested that political scientists’ preference for examining party systems rather than 
individual parties derives from their greater visibility, their fit with methodological habits and motivations of 
academics in the field.  Kay Lawson, Political Parties Inside and Out, Comparative Politics, 1990. 
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might suggest all formations would move towards consolidated structures that provide the 
most efficient means of achieving their goals: 
Economic accounts of party formation and development hold that the logic of the 
electoral market means that unconsolidated and proto-parties will converge on the 
equilibrium of institutionalised parties.  Parties are held to seek votes as a means to 
gaining office, and will adopt the organisational form that best suits this goal.  
According to an evolutionary conception, no less influential for usually being 
implicit, parties should learn from their mistakes, combine and institutionalise or be 
eliminated from the system… Yet parties often seem to be unwilling or unable to 
anticipate and learn…68 
Political formations are dynamic, multi-faceted entities which can adapt over time in 
response to changing internal pressures and the external political environment.  As such, 
they can be seen, to an extent, as masters of their own fate.  Enduring success for a party 
has been characterised as institutionalisation – where actors engage in a process of ‘goal 
substitution’: the subordination of individuals’ or groups’ direct objectives in favour of 
achieving the intermediate goal of success for the party in the expectation that the 
achievement of their principal aims will only be deferred.69  Hopkin views an organisation 
as providing a means to an end while an institution operates as an end in itself:  
“...institutionalisation involves an organisation generating emotional attachments and 
loyalties which sustain it in the face of threats to its existence.”70  The success or failure of 
the Democratic Convention can be measured in the same terms. 
Downs offered the classic formulation of parties pursuing control of resources within a 
rational choice framework.71  Muller and Strom further defined the objectives of parties as 
pursuing strategies aimed at office seeking, policy seeking and vote seeking.72 Panebianco 
has criticised the assumptions underlying these approaches by questioning whether parties 
                                                            
68Jason Sharman and Robert Phillips, An internalist perspective on party consolidation and the Bulgarian 
Union of Democratic Forces, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, 2004, pp. 397 – 420. 
69Robert Michels, Political Parties, Crowell-Collier, 1962. 
70Hopkin, page 12 
71Anthony Downs, An Economic Model of Democracy, Harper, New York, 1965. 
72Wolfgang Muller and Kaare Strom, Policy, Office, Votes?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 
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behave as rational organisations in pursuit of specific goals.73  He points to parties in the 
West European context such as the French Communist Party which appeared to make 
conscious strategic choices which lead to the party being permanently in opposition.  The 
real aims of a party are various and difficult to determine and may be disguised in the sense 
that stated aims may differ from the operational objectives pursued by party leaders. Muller 
and Strom also acknowledge many of the difficulties associated with essentially static 
models of party behaviour - the potential for a hierarchy of goals, the need for compromise 
between competing objectives and the underlying assumption that parties are unitary actors 
when they are clearly complex organisations experiencing internal competition over goals.   
The main actors on the centre-right in Romania shared a broad goal of becoming the 
leading player in national government and this makes it possible to apply the success 
criteria adopted by Szczerbiak, Hanley and others to define a mechanism for assessing the 
Convention’s performance.  Their approach does not directly draw upon the literature 
relating to institutionalisation but its assumptions are, to an extent, implicit in their 
operationalisation of success (and by extension failure).  They reject policy implementation 
as a measure of success for being too prone to external influences.  Instead they opt for two 
essentially intermediate or instrumental goals:  the durability of a political formation and its 
ability to maximise its vote within its constituency.74  Such a methodology has the benefit 
of measuring tangible outcomes – the proportion of the centre-right vote captured by a 
particular formation and the number of elections it fights as a viable formation and the 
trajectory of its popular support over time.  It also acknowledges the potential loss in 
political assets that would result from, for example, a siloed formation as currently exists on 
the right in Poland, or through the rapid decline of a dominant formation and its 
replacement by new forces operating in a similar space.75  In other words, durability and 
‘constituency dominance’ allow us to measure both short-term electoral success and longer 
term institutionalisation and it is this measure of party success which is used throughout 
                                                            
73Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties, Organisation and Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1988. 
74Sean Hanley, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton and Brigid Fowler, Sticking Together: Explaining 
Comparative Centre-Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, Party Politics, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, July 2008, pp407 - 434  
75As happened in Romania, for example, following the collapse of the Convention and the subsequent 
creation of the Truth and Justice Alliance between the Democratic Party and the National Liberals 
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this thesis.  The performance of the Convention, judged in these terms, is set out in Table 1 
which clearly demonstrates a pattern of growth both of its electoral support and within its 
own constituency, followed by dramatic collapse. 
The Democratic Convention failed to do what FIDESZ did in Hungary and what the Civic 
Democrats did in the Czech Republic. It was successful in creating a broad centre-right 
formation for a short time but it was not durable. So the failure of the Democratic 
Convention arises from its inability to evolve into an organisation that provides an enduring 
and stable base for centre-right elites from which to compete for power.  
As will be shown in chapter 2, the collapse of the Convention led to large parts of the 
centre-right political elite to be cast out of parliament in the short term. Few of the same 
actors returned as serious political ‘players’ at a later date. The National Liberal Party 
retained its presence in parliament (contesting the 2000 elections outside of the 
Convention) but the other main consequence of the 2000 election was that it created the 
opportunity for the Democrat Party to colonise the centre-right space vacated by the 
National Peasants. They entered an electoral alliance with the National Liberals for the 
2004 elections but they had engineered a dominant position within that alliance (thanks 
largely to the victory of their party leader in the presidential elections of 2004). They were 
able to terminate the alliance shortly after the elections and to establish a new formation 
(with some recruits from the National Liberal Party) that became the principal centre-right 
vehicle thereafter. Thus, as  a consequence of the consolidation of the Convention not being 
achieved (the intermediate measure of success), the existing centre-right elite was largely 
replaced by elite actors whose initial political positioning was as reformist members of the 
former Communist bureaucracy and whose attachment to centre-right ideological positions 
was loose.  
The Democratic Convention was, of course, conceived as an electoral alliance and was not 
intended to supercede the existing political parties when it was formed.  This does not 
negate its legitimacy as a subject for study.  The constituent parties within the Convention 
might be viewed as acting like factions within a formal party structure, competing internally 
for policy gains and positions.  But while this may appear superficially to be the case in 
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truth the behaviour of the member parties does not match the behaviour of party factions as 
they have been defined by academics thus far.76  Within the Convention there was policy 
competition over issues relating to the Communist past, with the Civic Alliance pressing 
for more action in this area, and over the policy demands of the ethnic Hungarian 
community.77  Richard Rose, for example, emphasises that parties have an existence 
outside of election time and that factions play a role in furthering policy agendas between 
elections. But Rose under-plays other incentive structures (office seeking and access to 
patronage resources) which appear to be more significant factors in dividing the National 
Liberals from the National Peasants.  Morgenstern asserts that institutional design is crucial 
in maintaining strong factions and that the political elites he studies in Uruguay themselves 
deliberately crafted an electoral system that institutionalised the role of factions in the 
electoral process.78  But Convention party leaders did not follow this route – indeed one of 
the few significant changes they made to the constitutional framework when in office ran 
counter to the preservation of parties-as-factions by raising the electoral threshold for 
electoral alliances to 8% of the vote compared to 5% for unitary parties.  The Convention’s 
leaders could, though, have opted for a different strategy that would have potentially 
created a clearer organisational identity for the Convention and made it the dominant force 
on the centre-right for a longer period.  This study will examine the reasons why these 
choices were not made. 
1.7  Establishing a system of party classification  
Studies of party systems in the newly formed democracies have often stressed the 
differences with the older West European systems since parties established in Central and 
Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism appeared in a different historical and societal 
context.79  Nevertheless, transnational comparison of party families in a post-Communist 
context remains popular and valid.  As well as offering the benefits of a convenient 
framework for analysis, parties themselves have often made conscious efforts to mirror the 
                                                            
76Richard Rose, Parties, factions and tendencies in Britain, Political Studies, volume 12, number 1, 1964, pp. 
33 - 46 
77See chapter five below. 
78Scott Morgenstern, Organised factions and disorganised parties, Party Politics, volume 7, number 2, 2001, 
pp. 235 – 256. 
79See, for example, Kitschelt, Party Systems. 
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patterns of established international formations and this has resulted in an increasingly 
‘westernised’ structure to party competition in the Central and Eastern European region.80  
The significance of establishing a definition for the centre-right is discussed below and the 
following section briefly sets out a methodology for grouping the main Romanian parties 
active during the period of study in to party families.  The aim of doing so is to give context 
to the intra-party competition that existed in Romania in the period studied by showing 
where the Democratic Convention’s electoral competitors from across the political 
spectrum were located.  It also demonstrates that in the first decade after the fall of 
Communism establishing a clear definition of the centre-right is not completely 
straightforward, not least because it was not until the end of the 1990s that parties 
themselves began to use the term regularly to describe their political position. 
Mair and Mudde describe four principle methods of assessing party family: 
sociology/origin; transnational linkeages; policy/ideology; and name, although they suggest 
the best results might be obtained by cross-referencing origin and ideology.81  Use of origin 
has the advantage of fixing a definition in a temporal sense but that also has a clear 
disadvantage in a time of great political flux since parties can relocate on spectrum over 
time.  Ideology has a dual advantage in being both more durable than individual policy 
decisions and more easily assessed in a comparative sense since parties often tend to 
explicitly locate themselves in a wider (ie internationally recognised) ideological 
framework.   The obvious weakness of relying on ideology is the fluidity of ideological 
positioning among parties in the region.  Romania’s Democrat Party, for example, joined 
the centre-right European Peoples Party formation after years as an avowedly social 
democratic party; the Romanian National Unity Party moved towards the centre having 
begun life on the extreme right of Romanian politics.  The examples are not limited to 
Romania – see, for example, the road travelled by Hungary’s Fidesz from left-liberal youth 
party to nationalist conservative party. 
                                                            
80See Attila Agh, The end of the beginning: the partial consolidation of East Central European parties and 
party systems, Papers on Democratic Transition, Budapest 1996, cited in Peter Mair and Cas Mudde (eds), 
The Party Family and its Study, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, 1998, pp. 211 – 229. 
81Mair and Mudde. 
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Use of name is problematic in a post-Communist context.  Parties associated with the 
former regimes were often very keen to throw off any clear connections with the 
Communist Party, while others attempted to establish linkages with pre-Communist 
formations which related only tentatively to their current location.  To an extent the term 
‘party’ itself became contaminated by its association with the former regime.  A link to 
international party families also offers a very partial answer since many parties operate 
outside the established groupings and others move between them at different times. 
A fifth method of classification does suggest itself, that of coalition preferences.  It could 
be argued that, within the context of post-Communist Europe, this is a sub-set of the 
sociology/origin classification since attitudes to potential coalition partners are often 
determined by the parties’ historic position vis a vis the former Communist regime.  
However, this would potentially exclude the significance of coalition choices made by 
newer parties which appear in the spectrum.  In the Romanian context this approach is 
relatively fruitful since attitudes to forming coalitions with the Social Democratic Party 
(and its Communist-successor forebears) offers a relatively consistent dividing line between 
those parties which have only partnered the Social Democrats; those which consistently 
opposed coalition making with the party and instead co-operated with or formed part of the 
Democratic Convention; and those parties which have taken a more pragmatic approach 
and co-operated with both ‘sides’. 
There is also potentially a sixth means of classifying parties – by assessing how voters 
perceive them.  Inevitably such a method of assessment will be influenced by how voters 
see themselves and as such may not maintain consistency over time.82  However, this 
information has not been factored into the classification used here for the more pragmatic 
reason that there is little published data relating to Romania that allows a meaningful 
comparison to be made. 
                                                            
82In the Romanian context Alina Mungiu Pippidi presents some interesting findings based on analysis of exit 
poll data from the 2000 elections.  Unfortunately the data does not help much with this study since it is drawn 
from only one set of elections and that from an election where the Democratic Convention’s electorate had all 
but vanished.  Alina Mungiu Pippidi, Politica Dupa Comunism, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2002, page 110. 
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Published classifications of Romanian parties are relatively scarce.  Stefan offers one such 
where he divides parties between eleven ‘historic party families’ but admits that the 
classification is simply for convenience and is not underpinned by systematic analysis.83  
Bugajski divides Romanian parties into nine camps based on an assessment of their 
ideological and programmatic positions.84  This study follows Mair and Mudde in dividing 
parties first by origin and then by cross referencing with ideological positioning.85  It also 
factors in coalition choices as a further distinguishing element. 
If origin is taken as a starting point for assessing the classification of parties, in the 
Romanian context, as in much of the region, the most relevant origination divide is a 
party’s position in respect of the former Communist regime.    A three-way split is 
generated between those parties committed to defending the virtues of the Communist past 
(‘radical continuity parties’ in Shafir’s typology, Communist Conservatives under 
Vachudova’s definition86); reformists favouring a managed and more gradual transition to 
liberal democracy and a market economy (generally but not exclusively Communist 
successor parties); and the ‘democratic opposition’ demanding the rapid and complete 
overthrow of the outgoing regime and its related political and economic structures.   
A second significant cleavage operating at the foundation of democracy in Romania was 
ethnicity.  In particular this was manifested in the conflict between Romanian nationalists 
and the ethnic Hungarian minority with any attempt by the latter to assert their rights in the 
new political setting being interpreted by Romanian nationalists as moves towards re-
integration of Transylvania into the Hungarian state.  So, when minority and majority 
nationalist classifications are added, a five-way split in relation to origin is created which 
covers most of the significant parties operating in Romania in this period. 
                                                            
83Laurentiu Stefan, Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania, Editura Ziua, 
Bucharest, 2004. 
84Janusz Bugajski, Political Parties of Eastern Europe, M E Sharpe, New York, 2002.  Bugajski’s 
methodology produces a spectrum of eleven party families in the region (of which nine are represented in 
Romania) which is highly delineated on the right but rather compressed on the left. 
85The source for the ideological assessment is the comprehensive descriptions given in Stan Stoica’s 
Dictionarul Partidelor Politice din Romania 1989-2003, Meronica, Bucharest, 2003. 
86Michael Shafir, Greater Romania Party.  Milada Vachudova, Centre-Right Parties. 
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Table 2:   The main political parties in post-Communist Romania (1990-2000) 
categorised by origin, ideology and coalition strategy 
Party Origin Ideology Coalition 
Radical continuity 
Socialist Workers Party 
 
Communist 
successor 
 
Communist 
 
Left 
Democratic Left 
National Salvation  
Front  
Social Democrats  
 
Communist 
successor 
Communist 
successor 
 
National unity 
 
Social Democrat 
 
Left 
 
Left 
Centre right 
National Peasants  
National Liberals 
Civic Alliance Party 
Democratic Convention 
Union of Right Forces 
 
Dem. Opposition 
Dem. Opposition 
Dem. Opposition 
Dem. Opposition 
Ideological 
 
Christ. Democrat 
Liberal 
Social liberal 
Broad centre-right 
Neo-liberal 
 
Convention 
Pragmatic 
Convention 
Convention 
Convention 
Pragmatic Centre 
Democratic Party 
Alliance for Romania 
Democratic Agrarians 
‘Historic’ Soc. Democrats 
Humanists/Conservatives 
 
Reformist  
Reformist  
Reformist 
Reformist 
Personal party 
 
Social Democrat 
Social Liberal 
Agrarian 
Social Democrat 
Social Lib./Cons. 
 
Pragmatic 
- 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic 
Pragmatic 
Majority Nationalist 
Greater Romania Party  
National Unity Party 
 
Maj. nationalist 
Maj. Nationalist 
 
Radical Return 
Nationalist 
 
Left 
Pragmatic 
Minority Nationalist 
Democratic Union  
of Hungarians  
 
Minority 
nationalists 
 
Nationalist 
 
Pragmatic 
Ecologists 
Ecologist formations 
 
Ideological 
 
Ecologist 
 
Convention 
This formulation fails to accommodate two groups of parties whose origination was very 
weakly connected to defined constituencies within society.  The first group is the personal 
or ‘vanity’ parties which have tended to posses very loosely defined ideological positions 
and to exist primarily as vehicles to promote a prominent individual such as the Humanist 
Party.  The second group is the ecologist parties and movements.  All of these formations 
have tended to operate as ‘boutique’ parties with limited electoral appeal, depending for 
continued influence either on co-operation through electoral alliances, or ultimately on 
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merger with larger formations.  Factoring in coalition preference87 and ideology gives rise 
to a seven-way grouping of parties into families set out above in Table 2.88   
The ideological description has not been arrived at in a systematic way. Rather it is drawn 
from a number of sources (self-reference by actors, indications in the media and in 
secondary sources such as dictionaries of parties and other works of political analysis).  The 
classifications used here would not be contentious among politicians and commentators in 
Romania although more rigorous assessment of, for example, manifesto content and 
decisions in government might be less clear-cut.  The seven groupings can be conveniently 
labelled with recognised titles: ‘radical continuity’ covering the unreformed Communist 
successor parties; ‘democratic left’ covering the parties led or influenced by President Ion 
Iliescu; ‘centre-right’ being the principal formations involved in the Democratic 
Convention; the ‘pragmatic centre’ which are parties with flexible ideological stand-points 
which have either originated on the left but coalesced with the centre right (as in the case of 
the ‘historic’ Social Democrats or  the Democrat Party) or formed alliances on both sides of 
the left-right divide; the ‘nationalist right’; ‘minority nationalists’; and the ‘ecologists’.89 
1.8  Thesis structure 
This study seeks to test the applicability of the key explanatory variables offered by 
Szczerbiak and Hanley for the success or failure of centre right parties via three 
propositions linked directly to their model.   
The dependent variable is the creation of a successful centre-right party-type formation and 
the independent variables are the crafting of an integrative narrative; the creation of a 
unified organisational structure; and elite cohesion.  So the three propositions are: 
                                                            
87As mentioned above, a three-way division relating to attitudes towards coalescing with the post-Communist 
left is significant here. 
88Appendix one provides a fuller summary of the main political parties that were active in Romania during the 
period studied but which fall outside the direct scope of this study (ie. those outside the Convention). 
89 Inevitably there is scope for alternative classifications, particularly of parties in the centre of the spectrum.  
The historic Social Democratic Party might properly be categorised as part of the democratic left since it 
consistently maintained a social democratic stance and eventually merged with its larger namesake.  The 
Democrats, too, adhered to a social democratic ideology until recently.  The National Liberals have co-
operated with Social Democratic governments and allied with the ‘post-Socialist’ Democrats.  But each of 
these parties positioned themselves at their origin in opposition to the Iliescu-led National Salvation Front, 
and I have taken this as the primary defining factor. 
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• That the fusion of nationalist, pro-democracy and pro-market philosophies 
into a broad integrative narrative is a necessary condition for the success of a 
centre right party.  
 
• That a unified structure will present higher barriers to exit for elite actors and 
thus will be more likely to succeed than an electoral coalition. In the 
Romanian context it is expected that the involvement of non-party formations 
in the Democratic Convention would weaken its organisational coherence (by 
diversifying its objectives and incentive structures. It is also anticipated that 
the ‘flat’ organisational structure which evened out power among the various 
members would reduce its ability to cohere around a single point. And the 
elite-centred nature of the organisation is also expected to weaken the 
organisation’s ability to endure and broaden its appeal as constituent entities 
lacked the incentives to substitute their own goals for those of the Convention. 
 
• That the legacies of the Communist era and the immediate transition from 
Communism would influence the development of the centre-right in Romania 
by weakening its ability to connect with a broad electoral base but that the 
scale of this influence would decline rapidly over time as elite actors adapted 
to the new political environment. 
Chapter two of this thesis continues the introductory framework of the study by describing 
the history of the Democratic Convention and places this into the context of what came 
next in terms of the Romanian centre-right. The aim is to show how the Convention 
evolved, to identify the key points in its development and to show how its performance is 
set into a longer view of centre-right development. 
Chapter three provides a summary of the historical developments that have shaped 
Romania’s politics.  It goes on to assess the events which led to the initial shaping of 
Romania’s post-Communist party system - the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime and its 
immediate aftermath.  It attempts to determine the factors which led to the development of 
highly polarised attitudes to the National Salvation Front, the affect this had on the strategic 
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decision making by the leaders of the opposition and the influence on their approach to the 
crafting of an ideology.  In doing so the chapter addresses to some extent the claims made 
for theories based on the importance of Communist regime legacies.  And it posits an 
alternative suggestion for the Romanian case – that the period immediately following the 
1989 revolution is a critical period which shapes the subsequent development of politics in 
Romania throughout the following decade to a greater extent than legacy factors. 
Chapter four examines the elites that made up the Convention and the tensions that existed 
between them in the context of those legacy factors. Enyedi in his study of party system 
consolidation in Hungary, claims that elites have the ability to shape the political landscape.  
He points to the differing social locations of elite groups at the formation of movements 
opposed to the Communist regime.  These differences result in cultural/political cleavages 
– particularly in respect of attitudes to the former regime and to the nation - retaining a 
greater significance among elites than among the electorate and those divisions are then 
reinforced by coalition choices.90    Autonomous leadership and the existence of a cleavage 
structure that aided consolidation helped Fidesz leaders to construct a dominant formation 
on the right of Hungarian politics.91  The significant (and destructive) role of party leaders 
in shaping centre-right party structures is also identified by Szczerbiak and, from an earlier 
round of democratisation, by Hopkin.  Their studies of Poland’s Solidarity Electoral Action 
and of Spain’s Union of the Democratic Centre suggest that even where the environment 
appears to be favourable to centre-right dominance, the failure of political leaders to unite 
behind an agenda of consolidation can lead to fracturing and defeat.92 
In a wider context, there has been some effort to study the role and development of factions 
within parties.  Studies of party factions in, for example, Uruguay, Japan, Italy and in 
Eastern Europe have focused on the institutional context in which those factions developed 
                                                            
90Zsolt Enyedi, The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation, European Journal of Political Research, 2005, 
vol. 44, no. 5, 697-720. 
91Zsolt Enyedi, Agency 
92For the Polish case see Aleks Szczerbiak, The Polish Centre-Right's (Last) Best Hope: The Rise and Fall of 
Solidarity Electoral Action, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2004, pp. 
55 – 79.  For the Spanish UCD see Jonathan Hopkin and Caterina Paolucci, The business firm model of party 
organisation, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 35, 1999, pp. 307 - 339 
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and the structural drivers that influence the strength of factions.93  Earlier examinations of 
factions explored their nature and composition – what constitutes a faction and why they 
occur.94 Transfer of the lessons from these studies to the Romanian case (to the case of the 
Democratic Convention in particular) is problematic, though, because studies of, for 
instance, Japan, Britain and the US examine the operation of factions in systems were the 
‘host’ parties are more solidly consolidated than was the case with the Romanian 
Democratic Convention.  They also tend to focus on the nature of and influences on the 
factions themselves rather than exploring the impact of the factions on the development of 
the parties of which they are a part. 
In the case of Romania, the prediction was made that politics – and by extension the 
internal life of parties - would tend towards Sultanism, with dominant individuals 
controlling personal patronage networks.95  The problem for the Democratic Convention, 
despite its being essentially an elite construction as set out in chapter three, was the lack of 
shared objectives among its leadership group.  This in turn cultivated an environment in 
which party-building was not prioritised in a way that might have created a more resilient 
formation.  Instead the elites pursued their own narrower and more attainable objectives at 
the expense of the consolidation of the Convention. 
Chapter five examines the organisational development of the Democratic Convention.   
The search for the role of organisational factors in explaining individual party success and 
failure has been further clouded because authors have focused largely on the impact of 
party organisation on party systems rather than how individual parties organise themselves 
within party systems (and the impact this might have on their performance).  Thus the 
familiar ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ party models apply to groups of parties and carry the 
assumption that these offer new ‘ideal types’ that parties trend towards because of 
                                                            
93Francoise Boucek, The Structure and Dynamics of Intra-Party Politics in Europe, Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society, vol. 3, no. 3 (2002), pp. 454 – 493.  Scott Morgenstern, Organised Factions and 
Disorganised Parties, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 235 – 256.  Kim Betcher, Factions of Interest in Japan 
and Italy, Party Politics, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 339 - 358 
94Richard Rose, Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain, Political Studies (1964), vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 33 – 
46.  Raphael Zariski, Party Factions and Comparative Politics, Midwest Journal of Political Science (1960), 
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 27 - 51 
95See section 1.4 above 
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competitive pressures or social trends in the environment within which they operate.  
Panebianco’s model, referred to above, suggests how parties can marshal the resources at 
their disposal to maximise their opportunities and he suggests that dominant elites push 
parties towards organisational stability in order to consolidate their position.96  But it is 
surprisingly difficult to find further analysis of the internal workings of parties in a form 
that might suggest why some are more organisationally effective than others or why some 
parties (or groups of parties) might be more effective at moving towards optimal 
organisational structures.97  After all, electoral logic would suggest all parties move 
towards consolidated structures that provide the most efficient means of achieving their 
goals: 
al 
d will 
rom the system… Yet parties often 
seem to be unwilling or unable to anticipate and learn98 
r 
its strong and committed activist base and professional organisation.100  Enyedi, examining 
                                                           
Economic accounts of party formation and development hold that the logic of the elector
market means that unconsolidated and proto-parties will converge on the equilibrium of 
institutionalised parties.  Parties are held to seek votes as a means to gaining office, an
adopt the organisational form that best suits this goal.  According to an evolutionary 
conception, no less influential for usually being implicit, parties should learn from their 
mistakes, combine and institutionalise or be eliminated f
Some studies have predicted likely party organisational forms grouped by party family 
rather than within party systems – as mentioned above, Kopecky suggests that successo
parties on the left in post-Communist states are more likely than parties on the right to 
develop mass membership bases.99  Hanley’s study of the Czech centre-right does not 
contradict this view but indicates that the success of the Civic Democrats is in part due to 
 
96Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties, Organisation and Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1988, esp. Chapter 3. 
97Kay Lawson has suggested that political scientists’ preference for examining party systems rather than 
individual parties derives from their greater visibility, their fit with methodological habits and motivations of 
academics in the field.  Kay Lawson, Political Parties Inside and Out, Comparative Politics, 1990. 
98Jason Sharman and Robert Phillips, An internalist perspective on party consolidation and the Bulgarian 
Union of Democratic Forces, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, 2004, pp. 397 – 420. 
99Petr Kopecky, Developing Party Organisations.  
100Sean Hanley, New Right. 
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the Hungarian case, sees centre-right parties there operating with slimmer organisational 
structures, individualised leadership and elevation of the ‘party in public office’.101 
The chapter analyses the decision making processes that underlay the formation of the 
Convention’s organisational structure and the allocation of resources between participants 
together with its leadership choices.  It highlights the weaknesses arising from a failure to 
develop the structures of the Convention in such a way to make it able to withstand the 
pressures of unpopularity in government.  This is manifested in particular through the 
mobility of Convention elites (only half of the National Peasant deputies elected in 1996 
were still affiliated to the party by the end of 2000, for example).  Chapter five looks at 
three key crises that the Convention faced as a way of testing the practical impact of its 
organisational structure and the Convention’s ability to succeed. 
Chapter six assesses the approach of the CDR to the crafting of an ideological position. The 
nature of ideology has attracted surprisingly little academic attention, perhaps because of 
the difficulty in providing a satisfactory definition.  Guido Dierickx describes it as a 
systematised set of opinions and distinguishes ideological principles from policy 
applications in terms of final and intermediary objectives.102  A fully developed ideology 
will, in Dierickx’s view, speak not just to the objectives of political action but contain 
opinions about all the elements of the political decision making process, power and conflict 
(for example the relationship of the state to the individual and the limits on freedom of 
action).  The distinction between longer term political goals and the more transitory nature 
of policy is important as it highlights the difficulty of discerning ideology from quantitative 
analysis of party manifestos and similar approaches.  Dierickx’s formulation does seem, 
though, to underplay the emotional element of ideology – the way in which it operates as a 
form of marker separating political actors whose political goals, both long and short term, 
appear to be largely similar – a factor which adds a further layer of uncertainty to its 
definition of ideology. 
                                                            
101Zsolt Enyedi, Searching for the Right Organization: Ideology and Party Structure in East-Central Europe, 
Party Politics 2008 14: 455-477. 
102Guido Dierickx in David Hanley (ed), Christian Democracy in Europe, A Comparative Perspective, Pinter, 
London, 1996, page 15. 
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The lack of clarity in definition is particularly marked on the right of politics which covers 
a broad spectrum of opinion and which lacks a draftsman in the style of Marx to provide a 
unifying scheme.103  Dierickx divides ideologies between those that are underpinned by 
notions of community (Gemeinschaft) and those that prioritise society (Gesellschaft).  He 
sees nationalism and Christian Democracy as Gemeinschaft ideologies and liberalism and 
socialism as Gesellschaft ideologies that reject the bounds of community in the form of 
Church, village and family and advocate modernisation.  In the new democracies of the 
CEE region, parties and politicians tended to fuse established western ideologies into 
particular national contexts to create distinctive political positions.  Kitschelt points to the 
nature of the preceding Communist regimes as influential in shaping the outlook of the 
post-Communist right, with neo-liberals gaining a dominant position in the Czech 
Republic, ruralist conservatives dominating in Hungary and Poland and radical anti-
Communism being the main feature of the right in Romania and Bulgaria.104  Others, such 
as Chan and Vachudova draw distinctions between the ‘moderate right’ that encompasses 
liberal, Christian Democrat and moderate nationalist platforms; radical nationalists; and 
conservative leftists (unreformed Communists).105  With some exceptions the latter two 
groups have declined in electoral significance within the region over time leaving 
moderates to compete or co-operate in the creation of rightist themes.   
While not entirely dismissing the possibility that the new political environment has 
rendered the traditional notion of the left-right divide as outmoded, Sean Hanley has 
suggested that there are three key identifiable themes to centre-right politics.  Primary 
among those is anti-Communism but they also contain economic liberalisation and broad 
nationalist appeals.106  To these three broad but critical themes, this paper adds three 
secondary elements in its analysis of centre-right ideology in Romania:  religious and moral 
themes; differing attitudes to the nature of democracy; and views on the country’s position 
                                                            
103Indeed, it is inherent in some elements of conservative ideology to specifically reject the validity of such 
codified, all encompassing, ideological structures. 
104Herbert Kitschelt, The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist democracies, Party Politics, vol. 
1, no. 4 (1995). 
105Kenneth Chan, Strands of Conservative Politics in Post-Communist Transition, in Paul Lewis (ed), Political 
Parties in post-Communist Eastern Europe, Frank Cass, London, 2001.  Milada Vachudova, Center-Right Parties. 
106Sean Hanley in Szczerbiak and Hanley, Centre-Right Parties, pp. 17-20 
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in relation to the outside world.  Together, these six elements represent the key 
battlegrounds of politics in Romania since 1989. 
Finally, the thesis concludes by drawing together the evidence from the preceding chapters 
to examine which were the key factors in shaping the progress of the Convention and what 
are the comparative lessons that can be drawn for centre-right parties in the Central and 
Eastern European region.  The principal conclusions reached are: that political leaders on 
the centre-right were influenced by the events immediately following the fall of Ceausescu 
in such a way that they made sub-optimal choices in relation to alliance and coalition 
building and the organisational structure of the Convention which suggests that critical 
events can shape the behaviour of political actors in a way that leads them to make choices 
which do not appear rational; that ideological differences between the Convention members 
were not the cause of the formations failure since, judged systematically, there was little 
ideological difference between the members and the Convention did craft a recognisable 
centre-right identity and that, therefore, ideological unity in itself may not be sufficient to 
produce success for a political formation; that differing operational objectives led initially 
to sub-optimal organisational structures (in particular the spreading of internal power 
evenly within the Convention and the failure to choose a politically experienced leader to 
drive the formation) which suggests that unified structures where power is concentrated 
rather than diffused and where a pragmatic approach to the delivery of policy objectives is 
taken will have a greater chance of success; and that the impact of those conflicting 
operational objectives was reinforced by the conflict between two groups of leaders within 
the formation, one of which had strong partisan loyalty to the ‘historic’ parties and the other 
which felt its legitimacy to be derived from the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 
which further suggests that a unified, politically experienced leadership with clear goals for 
the formation is more likely to succeed in creating a successful political formation. 
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1. 9  Data sources used 
Five main types of primary data source were sought in examining the hypotheses 
proposed.107  These are biographies and other published writings by political leaders active 
at the time; contemporaneous newspaper coverage; interviews; party archives; and election 
and polling data.108  More detail on each of these types of source is provided below but the 
main motivation behind the choice of sources was to obtain as wide as possible a 
perspective on the events that were taking place.   
A number of the main players in the politics of the period have published biographies, 
diaries or ‘conversations’ with commentators (in the main, only in Romanian) and these are 
useful because, while clearly likely to be partial accounts they provide a rich seam of 
information about the key events and the way that those leading actors perceived them – or 
wished them to be perceived.  Published work by Presidents Emil Constantinescu and Ion 
Iliescu, Prime Minister Petre Roman, government ministers Ion Diaconescu, Andrei Marga, 
Ion Ratiu, Valeriu Stoica and Varujan Vosganian, National Peasant Party leader Corneliu 
Coposu and presidential advisor Simon Maria Vrabiescu-Klechner have all been made use 
of here.  While there are obvious dangers in relying published diaries of politicians 
(especially those who are were still active at the time of publication), they nonetheless 
provide useful evidence of viewpoints, interpretations and the details of processes that go 
towards creating a full picture of political developments in the period studied. 
The principal newspaper source used is Romania Libera.  The choice of Romania Libera 
for in-depth study was partly pragmatic – it appeared virtually continuously from the period 
of the revolution onwards and archived copies were accessible via the library of University 
College London.109  The magazine ‘Revista 22’ fulfilled the role of in-house journal for the 
                                                            
107These are in addition to the principal secondary sources.  Chief among the previously published material 
that was used in developing this thesis is the work of Peter Siani-Davies on the revolution and the 1990 
election; Dan Pavel and Iulia Huiu’s history of the Convention; Lavinia Stan’s work on the National Peasants 
and Tom Gallagher’s thorough account of the years from 1996-2000. 
108Throughout the thesis, where titles are given in Romanian in footnotes and the bibliography, the sources 
themselves are written in Romanian and quotations or synopses are the author’s own translation.  Most of the 
interviews were conducted in English but some were conducted in Romanian and translation made either by 
the author or via an interpreter. 
109The complete archive of Romania Libera editions from January 1990 to December 2001 was examined at 
University College London in the process of completing this research. 
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Convention but there is no indication that significant trends in internal debate have been 
missed by concentrating on Romania Libera which occupied a useful political position as a 
critical friend of the Convention and which re-published a number of key articles from 
Revista 22.  The editorial office of Revista 22 was approached to ask if it was possible to 
examine their archive of the magazine but it was not possible to secure a reply.  The two 
obvious dangers in using a single newspaper as a major source are an imbalance in the 
information obtained and the risk of exaggerating its importance.  The newspaper was not 
an unthinking mouthpiece of the centre-right – its tone at the end of 1989, for example, had 
been largely positive towards the Front.  The first Mineriada at the end of January marked a 
turning point, though, and it became more sceptical of the intentions of the new 
government.110  The newspaper was clear in its support for the Democratic Convention in 
the 1992 and 1996 elections, and even in 2000 where it promoted independent presidential 
candidate Mugur Isarescu and the Democratic Convention-2000 alliance over the National 
Liberals.  But this editorial bias does not invalidate its usefulness as a source.  Romania 
Libera became a place where debates about the formation’s approach received extended 
coverage and it carried both regular opinion pieces by commentators and in-depth 
interviews with Convention leaders.  As far as the significance of its role goes, Siani-
Davies offers a compelling analysis of the position of newspapers in the aftermath of the 
revolution.  He acknowledges an inevitable bias towards the capital Bucharest in both 
content and distribution in the earliest period and he points out the much greater influence 
of the state-run television service.  But at the same time, the explosion of titles and 
readership after the revolution created a lively arena for debate, even if it is reasonable to 
be sceptical of some of the wilder claims relating to circulation – including those of 
Romania Libera which claimed to be selling a million copies by mid-January 1990.111  
Background information has also been taken from the Romania Country Reports published 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit for the period.112 
The semi-structured interviews were intended to verify the official and published versions 
of events with the recollections of some of the main political actors from the period.  They 
                                                            
110 See chapter 3 for an explanation of the Mineriada and its significance. 
111 See Siani Davies, Revolution, page 235. 
112 These reports were available to view at the UCL library in London. 
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were also intended to inform a deeper understanding of the research questions explored in 
the thesis by questions shaped around the hypotheses set out above.  The choice of 
interviewees was determined in part by the availability and willingness of interviewees to 
talk to me.  But the intention was also to obtain a cross-section of views from within the 
Democratic Convention (supported by a number of interviewees who could comment as 
outsiders to the Convention.)  The main focus of the interviews was on the leadership elites 
because this matches the focus of the thesis.  Twenty semi-structured interviews were 
completed and while they cannot offer the mathematical rigour of stratified mass surveys, it 
has the utility of being a more practical solution when studying a formation that ceased 
activity almost a decade ago (and of which the bulk of its parliamentary representatives 
were defeated in 2000).  The evidence obtained added significantly to the richness of the 
picture.  The interviews cover the range of formations that were involved in the Convention 
(with the exception of the historic Social Democrats).  Unsuccessful approaches were also 
made to a number of important political leaders, notably Petre Roman (former Prime 
Minister and leader of the Democrat Party), Emil Constantinescu (President and titular 
leader of the Convention), Dudu Ionescu (government minister and some-time leader of the 
National Peasants), Peter Eckstein (government minister and leader of the liberal faction in 
the Hungarian Democratic Union) and Valeriu Stoica (government minister and leader of 
the National Liberals during part of the period studied).  However, these absences are 
compensated for by interviews with, among others, Theodor Stolojan (Prime Minister from 
1991 to 1992 and National Liberal presidential candidate in 2000), Csaba Takacs 
(executive secretary of the Hungarian Democratic Union), former finance ministers Daniel 
Daianu and Varujan Vosganian, leading civil society activists Gabriel Andreescu, Renate 
Weber and Valerian Stan and president Constantinescu’s closest adviser when in office, 
Zoe Petre.113 
Access to party archives was sought with a view to obtaining impartial records of key 
meetings; to examine campaign material and to compare official statutes with actual 
practice.  Unfortunately this proved particularly troublesome, largely because Romanian 
political parties have not developed a culture of maintaining extensive central archives.  
                                                            
113A full list of interviews is set out in Appendix 3. 
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Romania’s universities, too, do not appear to have built archives of party election materials 
or documents.114  Unsuccessful attempts were made to gain access to the official archives 
of the National Liberals and the National Peasant Party and both parties claimed that they 
did not hold records relating to the Convention.115  Details of party organisation, meetings 
of leadership groups, conferences and policy platforms have thus had to be gleaned from 
interviews and newspaper archives instead.  It was also possible to access a small personal 
collection of party material (mainly manifestos) from the period and the Civic Alliance 
maintains an archive section from the period on its website (formation statutes, press 
statements and policy papers) which proved useful.  Limited amounts of archive material of 
this type is also available on the websites of the Hungarian Democratic Union, the Union of 
Right Forces and the Coposu and Ratiu foundations.116 
The main focus of this thesis is on the organisational structure of the Democratic 
Convention and its leadership elites rather than on its electorate.  As such, data relating to 
demographics and voter behaviour are of secondary importance.  Comprehensive election 
data is available on-line, either via Essex University’s excellent and detailed regional 
election results database, or via the official results published by the various Romanian 
Central Election Bureaux.117  Opinion polling was a developing industry through the period 
examined here and records are incomplete.  None of the leading polling organisations holds 
a comprehensive archive of polling results online (and none of those approached responded 
to requests for access to archive records.)  Polling data that is referred to here is thus largely 
taken from those polls that were published intermittently in the media during the period and 
in published secondary accounts. 
 
                                                            
114Approaches were made to the heads of the politics departments at the University of Bucharest, the National 
School of Political Science (SNSPA) and the Rector of Cluj University, all of whom confirmed that their 
institutions did not maintain such archives. 
115Approaches were made to Dan Motreanu, General Secretary of the National Liberal Party and to Virgil 
Petrescu, vice president of the National Peasant Party. 
116Website addresses are given in the bibliography 
117A Central Election Bureau is established for each round of national elections.  Results published by the 
bureaux are available online for 1996 and 2000. 
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Chapter 2: The Convention and beyond - the evolution of the Romanian centre-right 
1991 to 2008 
The aim of this chapter is to set the growth and decline of the Democratic Convention into 
the wider context of the evolution of Romania’s post-Communist centre-right. It does so by 
tracing the electoral performance of the Convention and its successors on the centre-right. 
Published systematic analysis of elections and electorates is extremely scarce for Romania: 
the only substantial studies currently available cover the elections of 2008 and 2009.118 
Reliable and detailed polling data is also largely absent for the 1990s.119 County-level 
voting figures are available, though, which can give some useful indicators to the 
development of the Convention’s electoral base. So too can the small number of academic 
studies which tend to focus on limited areas. 
Political developments in the period prior to the formation of the Convention in 1991 are 
covered in detail in chapter three so this chapter deals with the period from the 
Convention’s formation to the presidential elections of 2009. 
The Democratic Convention was an electoral alliance that was formed as an umbrella for 
the democratic opposition in 1991 and was consigned to history with the spectacular 
electoral defeat of November 2000, after which it ceased to exist.  Its membership was fluid 
and was united by a single factor – opposition to the Communist-successor left 
(specifically, that part led by Ion Iliescu).  Organisationally it appeared to be weak, 
operationally intermittent, unfocused and limited in scope.  It did, though, establish itself as 
the principal force on the centre-right of Romanian politics and win the 1996 elections only 
to collapse four years later.  It was an electoral alliance that was deliberately crafted by 
existing parties some two years after the fall of Communism which marks it out from 
‘movement parties’ such as the Czech Civic Forum which were forged at the time of the 
1989 ‘revolutions’ by those directly involved in the over-throw of Communist regimes. It 
                                                            
118 Gheorghe Teodorescu, Alegeri 2008, Insomar, Bucharest, 2010; Mircea Comsa, Andrei Gheorghita and 
Claudiu Tufis, Alegerile pentru Parlamentul European 2009, Polirom, Bucharest, 2010 
119 Polling companies were contacted about their archives for this study but none responded. Polling data is 
cited intermittently through the 1990s in newspaper articles but its level of analysis tends not to go beyond 
simple voting intentions. Commentators have also regularly questioned the validity of polling companies’ 
methodologies but it is difficult to establish whether those criticisms derive more from partisan political 
motivations than from evidence-based assessments  
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was established explicitly in response to a perceived need for an electoral strategy that 
united opponents of the post-Communist left (in the shape of the National Salvation Front), 
to balance the electoral and organisational dominance of the Front. Ultimately it was not a 
success in the terms set out by Szczerbiak and Hanley: its dominance of the centre-right 
political space was limited to two elections (1992 and 1996) and rather than evolve into a 
stable and enduring formation it broke up after its election defeat in 2000 to be succeeded 
by new formations which occupied the centre-right political space.  
Table 3: Selected Romanian election results, 1990 - 2009120 
  1990* 1992 1996 2000 2004 2007 2008 2009 
CDR+  20.0 30.2 5.0     
PNT 2.6    1.9 1.4   
PNL 6.4 2.6  6.9  13.4 19.5 20.0 
Dem  10.2 12.9 7.0  28.8 32.4 32.4 
ADA     31.5    
PSD/FSN 66.3 27.7 21.5 36.6 36.8 23.1 33.1 31.1 
UDMR 7.2 7.5 6.6 6.8 6.2 5.5 6.6 3.8 
PRM  3.9 4.5 19.5 13.0 4.1 3.1 5.6 
PUNR  7.7 4.4 1.4     
PNG     2.2 4.9 2.3 1.9 
PSM  3.0 2.2 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.5 
Oth 20.9 17.4 17.7 16.0 8.1 18.2 3.0 4.7 
 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* Figures shown are for % vote share in elections to the lower house of parliament except for 2007 (European 
Parliament elections) and 2009 (Presidential elections, first round) 
+ Abbreviations: CDR = Democratic Convention; PNT = National Peasant Party; PNL = National Liberals; 
Dem = Democrat Party (in 1992, the Petre Roman faction of the National Salvation Front, in 1996 the Union 
of Social Democrats, in 2008 and 2009, the Democrat Liberal Party); ADA = Truth and Justice Alliance 
(between the Democrat Party and the National Liberal Party); PSD/FSN = the Iliescu-led left in its various 
incarnations (National Salvation Front through to Social Democrat Party); UDMR = Hungarian Democratic 
Union; PRM = Greater Romania Party; PUNR = National Unity Party; PNG = New Generation Party; PSM = 
Socialist Workers Party (Socialist Alliance from 2004); Oth = others. Further details of the parties are given 
in appendix one. 
 
After the Convention ceased to exist, the civil society organisations which had formed part 
of its original structure withdrew from direct participation in electoral contests. Following 
                                                            
120 Source for election results between 1990 and 2000: 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc accessed 2 
September 2010. Source for 2004: http://www.bec2004.ro/ accessed 2 September 2010. Source for 2007: 
http://www.bec2007pe.ro/rezultate.html accessed 2 September 2010; Source for 2008: 
http://www.becparlamentare2008.ro/ accessed 2 September 2010; Source for 2009: http://www.bec2009p.ro/ 
accessed 2 September 2010 
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the 2000 elections the National Peasant Party retreated into factional in-fighting and 
electoral marginality.121 Two national parties which had formed part of the previous 
governing coalition retained parliamentary representation: the National Liberal Party and 
the Democrat Party.122 This chapter briefly continues the examination of the centre-right up 
to the elections of 2009 (by which time the Democrats appeared to have established 
themselves as a stable and dominant force on the centre right) as a means of setting the 
Convention’s history in context.  
Table 4: Party members of the Democratic Convention at the national elections of 
1992, 1996 and 2000 (civic society organisations not shown) 
  1992 1996 2000 
National Peasant Party X X X 
National Liberal Party  X  
National Liberal Party – Democratic Convention X X  
Civic Alliance Party X   
Hungarian Democratic Union X   
‘Historic’ Social Democratic Party X   
Ecologist Party X X  
Ecologist Movement  X  
Ecologist Federation   X 
National Christian Democratic Alliance   X 
Moldovan Party   X 
Union of Right Forces   X 
 
2.1  Balancing act – the formation of the Democratic Convention 
The shock of defeat in the 1990 elections and the attacks on party offices and on student 
protesters in Bucharest’s University Square in the early months of that year prompted the 
first moves towards co-operation among the ‘democratic opposition’.  Civic society 
activists – some of whom had initially been involved in the governing structures of the 
National Salvation Front – took the lead in creating a broad opposition structure.  The 
publication of the Timisoara Declaration in March 1990 was a key event in the shaping of 
the new political divide between supporters and opponents of the National Salvation 
                                                            
121 See Lavinia Stan, From Riches To Rags: The Romanian National Christian Democrat Party, East 
European Quarterly, 39 (2), pp. 179-227, 2005, for an extensive study of the National Peasant Party after 
2000 
122 The Hungarian Democratic Union also retained its parliamentary representation, but its electoral appeal 
was limited to less than one in ten of the electorate and, as such, is not a genuinely national party 
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Front.123  The first national convention of the Democratic Anti-Totalitarian Forum was held 
in Cluj in October 1990 – President Emil Constantinescu identifies this event (organised on 
the initiative of dissident poet Doina Cornea), together with Corneliu Coposu’s vision and 
his own leadership of the formation as the three factors which contributed most to the 
development of the Convention.124  Co-operation between the parties followed in the form 
of the National Convention for the Installation of Democracy in December 1990.  The 
National Convention for the Installation of Democracy agreement was signed by the leaders 
of the National Peasant Party, the National Liberals, the (historic) Social Democrats, the 
Hungarian Democratic Union, the Ecology Party and the Ecological Movement (actually a 
party).  The Civic Alliance Party joined after that party was formed in the summer of 
1991.125 
The Democratic Convention itself was launched on 13th November 1991, in the wake of 
another miners’ march on Bucharest and the consequent fall of the Petre Roman 
government.  The original member organisations of the National Convention for the 
Installation of Democracy were joined by two other small parties and, crucially for the 
subsequent development of the formation, by a range of civic society organisations.  
Principal among these were the Association of Former Political Prisoners, the World Union 
of Free Romanians and the Civic Alliance.126  The World Union of Free Romanians was a 
US-based organisation that provided a voice for the diaspora during the Communist era.127  
It was valued for its links with Western governments and politicians.128  The Association of 
Former Political Prisoners was formed after the fall of Ceausescu to represent the interests 
                                                            
123 Csaba Takacs (interview, Cluj, January 2009), points to the importance of the Timisoara Declaration in 
that it crystallised opposition to the Front’s decision to contest the forthcoming elections as a political party.  
The thirteen points of the Declaration were a manifesto for those who believed that the spirit of the revolution 
of December 1989 had been betrayed by the continued occupation of power structures by ex-Communists.  It 
is reproduced as Appendix 3 of Pavel and Huiu, pp. 515 – 518. 
124Emil Constantinescu, Time of Tearing Down, Time of Building, Universalia, Bucharest, 2005, p. 250. 
125Pavel and Huiu, pp. 79 – 80. 
126Pavel and Huiu, pp. 89 – 91.   
127Details of its influence can be found in the memoirs of Simona Vrabiescu-Kleckner, a leading member of 
the organisation and adviser to President Constantinescu after his election.  Simona Maria Vrabiescu-
Kleckner, O Marturie Provocata, Themis, Bucharest, 2004. 
128 Interview with Csaba Takacs, January 2009, Cluj. 
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of political detainees.129  The influence of these groups on the Conventions ideological 
positioning and policy programme is explored in subsequent chapters. 
2.2  Learning from defeat: the Convention’s electoral performance in 1992 and 1996 
The uniting of the main opposition parties into the Democratic Convention in the autumn of 
1991 coincided with a growing conflict between President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister 
Petre Roman - a conflict which eventually split the Front and changed substantially the 
competitive environment in which the Convention operated.  Roman was dismissed as 
Prime Minister on 26th September 1991 but he retained control of the National Salvation 
Front’s leadership structures.130  Front politicians who favoured a more rapid reform 
programme coalesced around Roman and in March 1992 the Front held a critical national 
congress where competing reform and conservative political programmes were debated.  
Initially, the Roman faction retained the name the National Salvation Front but they later 
changed to the Democrat Party.  The Iliescu faction adopted the name the Democratic 
National Salvation Front before later changing to the Social Democratic Party. 
The local elections held in February 1992 were a significant staging post towards the 
general election due in the autumn.131  They also provided the Convention’s first major test 
of organisational unity.  Diaconescu states that the selection of common lists for the council 
elections and joint candidates for the mayoralities was a substantial problem, in part 
(according to Diaconescu) because opinion polls showed a shift in popular support from the 
National Liberals to the National Peasants since the former joined the Stolojan government.  
In the end, apart from where independent candidates were recruited, the allocations 
between the National Liberals and the National Peasants were made based on the election 
results of 1990 with some adjustment for the most recent opinion polls.132 
The first round of voting (electing mayors, county and community councils) took place on 
9th February, the second round (run-offs in mayoral elections where no candidate had won 
                                                            
129 The organisation University Solidarity was also important as a source of support among intellectuals.  Emil 
Constantinescu was a member of this organisation.  Interview with Valerian Stan, Executive member of the 
Civic Alliance, February 2009, Bucharest 
130 Demisia Guvernului, Romania Libera, 27th September 1991, page 1. 
131 Diaconescu describes the elections as having ‘great importance’ for the Convention because they 
represented the ‘first examination of the Convention by the electorate.’  Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 97. 
132 Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 98. 
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50% of the vote in the first ballot) took place a fortnight later.  The National Salvation 
Front – still united as an organisation despite the conflict between Roman and Iliescu – 
polled the most votes but their support had halved since the parliamentary elections of May 
1990.  The Convention scored a creditable result and achieved notable successes in the 
mayoral elections over the two rounds of voting – winning the big city mayoralities of 
Bucharest (and all six of Bucharest’s ‘sector’ mayors), Timisoara, Bacau, Brasov, Sibiu, 
Constanta, Ploiesti and Arad.133 
Table 5:  Local election results 1992 - seats won on County Councils (consilieri 
judeteni)134 
Party %
National Salvation Front  33.9
Democratic Convention 23.8
Democratic Agrarian Party 12.4
Democratic Union of Hungarians 7.1
Romanian National Unity Party 4.7
Ecologist Movement 2.0
National Liberals135 1.8
National Liberal – Youth Wing 1.0
Greater Romania Party 0.9
Others 12.4
 
Despite its success in the local government elections, the Convention was still a fragile 
entity.  The National Liberal leadership in particular did not seem convinced that the 
Convention offered the best strategic choice for achieving its goals: the party’s decision to 
participate in the provisional government set up to follow Roman’s administration was a 
major source of tension within the Convention.136  National Peasant vice president Ion 
Diaconescu recounts the tragi-comic attempt to hold a press conference to celebrate the 
election results which underlines the tensions between the main parties in the Convention 
and presaged the departure of the National Liberals from the formation.  As the formation’s 
leadership gathered at Convention headquarters together with press and television 
journalists it became clear that the new (National Liberal) mayor of Bucharest, Crin 
                                                            
133 Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, page 51. 
134 Stan Stoica, Romania Dupa 1989, pp. 243-244 
135 Where running independently of the Convention banner 
136 See chapter 3 below. 
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Halaicu, was not among them.  Diaconescu eventually established that Halaicu had called a 
work meeting of all the Bucharest sector (district) mayors timed to coincide with the press 
conference.  National Liberal leader Radu Campeanu could not be reached on the telephone 
but eventually it was decided to move the entire press conference from the Convention 
offices to City Hall.  Two days later the National Liberals held their own celebration press 
conference.137 
The period between the local elections and the presidential and parliamentary polls held in 
September 1992 was a turbulent one in political terms.  The National Salvation Front 
completed its split between the Roman and Iliescu camps; the Convention itself suffered a 
major split as the National Liberals opted to contest the general election on their own 
platform; and the constitutional question re-appeared when the exiled king, Michael, was 
finally allowed to visit the country in the spring.  Success and even survival for the 
Convention were far from secured: it faced significant competition from four directions in 
this period, the Iliescu and Roman parties, the nationalist right and, following the internal 
split, from the National Liberals too. 
The first task in the wake of the local elections was the selection of candidates for the 
parliamentary and presidential polls.  The selection of parliamentary candidates could have 
presented a major hurdle for the Convention.138  It was agreed that one third of the 
candidates would be National Liberals, one third National Peasants, half of the remainder 
would be drawn from the Civic Alliance Party and the rest from the historic Social 
Democrats and the Ecology Party.139  Although the formula was accepted, Radu Campeanu 
engineered the departure of the National Liberals from the Convention shortly afterwards in 
April 1992, less than six months before the parliamentary and presidential elections.140 
Despite the crowded political field and the best efforts of the National Liberals to change 
the dynamic of the election campaign (by announcing it had approached King Michael to 
                                                            
137 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 99. 
138 The selection of Emil Constantinescu as the Convention’s presidential candidate is covered in more detail 
in chapter 3 below. 
139 Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 100. 
140 A faction of the National Liberals led by Nicolae Cerveni remained within the Convention and the 
National Liberal Youth Wing applied to join the formation after Campeanu’s followers left. 
58 
 
be its presidential candidate)141, by the start of the official campaign period the Convention 
appeared to have consolidated its position as principal challenger to Iliescu and his party.142  
The campaign for Radu Campeanu’s party ran well behind that of the Convention.143  The 
nationalist right was organisationally weak with its support geographically concentrated 
and lacking a credible national leader despite Gheorghe Funar’s success in Cluj.144 
Following the split between Roman and Iliescu, the Roman faction chose its own candidate 
for the 1992 presidential election.  The leading actors in the Front’s internal rupture cast it 
as a contest between two forms of social democracy – popularly referred to as the ‘war of 
the roses’.145  But the electorate paid little attention to the nuances of left-right delineation 
and the Roman faction was bound to attack Iliescu from the right.146  The Roman faction, 
though, made an immense miscalculation which effectively handed Emil Constantinescu 
the role of leading challenger to Ion Iliescu: the party chose the unknown academic scientist 
Caius Dragomir as its presidential candidate.  Petre Roman decided not to put his name 
forward to be candidate, explaining his decision as not wishing to damage the party at its 
birth (presumably because he saw himself as a divisive figure).147 Whatever the reasoning 
behind the decision it robbed the party of its main electoral asset – Petre Roman’s name 
recognition.  Roman came close to achieving second place in the 1996 elections but it is 
only possible to speculate on the outcome – and its long term effects - had Roman run 
against the unknown electoral novice Constantinescu in 1992.  Six candidates entered the 
presidential contest.  In addition to Iliescu, Dragomir, Constantinescu and Funar there was 
an independent candidate and a representative of the tiny Republican Party.  Iliescu topped 
the poll but having failed to win a majority in the first ballot was forced into a run-off with 
Constantinescu. 
                                                            
141 See chapter 3 below. 
142 The Romanian polling industry was barely developed at this stage and there is little firm evidence to map 
the evolution of party support over the period. 
143 In this election the National Liberals were without the backing of civil society groups, significant media 
outlets or even the Hungarian minority (as Campeanu  had enjoyed in 1990). 
144 The nationalist vote was also divided between Funar’s National Unity Party and the Greater Romania Party 
of Corneliu Vadim Tudor which gained from the defection of a dozen Front parliamentarians when the 
Roman-Iliescu split was formalised.  Tom Gallagher, Theft, page 104. 
145 Florin Abraham, Romania de la Comunism la Capitalism, Tritonic, Bucharest, 2006, page 59. 
146 Caius Dragomir, for example, the Roman faction’s presidential candidate attacked Iliescu for signing a co-
operation treaty with the Soviet Union because it meant renouncing Romanian claims over the region of 
Bessarabia.  Cine va fi candidatul FSN la presidentie?, Romania Libera, 2 July 1992, page 3. 
147 Conventia Nationala Extraordinara a FSN, Romania Libera, 27 July 1992, page 2. 
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Table 6: Presidential election result September/October 1992148 
  Round I  Round II 
Candidate Vote % Vote %
Ion Iliescu (Democratic National 
Salvation Front) 
5 633 465 47.3 7 393 429 61.4
Emil Constantinescu (Democratic 
Convention) 
3 717 006 31.2 4 641 207 38.6
Gheorghe Funar (National Unity 
Party) 
1 294 388 10.9
Caius Dragomir (National 
Salvation Front) 
564 655 4.8
Ion Manzatu (Republican Party) 362 485 3.1
Mircea Druc (Independent) 326 866 2.8
 
 
Table 7: Parliamentary election results September 1992149 
Party Votes* %* Deputies 
elected 
Senators 
elected
Democratic National Salvation Front 3 015 708 27.7 117 49
Democratic Convention 2 177 144 20.0 82 34
National Salvation Front 1 108 500 10.2 43 18
National Unity Party 839 586 7.7 30 14
Hungarian Democratic Union 811 290 7.5 27 12
Greater Romania Party 424 061 3.9 16 6
Socialist Workers’ Party 330 378 3.0 13 5
Democratic Agrarian Party 326 289 2.9 0 5
National Liberal Party 286 467 2.6 0 0
Others 14.5 13** 0 
* Votes cast in elections to Chamber of Deputies 
** Seats allocated to national minorities 
 
Both Ratiu and Diaconescu state that the 1992 elections were a success because of the 
substantial advance over the results in 1990.150  Constantinescu’s performance attracted 
some criticism but his supporters pointed out that the first IMAS poll after his selection as 
candidate in the summer of 1992 gave him 13% support and that the 38.6% that he 
eventually achieved in the second round of voting for the presidency represented a 
significant increase in that score.151  The result was good enough to consolidate 
                                                            
148 Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, page 240. 
149 Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, page 224. 
150 Ion Ratiu, Istoria unei candidature deturnate, Regent House, Bucharest, 2001, page I, Ion Diaconescu, 
Revolutie, page 118. 
151 Pavel and Huiu, page 150. 
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Constantinescu’s position at the head of the formation.  Immediately after the election 
Coposu resigned the presidency of the Convention and proposed Constantinescu in his 
place.  The Convention’s Central Co-ordinating Committee voted 15 – 0 with three 
abstentions to elect Constantinecu, the three abstentions coming from his former leadership 
rival Nicolae Manolescu plus Ecologist leader Otto Weber and Bogdan Grabovski of the 
World Union of Free Romanians both of whom were close to Ion Ratiu.152 
Pavel and Huiu identify the emergence of a distinct Convention electorate in the 1992 
elections.  Support for the Convention was higher in the Transylvanian region than 
elsewhere.  As mentioned above, in the local elections the Convention won the mayoralities 
of a number of major cities and in the parliamentary poll it took 28.5% of the vote in 
Romania’s largest towns and cities compared to 21.7% for the Iliescu faction of the Front.  
In rural areas the Iliescu faction won 35.7% of the vote compared to just 15.9% for the 
Convention. Convention voters tended to be younger and better educated than supporters of 
Iliescu’s party (22% of the Convention’s electorate were students, pupils or young people 
compared to under 7% of Democratic National Salvation Front supporters).  And manual 
workers and ‘peasants’ made up a significantly larger part of the electorate for Iliescu’s 
party (41% compared to 21% for the Convention).153 
The Convention’s campaign was more focused and better organised than the disparate 
campaigns of 1990.  It appears to have made some use of its overseas connections to bring 
in outside help for the 1992 campaign.154  Yet it was clearly organisationally out-gunned 
once again by Ion Iliescu and his supporters: 
[Iliescu’s party] revived the charges made against the opposition in May 1990 that it 
intended to turn the clock back to an era of harsh economic exploitation and that it 
could not be trusted to safeguard Romania’s national interest.  Emil Constantinescu 
declared afterwards that he and his supporters had been accused of five fundamental 
                                                            
152 Pavel and Huiu, page 158. 
153 Pavel and Huiu, page 146. 
154 Ion Ratiu recounts meetings with US Republican and British Conservative advisers.  Ion Ratiu, page 263 
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sins: bringing back the king, restoring landlords, reviving capitalism, selling 
Transylvania to the Hungarians and persecuting former Communists.155 
The sense of stolen power and a lack of democratic legitimacy for Iliescu’s party persisted 
after the 1992 elections and potentially hindered the Convention’s capacity to learn from its 
defeat.  Even before the elections took place a discourse around electoral fraud and 
manipulation had grown up.  To illustrate the point, after the elections the Convention 
announced it was challenging the results in seven counties and in parts of Bucharest thanks 
to a range of perceived irregularities.156 
The imperative for the Convention’s members to remain united remained, though.  The 
Convention’s parliamentary parties were united in their refusal to join a Front-led 
government.157    There was discussion about the future of the National Liberal Party which 
identified Radu Campeanu as a block on the future unity of the party within the 
Convention.158  The non-nationalist opposition parties held a joint press conference to 
announce plans for co-operation in the new parliament but there was no indication that 
discussions were taking place that would lead to wider co-operation or a re-casting of the 
opposition’s organisational structure.159  Neither was there any sign that the Convention’s 
leaders had an appetite for engaging in a more wide ranging debate about the formation’s 
future strategy.160   
Over the next four years it was the evolution of the wider political environment which did 
most to shape the battleground for the 1996 elections although the Convention played a part 
by sharpening and modernising its electoral organisation further.  Compared to the 
elections of 1992, the Convention’s campaign in 1996 showed that a good deal of 
organisational development had taken place.   
                                                            
155 Tom Gallagher, Theft, page 105. 
156 CDR contesta alegerile in 7 judete, Romania Libera, 5 October 1992, page 3.   
157 Nici un partid din CDR nu va participa la o guvernare de stinga, Romania Libera, 6 October 1992, page 2. 
158 Liberalii intre agonie si refacere, Romania Libera, 30 October 1992, page 5. 
159 Conferinta de presa a CDR – FSN, Romania Libera, 29 October 1992, page 3. 
160 Emil Constantinescu announced his intention to take on the role of ‘people’s tribune’ but this appeared to 
be a personal plan rather than an indication of a wider leadership vision for the Convention (at this stage, of 
course, Corneliu Coposu was president of the Convention itself so Constantinescu’s position going forward 
was less clear.  Conferinta de presa a d-lui Emil Constantinescu, Romania Libera, 16 October 1992, page 3. 
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Deletant and Siani Davies note that the 1996 election campaign was professionalised (with 
clear evidence of foreign influences) but markedly more intense in urban areas than in rural 
areas.  All the parties employed public meetings and widespread use of postering.  The 
parties bought newspaper advertising space but Deletant and Siani-Davies note that the 
circulation of even the most popular newspaper – Evenimentul Zilei – was 170,000 from a 
population of 23 million.161  Television had taken on a more significant role with the 
growth in the number of independent TV channels. Air-time allotted to each party was 
governed by statute but although this was, according to Deletant and Siani-Davies, 
scrupulously observed, there was criticism of the passive nature of TV election coverage 
with programmes content to repeat party press releases rather than interrogate their claims 
and presentations. 
In January 1996, the National Peasant team of Democratic Convention campaign managers 
took part in a campaign planning seminar in the mountain resort of Sinaia.  The seminar, 
organised by the Romanian Institute of Citizens for Christian Democracy, was attended by 
representatives of the British Conservative Party.  Younger members of the party’s 
leadership cohort appear to have been behind the initiative which covered sessions on ‘the 
role of a campaign manager’ and ‘interpreting campaign information’ as well as more 
esoteric topics.162 This was followed in March by the presentation of thirty four ‘diplomas’ 
to the ‘first professional electoral campaign directors in Romania,’ by a representative of 
the British Conservative Party.163 Zoe Petre also states that the Constantinescu team 
received help from French President Jacques Chirac’s campaign team and from advisers 
linked to both the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States.164 
At the beginning of 1996 polling evidence did not appear to offer the opposition many 
grounds for confidence.  A Gallup poll at the beginning of January showed Iliescu’s Social 
Democrats and the Convention level pegging in voter preferences at 25% each.165  The 
other messages given by the same poll were confused and demonstrated how difficult it was 
                                                            
161 Dennis Deletant and Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Elections of November 1996, Representation, 
volume 35, numbers 2 and 3, pp. 155 – 167. 
162 Un partid al interesului national, Romania Libera, 30 January 1996, page 3. 
163 Primii directori de campanie electoral profesionisti din Romania, Romania Libera, 4 March 1996, page 3. 
164 Interview with Zoe Petre. 
165 Gallup poll commissioned for the state television channel, TVR, reported in Romania Libera, 5 January 
1996, page 3. 
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for Convention leaders to craft a consistent message.  A clear majority (59% against 19%) 
stated that a market economy was preferable to one run by the state but few were prepared 
to accept the risks that a market economy brought with it: 56% expressed a preference for a 
secure job that was less well paid compared to 25% who were willing to trade job security 
for better pay.  Half the respondents felt that only thieves had been winners from 
privatisation and less than a third (32%) felt that further privatisation would improve the lot 
of the population in general.  Indeed, even the negative impact of perceptions about corrupt 
privatisation processes could have been discounted somewhat by apparently ambivalent 
attitudes to theft and, in any case, only a little over a third thought that political change was 
the way to achieve change for the country.166  
Corneliu Coposu had died in 1995 and this had destabilised the Convention (and the 
National Peasant Party). The break with the Hungarian Democratic Union that is examined 
in more detail in chapter five damaged the sense of opposition unity which derived from the 
return of the National Liberals to the formation.167  A rumour appeared – and was promptly 
denied - that the National Peasants were prepared to support Petre Roman for the 
presidency.168  The sense of crisis generated by stubbornly high levels of Social Democrat 
support and the internal troubles of the National Peasant Party led the Convention to stress 
its support for Constantinescu, to re-emphasise that it would not collaborate with the Social 
Democrats in government and that it did not consider it opportune to enter a pact with any 
other party or formation (a reference to the Democrat Party and the Union of Social 
Democrats – the alliance that the Democrats had formed with the historic Social Democrats 
after the latter party left the Convention).169 
The government led by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu was built on a coalition between 
Iliescu’s party (by now called the Social Democrats), the far left and the far right.170  It was 
unstable and was perceived as damaging Romania’s image abroad which had held back the 
                                                            
166 Asked whether they agreed with the statement, ‘regardless of where the money comes from, what matters 
is what you do with it’, 43% agreed and 43% disagreed. 
167 See below. 
168 In sedinta Consiliului CDR nu avut loc nici o lupta, Romania Libera, 12 February 1996, page 3. 
169 Consiliul National al CDR, Romania Libera, 12 February 1996, page 3. 
170 Referred to as the Red Quadrilateral, between 1992 and 1996 the government had been sustained variously 
by the Socialist Workers Party, the National Unity Party and the Greater Romania Party.  See Florin 
Abraham, pp. 248 – 265. 
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country’s efforts to gain entry into the Euro-Atlantic structures that would have helped 
Romania to cope with the strains of transition.171  Yet it had survived the entire four year 
parliamentary term.  It had delivered economic recovery of sorts with GDP growing 17.6% 
from 1993 to 1996 and net average real wages growing 8.3%.172 And by the time of the 
elections it had normalised relations with Hungary and made the first steps towards NATO 
and EU membership.173 Assessment of the the performance of the Vacaroiu government is 
not universally negative: 
On the whole the privatisation process was more rapid than is widely supposed.  
Decollectivisation of agriculture was achieved rapidly and the housing stock was 
almost completely sold off.  By 1996, the last year of the Vacaroiu government, 54% 
of GDP was from the private sector compared to 42.6% in 1995.174 
Abraham echoes this view, pointing out that the government achieved ‘micro stabilisation’ 
of the economy and eventual progress in foreign relations.  Explanation for the Social 
Democrats’ defeat, when it came, rests more with a failure to meet the expectations of the 
electorate: 
The loss of the election in 1996 can be explained by three phrases which came to 
define, for the majority of the urban electorate, the Vacaroiu government: corruption, 
stagnation and lost hopes.  The opposition used a single phrase to combine all of 
these: change.175 
In fact the opposition focused its attacks on three broad themes: corruption, economic 
failure and drawing parallels between the Social Democrat government (and Iliescu in 
particular) and the former Communist dictatorship.   
                                                            
171 That perception rests particularly strongly with domestic opponents of the Iliescu regime and with foreign 
liberal observers.  It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the wider Romanian electorate shared the sense 
that international isolation was damaging the country’s progress. 
172 In contrast to the comparative figures for both the preceding and following periods which saw GDP and 
net real wages fall sharply.  David Phinnemore (ed), The EU and Romania, The Federal Trust, London, 2006, 
page 32. 
173 David Phinnemore, pp 38 – 48. 
174 Liliana Pop Democratising capitalism? The political economy of post-communist transformations in 
Romania, 1989-2001, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2006, page 93. 
175 Abraham, page 265. 
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Throughout the second half of 1996, Romania Libera repeatedly ran stories painting the 
Social Democrats as a running a kleptocracy for the benefit of a ruling clique.  Links were 
drawn between Iliescu and high profile corruption cases;176 the government was accused of 
collaborating in sanctions-busting smuggling to Yugoslavia;177 and the party was presented 
as run by a greedy elite ready to trade influence for cash.178 
The Caritas scandal also provided a boost to the Convention. A notorious pyramid 
investment scheme that was born in Cluj and gained the active endorsement of the city’s 
nationalist mayor, Gheorghe Funar.  It is estimated to have involved investments of over $1 
billion possibly involving a third of Romanian households before it collapsed into 
bankruptcy in 1994.179  Promising returns of at least 800% on investment it traded on the 
lack of experience of Romanian citizens and the government alike to prosper and avoid 
legal sanction.180  As well as damaging the government’s reputation for economic 
management, the involvement of Funar in the Caritas scandal also meant that the nationalist 
right was more divided and less credible than it had been in the previous round of elections.  
Since the 1992 elections the National Unity Party had begun moves towards the centre of 
the political spectrum which ultimately ended in the departure of the party’s radical 
nationalist leader and the disappearance of the party from the national political scene.181  
The Greater Romania Party was also on the scene but not yet strong enough to exploit the 
discontent of the electorate. 
The government’s economic record had to be a core part of the Convention’s message 
despite the mixed messages of the polling evidence – economic reform was, after all, at the 
                                                            
176 Sever Muresan se afla la Cluj, Romania Libera, 17 August 1996, page 1.  Muresan was one of a group of 
prominent businessman who were frequently accused of enjoying immunity from prosecution through both 
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centre of the Convention’s new programme.  Attacks ranged extensively over a variety of 
issues including energy policy (linked to rising domestic fuel prices), agriculture and 
general economic decline.182 
The attempts to link the government to the Communist past were frequently personalised to 
Iliescu.183  The legitimacy of his run for office was questioned (the constitution limits 
presidents to serving two terms – Iliescu was successful in arguing that the 1990-1992 
period did not count in this calculation) as he was cast in the role of putative dictator.184  
Romania Libera even made the somewhat improbable accusation that Iliescu favoured the 
re-collectivisation of agriculture.185  Another consistent theme was the threat of electoral 
manipulation with parallels often explicitly drawn with the ‘stolen’ election of 1946.186 
As in 1992, the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for the autumn were 
preceded by elections for local government.  This time, though, the local elections were 
held in June which gave little time for analysis and organisational response before the 
general election campaign began.  The outcome of the local elections served to emphasise 
the scale of the task still facing the Convention.  The results were a virtual tie between the 
Convention and the Social Democrats but with neither formation gaining more than a fifth 
of the votes cast in the first round of voting.  Although the Convention polled well in the 
larger cities its performance prompted further speculation about collaboration with the 
Democrat Party and the historic Social Democrats who by this time had formed the Union 
of Social Democrats.187 
 
 
                                                            
182 Guvernul Vacaroiu a impins tara intra un crize cronica de energia, Romania Libera, 14 September 1996, 
page 4; Statul nu are bani sa cumpere porumbul taranilor, Romania Libera, 22 October 1996, page 4; Iliescu 
mincinos, Romania Libera, 22 October 1996, page 2. 
183 Ion Iliescu a fost aplaudat la congresele PCR, Romania Libera, 30 August 1996, page 3 (Iliescu was 
applauded at Romanian Communist Party congresses). 
184 Iliescu mincinos, Romania Libera, 22 October 1996, page 5. 
185 Ion Iliescu doreste colectivizarea, Romania Libera, 2 November 1996, page 1. 
186 Recurs la Machiavelli, Romania Libera, 9 October 1996, page 1 reported electoral fraud in the city of 
Bacau; Batausii, Romania Libera, 11 October 1996, page 1 reported attacks on opposition activists in 
Bucharest. 
187 Astazi este posibila anuntarea unui accord CDR-USD, Romania Libera, 3 June 1996, page 3 
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Table 8: Votes cast in elections to County Councils, 2 June 1996188 
Party/formation Votes % 
Democratic Convention 1 667 417 19.5 
Social Democrats 1 390 225 16.3 
Union of Social Democrats 962 719 11.3 
Democratic Union of Hungarians 602 561 7.1 
National Unity Party 461 447 5.4 
Socialist Workers Party 439 392 5.2 
Greater Romania Party 344 056 4.0 
Democratic Agrarian Party 273 290 3.2 
Civic Alliance Party 270 207 3.2 
Others 2 127 310 24.8 
 8 538 624  
 
After the local elections it became clear that Constantinescu would not be the sole 
representative of the democratic opposition in the presidential contest.  The leaders of the 
Civic Alliance Party (Nicolae Manolescu), the Liberal Party ’93 (Dinu Patriciu) and the 
National Liberal Party – Campeanu (Radu Campeanu) engaged in negotiations to field a 
single candidate representing the National Liberal Alliance.189  More surprising was the 
decision of the Democratic Union of Hungarians to field its own candidate for the 
presidency for the first time.  The move prompted concerns from within the Convention 
that their former collaborators were buying leverage for the second round of voting in what 
was a far from clear political landscape.190  This may have been the case but given the 
speed with which the two formations concluded a coalition agreement after the elections it 
is just as likely that the Democratic Union was calculating that it would give their 
supporters an additional reason to turn out to vote thereby helping to maximise the 
formation’s showing in the parliamentary elections.  Gyorgy Frunda, the Democratic Union 
presidential candidate expressed this hope explicitly. 
By August, the Convention’s position appeared to have improved.  A rash of polls all 
showed that the Convention was ahead of the Social Democrats in preferences for the 
parliamentary elections.  Constantinescu, though, was running behind the Convention’s poll 
                                                            
188 Stan Stoica, Romania Dupa 1989, pp. 244 - 245 
189 Largirea ANL, in impas!, Romania Libera, 17 July 1996, page 3.  Ultimately they did not succeed.  The 
Campeanu faction stayed outside the Alliance and both Radu Campeanu and Nicolae Manolescu (representing 
the Alliance) scored derisory totals in the presidential poll. 
190 Candidatura UDMR va agita problema nationala, Romania Libera, 15 July, 1996, page 3 
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rating and Ion Iliescu had a clear lead in presidential election preferences.191  None of the 
polls indicated preferences for a run-off ballot between Constantinescu and Iliescu.  But the 
CURS poll gave some clues to the reasons behind the strengthening of the Convention’s 
position:  52% replied that the country was heading in the wrong direction, compared to 
28% who thought it was going in the right direction.  The leading issue for the next 
government to tackle was reducing poverty (34%) followed by unemployment (19%) and 
prices (15%). 
Table 9:  opinion poll ratings, August 1996, choice for presidential elections (%) 
  IMAS CURS IRSOP 
Emil Constantinescu 32 29 28 
Ion Iliescu 37 37 36 
Petre Roman  19 18 21 
VadimTudor 5 3 4 
Gheorghe Funar 4 4 4 
Gyorgy Frunda -192 5 4 
Others 3 4 3 
 
Table 10:  opinion poll ratings, August 1996, party choice for parliamentary elections 
(%) 
  IMAS CURS IRSOP 
Democratic Convention 34 33 34 
Social Democrats 28 30 30 
Social Democratic Union 14 13 13 
Democratic Union of Hungarians 6 7 5 
Romanian National Unity Party 4 5 4 
Socialist Workers Party 4 3 3 
Greater Romania Party 3 3 3 
Democratic Agrarians 3 1 3 
National Liberal Alliance 3 4 2 
Others 1 1 3
 
 
During September the Convention campaign paid particular attention to issues affecting 
rural Romania (perhaps timed to coincide with the harvest) with a series of announcements 
                                                            
191 Sondaj IMAS, Romania Libera, 7 August 1996, page 3; Un alt sondaj:  CURS, Romania Libera, 9 August 
1996, page 3; Al treilea sondaj:  IRSOP, Romania Libera, 13 August 1996, page 3 
192 The IMAS poll does not appear to have named Frunda, candidate of the Democratic Union of Hungarians, 
as an option which may account for Constantinescu’s higher score in that poll since most of Frunda’s 
potential voters would have transferred to Constantinescu 
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and election rallies in the rural south and east of the country.193  The list of pledges made a 
tempting offer, including increased peasant pensions, accelerated restitution of agricultural 
property, delaying of agricultural taxes and increased access to credit for farmers.194 
On 27th October, the Convention launched its “Contract with Youth” at a concert in 
Bucharest.195  Promising ‘twelve solutions for the twelfth hour’, the Contract made a series 
of commitments covering economic, housing and health policies plus promises of 
investment in education infrastructure.196  The following day, Constantinescu toured 
industrial areas including the state-run Sidex steel works and promised state aid for 
‘strategic’ industries.197 
Each of these specific programmes was drawn from the Contract with Romania which had 
been launched in November 1995 and which had been consciously modelled on the US 
Republican Party’s Contract with America which was seen as delivering success for that 
party in the 1994 Congressional elections. 
The first round of voting on 3rd November 1996 left the Convention with a clear lead in 
parliament but well short of a majority.  Iliescu was ahead in the presidential ballot but 
Roman’s endorsement of Constantinescu for the second round of voting placed the 
challenger clearly in the driving seat.198  The final result was a clear victory for 
Constantinescu in the presidential election and a partial victory in the parliamentary poll 
(where the Convention held a clear lead over the Social Democrats but fell well short of an 
overall majority. 
 
 
                                                            
193 Emil Constantinescu a semnat “Contractul cu satul romanesc”, Romania Libera, 6 September 1996, page 
3; Intoarcele la problemele reale ale satului romanesc, Romania Libera, 26 September 1996, page 3 
194 Un om cu frica lui Dumnezeu, Romania Libera, 5 September 1996, page 3 
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Table 11: Votes cast in the presidential election, November 1996199 
  Round I  Round II  
 Votes % Votes % 
Emil Constantinescu 3 569 941 28.5 7 057 906 54.4
Ion Iliescu 4 081 093 32.3 5 914 579 45.6
Petre Roman  2 598 545 20.5  
Gyorgy Frunda 761 411 6.0  
VadimTudor 597 508 4.7  
Gheorghe Funar 407 828 3.2  
Others 636 581 4.8  
 
 
Table 12: Result of the parliamentary election, November 1996200 
  Vote* %* Deputies 
elected 
Senators 
elected 
Democratic Convention 3 692 321 30.2 122 53
Social Democrats 2 633 860 21.5 91 41
Union of Social Democrats 1 582 231 12.9 53 23
Hungarian Democratic Union 812 628 6.6 25 11
Greater Romania Party 545 430 4.5 19 8
National Unity Party 533 384 4.4 18 7
Others 2 438 892 19.9 15** 0
* Chamber of Deputies.  ** Representing the ethnic minorities 
 
2.3  From opposition to power and out again – the Convention in government 
The Convention’s victory in November 1996 was hailed as a momentous event: 
There can be little doubt that the polls of 1996 were a milestone in Romanian 
electoral history.  They brought the first democratic change of head of state since the 
foundation of the independent state in 1859 and saw a ruling government voted out of 
office for the first time since 1937.  To the supporters of the opposition in Romania, 
however, the electoral victory of Constantinescu and the Democratic Convention was 
laden with far greater historic symbolism.  After more than fifty years of oppression, 
they saw it as marking nothing less than the final defeat of Communism in 
Romania.201 
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Within three weeks of Constantinescu’s election as president a government accord was in 
place, signed by the leaders of the Convention, the Union of Social Democrats (the 
electoral alliance within which the Democrat Party had fought the election) and the 
Hungarian Democratic Union (and witnessed by representatives of civic society 
organisations).202  The coalition agreement placed the concerns of civic society 
campaigners at the top of its agenda, promising to work towards a free, open and 
democratic society based on respect for the rule of law, political pluralism and diversity.  
Its second priority was liberalisation of the economy (coupled with increased social 
protection and a six month stabilisation plan. And the third area specifically mentioned 
related to measures aimed at bringing Romania back into the community of western nations 
via membership of NATO and the European Union.203 
But leading National Liberal Valeriu Stoica claims that the Convention was unprepared for 
power – that it had a romantic vision of government and did not understand the 
implications of governing in coalition.  His own position in the government was not 
discussed with him before the elections and he claims he learned of his appointment as 
Minister of Justice when it was announced on television.204  One government adviser talks 
of ministers ‘behaving as though they were members of the Spanish Riding School but 
finding they were in a wild west Rodeo.’205       
There is widespread agreement that after the election victory of 1996, the formal structures 
of the Convention fell into disuse.  President Emil Constantinescu, for example, is clear that 
the Convention no longer existed after it came to power.206  Government minister Varujan 
Vosganian concurs: 
                                                            
202 A fost semnat Acordul pentru Romania, Romania Libera, 6 December 1996, page 2. 
203 Acord de solidaritate guvernamentala si parlamentara, Romania Libera, 6 December 1996, page 2. 
204 Valeriu Stoica, Provocare Liberale, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 47 – 48. 
205 Interview with Liviu Muresan, defence consultant to the government 1996 – 2000, March 2007, Bucharest. 
206 Report of a round-table discussion organised by the magazine Revista22 to mark the tenth anniversary of 
the 1996 elections.  www.revista22.ro/alegeri_1996-3236.html accessed 18 February 2009. 
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The Democratic Convention didn’t function after the election.  It had no capacity to 
give a political dimension to actions in government so each party took decisions in its 
own interests.207 
The governing parties (which included the Union of Social Democrats and the Hungarian 
Democratic Union as well as the parties that were members of the Convention) negotiated 
an algorithm for the allocation of government posts in proportion to their relative strengths 
in parliament. Some critics came to see the operation of the algorithm, and the long 
negotiations it provoked whenever there was a change in government personnel, as 
symbolic of the government becoming more attached to the spoils of office than to the 
idealistic aims of its supporters.208  Poor coalition management and the inexperience of 
ministers contributed to the sense of drift while the failure to deliver concrete benefits to 
the electorate resulted in electoral support for the Convention permanently eroding. Even 
the smallest decisions were referred back and forth between ministers, the Prime Minister, 
the President and party leaders – to create a sense of lost momentum: 
There was a complicated government management structure.  There was no policy 
planning and an extreme reliance on advice from outside.  It was a very fragile 
coalition.209 
Government co-ordination was in the hands of the much-mocked Political Co-ordinating 
Committee (COCOPO) and a Parliamentary Co-ordinating Committee (COCOPA) but the 
bodies themselves appear to have added to the sense of drift and decision making 
paralysis.210  President Constantinescu’s view was that the acronyms looked as though they 
had been invented by a satirical magazine.211  Other members of the government agreed 
that the governing structures failed in appearance and practice to do their jobs effectively: 
                                                            
207 Interview with Varujan Vosganian, leader of the Alternative Romania Party (subsequently the Union of 
Right Forces), January 2009, Bucharest. 
208 Interview with Iulia Huiu, August 2008, Bucharest. 
209 Interview with Daniel Daianu, May 2008, Brussels. 
210 Pavel and Huiu, page 323.  A later article in Libertatea highlights that government decision making 
processes were too diffuse and un-co-ordinated with deputy prime minister Marko Bela indicating that there 
were at least four different discussion forums involved in decision making.  
http://news.4romania.com/Cocogu-cocopa-cocopre-si-cocofi_31533.html accessed 13 March 2009. 
211 Constantinescu, page 270. 
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The Convention had, at its top, people with moral authority after years in prison but 
they didn’t have enough technical competence to govern.  COCOPO didn’t work 
well.  It was ridiculed in the press.212 
It is possible that the Convention made a tactical error in failing to force early elections 
after the inconclusive 1996 parliamentary poll.  Following the crisis precipitated by the 
sacking of Valerian Stan (discussed in detail in chapter five), Ion Diaconescu and others 
had pressed for early elections in order to strengthen the Convention’s hand against the 
Democratic Party.  Constantinescu and his advisers resisted.  Zoe Petre points out that the 
process of calling early elections is not an easy one: it would have taken more than two 
months to achieve; the outcome of the elections was far from certain; and in any case the 
process might have driven the Democrats into coalition with Iliescu’s Social Democrats 
which would have simply left the Convention out of power altogether.213   
When attempts were made to resurrect the Convention as an electoral force in the summer 
of 2000, the organisation that emerged was a shadow of the former entity.  The Democratic 
Convention 2000 agreement was signed in August between the leaders of the National 
Peasants, the Ecologist Federation and the Union of Right Forces.214  The formation was 
later joined by Victor Ciorbea’s National Christian Democratic Alliance and the Party of 
Moldovans.215   
Leadership of the new formation was placed in the hands of an Alliance Council which 
initially consisted of four National Peasants, three representatives of the Union of Right 
Forces and two Ecologists who were subsequently joined by two representatives of the 
National Christian Democratic Alliance and one of the Moldovan party.216  In September, 
the five parties signed a ‘Protocol of Association’ with six civic society organisations but 
none of these groups approached the size and stature of former associates the Civic 
                                                            
212 Interview with Andrei Marga, Education Minister, 1998 – 2000, 27 January 2009, Cluj. 
213 Interview with Zoe Petre 
214 Alianta de centru-dreapta se constituie astazi, Romania Libera, 7 August 2000, page 3 
215 The Party of Moldovans was formed in 1998 by the mayor of Iasi (previously a member of the Civic 
Alliance Party) to promote the interests of the eastern provinces of Romania:  Ziarul de Iasi, Partidul 
Moldovenilor s-a inscris la Tribunal, 25/8/98 (on-line edition www.ziaruldeiasi.ro, accessed 17 May 2008).  
Four mayors were elected under its banner in the 2000 local elections but it remained no more than a marginal 
political force.   
216 Pavel and Huiu, pp. 465 – 466. 
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Alliance, the Association of Former Political Prisoners or the World Union of Free 
Romanians all of which opted not to be involved.217 
2.4 From Orange Revolution to ‘the Basescu epoch’ – the rebuilding of the centre-
right 
Attempts to regroup the centre-right began immediately after the 2000 election fiasco.  Two 
parties which were part of the governing coalition from 1996 – 2000 and which retained 
their parliamentary representation – the National Liberals and the Democrats – became the 
focus of attempts to re-craft a credible vehicle for the right. 
One of the key actors in the dramas that were to unfold was Valeriu Stoica, justice minister 
in the Democratic Convention government and then president of the National Liberals.  He 
is seen as both a compulsive back-room political operator and as the one leading politician 
with a consistent vision of centre-right political unity.218  His recently published book 
details his own efforts to forge a single political entity on the centre-right capable of 
competing with the Social Democrats.219  In it he makes clear that he initiated discussions 
about the fusion of the National Liberals and the Democrats immediately after the 2000 
elections.220   
The National Liberals faced an extended period of internal conflict after the 2000 elections, 
centred on personalities to an extent but more critically on future party strategy.  Chief 
opponent of Stoica and his unification project for the centre-right was Dinu Patriciu.221  
Patriu’s group favoured a more cautious strategy, more willing to entertain the prospect of 
co-operation with the Social Democrats and preferring the National Liberals to play the role 
of a smaller but more ideologically coherent pivot party.  In 2002, Stoica handed the 
                                                            
217 Pavel and Huiu, page 466. 
218 Interviews with Radoi and Huiu 
219 Valeriu Stoica, Unificarea Dreptei, (Bucharest:  Humanitas, 2008). 
220 Stoica claims that moves towards unity were stalled at that time because of the National Liberals’ decision 
to give formal backing to the minority Social Democrat government and because of the sense of competition 
between the two parties which came out of the 2000 election on a roughly equal footing.   
221 Patriciu heads the Rompetrol Group and is one of Romania’s richest businessmen.  He has been associated 
with the National Liberal Party since 1990 and was a leading figure among young radicals who promoted a 
neo-liberal economic programme for the party. 
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leadership of the party to Teodor Stolojan and an extensive change of personnel at the top 
of the party followed – consolidating the hold of the new leadership.222 
In tandem with evolutionary changes in the strategy, electoral realities pushed the National 
Liberals and the Democrats closer together.  Bucharest mayor Traian Basescu successfully 
challenged Petre Roman for the leadership of the Democrat Party early in 2001. Despite the 
fanfare that had greeted Basescu’s election as party leader, his electoral impact soon 
appeared to wear off.  Through the 2000-2004 parliament, he failed to buck the trend of 
declining public confidence in all political leaders and Democrat support was becalmed for 
much of the period – by the summer of 2003 there was little indication of the dramatic 
breakthrough to come a little over a year later.223 
The Democrat-National Liberal co-operation project finally resulted in the creation of the 
Truth and Justice Alliance in September 2003.  With Stolojan nominated as presidential 
candidate initial hopes were high.  The Alliance did not function fully for the local elections 
of 2004 as in some localities candidates insisted in running as National Liberals rather than 
under the banner of the alliance.  Yet the results were good enough to demonstrate the 
benefits of the joint ticket as Alliance candidates won notable victories in major cities such 
as Bucharest and Cluj.224  The Alliance was unable to build on the successes of the Spring, 
however, and by the start of the Autumn General Election campaign the governing Social 
Democrats appeared well set to extend their time in power and for the presidency to pass 
from Iliescu to prime minister and party leader Adrian Nastase.225  
                                                            
222 A. Radu, Prefata Unei Aliante, Sfera Politicii number 105 (Bucharest: FSC, 2003).  Stoica acknowledges 
trading heavily on the political capital of his close partner, Teodor Stolojan – see Stoica (2008).  Stolojan was 
Prime Minister from 1991-92 and returned from a spell with the World Bank to run as a presidential candidate 
in 2000.  He is currently a Democrat-Liberal Euro MP. 
223 Cristian Parvelescu, O Construtie Alternative, Sfera Politicii, Number 105, (Bucharest:  FSC, 2003) quotes 
BOP opinion polls showing Democrat support consistently between 8 and 10% between June 2001 and June 
2003.  Over the same time span, faith in Basescu fell from 50% to under 30% and the share of voters planning 
to back him in the presidential poll remained stuck between 11 and 13%.  
224 See Stoica (2008) and Cristian Parvalescu, Competitie si Bipolizare, Sfera Politicii number 110/111 
(Bucharest, FSC, 2004). 
225 An INSOMAR poll in September 2004 showed Nastase leading Stolojan by 41% to 24% in preferences for 
the presidential poll.  For parliament, the Social Democrats led the Alliance by 36% to 26%.  The sense of 
disappointment within the Democrat Party at the lack of progress and the internal demand for radical action to 
re-launch the party is confirmed by a report published by the Ovidiu Sincai Institute in the Summer of 2003.  
The Institute has close links to the Social Democrats but its analysis of the situation is not unduly influenced 
by partisan leanings.  
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The Social Democrats were united and had a convincing story to tell about Romania’s 
economic and political progress.  In the campaign, the Social Democrats continued the 
process they had launched after their 1996 defeat of creating a distinctive mainstream 
centre-left identity. 226  Their campaign coupled an appeal to their older, rural voter base 
with messages emphasising modernisation and internationalism through membership of 
NATO and the EU.227  It was Basescu’s last minute entry into the presidential race that 
changed the electoral dynamic.  The Alliance focused heavily on his personality, his drive 
and energy to tackle corruption.  The one truly distinctive element of their policy 
prospectus was the introduction of a 16% flat tax regime (which was duly implemented 
after the election).   
Traian Basescu won the 2004 presidential election on the second ballot by a margin of less 
than 250,000 votes from ten million that were cast.  In the first round a fortnight earlier, he 
had trailed Adrian Nastase by seven percentage points but Basescu’s momentum and the 
strength of the ‘Communist Successor’ fault line was sufficient to unite opponents of the 
Social Democrats behind the Alliance candidate.  The surprise result of the run-off changed 
the course of government construction.  Following the parliamentary election results, which 
were held on the same day as the first round of voting in the presidential poll, the Social 
Democrats had begun negotiations with the Hungarian Democratic Union and with the 
Humanist Party (which had run on a joint platform and shared list of candidates with the 
Social Democrats).  Basescu used his mandate to force a change of direction in the coalition 
negotiations, threatening the smaller parties with early elections if a government led by the 
Truth and Justice Alliance was not installed.  Basescu’s approach of ‘total offensive’228 
changed more than the complexion of the government: it plunged the Social Democrats into 
a crisis of confidence and gave the Democrats the capital with which to engage in a re-
casting of the right.   
                                                            
226 The Iliescu-led conservative wing of the National Salvation Front evolved via various name changes into 
the Social Democratic Party.  They should not be confused with the ‘historic’ Social Democrats although the 
two parties did ultimate merge. 
227 Florin Abraham, Romania de la Comunism la Capitalism (Bucharest:  Tritonic, 2006). 
228 B. Teodorescu and D. Sultanescu, Revolutie Portocalie In Romania (Bucharest, Fundatia PRO, 2006). 
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Table 13:  Chamber of Deputies election result, 2004229 
Party/Grouping % votes Seats 
Social Democrats and Humanists (centre-left) 36.8 132 
Truth & Justice Alliance (centrist) 31.5 112 
National Peasant Party (centre-right) 1.8 0 
Democratic Union of Hungarians (minority) 6.2 22 
Greater Romania Party (nationalist) 13.0 48 
Others 10.7 18 
Total 100.0 332 
 
Soon after the Alliance victory in 2004, coalition tensions began to appear.  Basescu’s 
aggressive attitude towards the Humanists (who subsequently re-branded as the 
Conservative Party) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in coalition negotiations 
meant relations within the government were strained from the beginning.  The president’s 
fondness for conflict also meant that he was soon at war with the Prime Minister and 
National Liberal leader, Calin Popescu Tariceanu.230   
The president’s approach was to brand Tariceanu as being under the influence of the class 
of political barons who had held back reform and efforts to tackle corruption since the fall 
of Communism.  He was aided by the revelation that oil magnate Dinu Patriciu had funded 
both the National Liberal and the Social Democrat election campaign.231  Underlying 
Basescu’s tactics was a desire to trigger early parliamentary elections aimed at increasing 
Democrat Party representation and influence in parliament (the Democrats had been the 
junior partner in the allocation of list places in 2004, electing 48 deputies compared to the 
National Liberals’ 64).   
By the end of 2006, the break-down of relations between president and government was 
such that the National Liberals decided to back moves to impeach Basescu.  The Democrats 
withdrew from the coalition leaving the National Liberals clinging to power as a minority 
government with the support of the Social Democrats.  A referendum triggered by the 
impeachment process was held in May 2007 and ended in triumph for Basescu as the move 
                                                            
229 Central Election Bureau, www.bec2004.ro, accessed 3 September 2010 
230 The catalyst for the conflict was Tariceanu’s decision in July 2005 not to resign and prompt early elections 
as he initially indicated he would 
231 The bitterness of the conflict within the National Liberals is made clear by Valeriu Stoica.  Referring to 
Patriciu’s dominant role he brands opponents of Basescu within the party as ‘petro-liberals’, Stoica (2008) 
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was rejected by 74.5% of voters.232  Basescu supporters within the National Liberals then 
broke away to form a new party – the Liberal Democrats – led by Teodor Stolojan, which 
was committed to continued and closer co-operation with the Democrats.  Although early 
parliamentary elections did not materialise, the parties braced themselves for months of 
conflict as Romania faced a series of electoral tests running through to the presidential 
elections. 
Romania’s first European Parliament elections, in November 2007, offered an interesting 
landscape because voters had the choice between National Liberals, Liberal Democrats and 
the Democrats.  The Liberal Democrats performed better than many had anticipated, but 
their performance was heavily influenced by the localised nature of the organisational 
transfers from the National Liberals.   
Merger between the Democrat Party and the Liberal Democrats followed the European 
Parliament poll, creating the Democrat-Liberal Party.  Voters then faced four sets of 
elections in eighteen months: council and mayoral elections in June 2008; parliamentary 
elections in November 2008; a further set of European Parliament elections in June 2009; 
and a presidential contest in November/December 2009.233 Over this time the Democrat-
Liberals and the National Liberals fought to dominate the centre-right political space but 
Basescu’s party consistently came out on top (see table above). Options for alliance 
building remained fluid but the division between the two former allies remained: both 
parties formed coalitions with the Social Democrats and with the Hungarian Democratic 
Union during this period but not with each other.  
2.5 In search of a Convention electorate 
What follows is not intended as a fully worked analysis of the Convention’s electorate. 
Such a calculation would require a level of data that is more detailed than is available here. 
Rather it is intended to identify some of the factors that might be indicative of the 
Convention’s electorate if such a thing exists. The table below shows the Convention’s vote 
                                                            
232 Edward Maxfield, Europe and Romania’s Presidential Impeachment Referendum, EPERN Referendum 
Briefing, (Brighton, Sussex European Institute, 2007) 
233 Legislation to separate the parliamentary and presidential polls by giving the president a five year term had 
been passed in 2004 
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in the Chamber of Deputies elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 broken down by county. The 
highlighted figures show where the Convention achieved a vote higher than its national 
average. The results lead to a number of tentative conclusions: 
• There was at least a measure of geographic consistency in the Convention’s vote. 
Only four counties recorded higher than average votes in just a single election and 
each of those was in 2000 where the Convention’s overall vote tally was so low as 
to make differentials almost meaningless 
• There might be some relationship between more urban electorates and a tendency to 
vote for the Convention: counties containing large urban centres appear more likely 
to favour the Convention. Data used by Pavel and Huiu, and referred to above, also 
indicates that the Convention’s electorate was generally younger and better 
educated than that of the left or the far right. 
• There is no clear relationship between average income level and Convention vote. 
The table shows county-by-county household income indexed against the national 
average in 2007. This is not a wholly satisfactory measure since the distribution of 
income may change over time but it is the only data that could be found broken 
down by county and the broad pattern of distribution is not likely to have changed 
dramatically between, say, 1996 and 2007. What it shows is that there is no clear 
pattern that counties with a higher level of household income (and thus the 
likelihood of a larger middle class) delivered a higher vote to the Democratic 
Convention.    
One other factor that does suggest itself is a link between active involvement in opposition 
to the Ceausescu regime and a stronger than average vote for the Convention. Only five 
counties show above average vote shares in all three elections. Two of these, Bucharest and 
Timisoara, have powerful associations with the December 1989 uprising. Sibiu and Brasov 
also witnessed popular protests at this time and Brasov was the location of one of the few 
earlier demonstrations of opposition to the regime in 1987. 
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Table 14: Convention (Parliamentary) vote by county and average household income 
  1992   1996   2000   
County vote %  Vote %  Vote % Y234  
Alba 40091 20.0 79806 35.2 15925 8.0 86.6
Arad 69351 29.2 92866 34.7 10281 4.5 91.0
Arges 51823 17.1 87030 25.2 12195 3.9 101.5
Bacau 46552 13.1 116321 29.9 7432 2.1 97.2
Bihor 57096 17.0 80887 23.6 11312 3.7 79.6
Bistrita-Nasaud 25605 17.4 52088 30.9 11070 7.7 82.5
Botosani 22607 10.3 39257 16.1 6026 2.8 82.2
Brasov235 78329 24.2 126258 34.6 20698 6.6 82.5
Braila 29431 14.4 63101 28.1 4310 2.1 93.9
Buzau 33871 12.7 63558 22.4 13130 5.3 82.6
Caras-Severin 54609 31.3 73212 36.1 7934 4.5 77.5
Calarasi 21241 15.0 35540 21.6 5306 3.6 82.8
Cluj 69505 18.5 127828 29.4 20668 5.5 104.5
Constanta 85539 23.1 151075 35.4 16916 4.5 106.2
Covasna 9413 7.4 9398 6.8 870 0.7 73.8
Dambovita 48785 20.3 85234 29.7 6591 2.6 98.5
Dolj 66168 20.5 141015 36.2 15791 4.5 99.9
Galati 52680 19.1 110716 33.4 8706 2.9 95.9
Giurgiu 23177 19.9 36599 26.1 3174 2.6 88.0
Gorj 20423 13.7 37252 21.4 4711 2.8 112.2
Harghita 10984 5.6 5562 2.6 818 0.5 80.0
Hunedoara 44820 16.1 77087 25.5 9374 3.4 92.9
Ialomita 18587 14.1 37189 23.7 4576 3.2 83.6
Iasi 72606 21.3 121009 29.0 21984 5.7 91.5
Ilfov 35990 29.3 60099 41.2 4756 3.9 118.2
Maramures 42732 17.9 68462 25.4 11821 5.1 79.4
Mehedinti 27203 20.8 52475 32.2 6317 4.3 100.3
Mures 25465 7.7 49209 13.7 3851 1.2 89.8
Neamt 48819 16.7 71185 22.2 8706 3.1 82.9
Olt 27689 13.5 59033 24.0 7002 2.9 93.0
Prahova 79783 18.7 173449 35.8 22170 5.3 101.7
Satu Mare 40915 21.0 63188 31.0 8386 5.4 88.4
Salaj 17028 12.7 32955 22.1 7009 5.5 87.5
Sibiu 64574 27.9 100234 38.8 14628 6.6 95.5
Suceava 62982 18.6 81397 22.3 12660 3.9 82.5
Teleorman 27718 13.0 59575 24.8 8236 3.6 86.6
Timis 145504 42.6 176778 44.6 27226 8.0 99.1
Tulcea 21842 17.7 38776 28.8 3202 2.7 87.7
Vaslui 22194 11.3 58054 25.9 10024 4.9 88.4
Valcea 31318 16.2 64681 29.3 9622 4.7 81.4
Vrancea 33530 17.3 57820 28.3 6165 3.5 88.7
Bucuresti 368565 32.6 575063 47.0 134556 12.4 134.5
                                                            
234 Average monthly earnings by county in 2007 (national average = 100). Data published by National 
Statistical Institute. http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/en/cp4.pdf accessed 2 September 2010 
235 Counties shown in bold contain a city of over 250,000 population according to the 2002 census 
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2.6 Conclusions 
Over time the strategy followed by centre-right actors thus appears to have moved from one 
of repeated attempts at collaboration (between 1991 and 2004) to one of competition.  
There are signs that the change of strategy was a conscious one: Valeriu Stoica indicates in 
his book on the unification of the right that the creation of the Democrat-Liberals was a 
deliberate attempt to avoid the mistakes associated with the Democratic Convention.   
The centre-right electorate appears to have broadened since the Convention collapsed: the 
combined left/far right vote has declined from over 50% in the elections of 2000 and 2004 
to under 40% in subsequent national elections. 
The absence of detailed source material makes it difficult to provide a thorough analysis of 
the Convention’s electorate. From the data available it appears to have been drawn more 
heavily from among younger, more urban and better educated voters. Proximity to the 
popular protests against the Communist regime also seem to increase the tendency to vote 
for the Convention. These conclusions are supported by Roper and Fesnic’s research which 
shows that historic factors were more important in determining early voting patterns than 
socio-economic ones.236 
What is clear is that the Convention failed to establish a substantial loyal electorate for 
itself: 80% of it vote share was lost between 1996 and 2000, leading to its final collapse and 
replacement as the leading vehicle for centre-right political elites. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
236 Stephen Roper and Florin Fesnic, Historical legacies and their impact on Post-Communist voting 
behaviour, Europe Asia Studies, Volume 5 Number 1, 2003. 
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Chapter 3:  Turning points and legacies:  the Democratic Convention’s pre-history 
The polarisation was unavoidable and related to events of December 1989.  There was 
a natural desire to simplify.  With hindsight, there was a blind belief that we just had 
to get rid of the legacy of Communism and then we would have paradise.  This is 
binary logic bullshit.  The world is more complicated.  We needed to rely on 
institutions, not leaders so much.237 
As discussed in chapter 1 much analysis, both comparative and country specific, of 
Romania’s post-Communist political development has focused on the impact of historical 
legacies to account for its apparently exceptional path.  The influence of the Communist 
regime in particular is seen as key to understanding the dominance of the left, the strength 
of the far right and even the apparently shaky nature of Romania’s democratic institutions:  
the suppression of dissent; the destruction of civil society organisations; the absence of any 
reform experimentation; the messianic, personalised dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu and, 
most commonly, the adoption of crude nationalism to disguise the failings of actually 
existing socialism are all viewed in this context.238  The first aim of this chapter is to 
explore the legacies (pre-Communist as well as Communist) that might contribute to 
shaping the context in which the centre-right developed and to ask whether those legacies 
maintained an enduring impact on the development of parties through the 1990s.  To do 
this, the chapter begins by briefly tracing the history of the modern Romanian state from its 
inception in the 19th Century and it goes on to set out some of the key features of the 
Communist regime. 
This study does not deny the influence of historical factors in key areas of the immediate 
post-Communist political landscape: as explored in more detail in this chapter, the absence 
of an established domestic opposition elite (such as existed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland), for example, created a leadership vacuum on the centre-right that was filled by 
pre-Communist political activists; and the behaviour of those leaders of the ‘historic’ 
parties appears to be shaped by memories of the pre-war positioning of their revived parties 
                                                            
237 Interview with Daniel Daianu, finance minister, 1997-1998 and subsequently a Member of the European 
Parliament representing the National Liberal Party. 
238 See, for example, Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism and Alina Mungiu Pippidi’s contribution to Andras 
Bozoki and John Ishiyama. 
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(this is explored in more detail in chapter 4, below).    However, it is suggested here that a 
greater and more enduring impact was derived from the immediate transition from 
Communism to democracy. The intensity of the conflict and the disputed nature of the 
transition to a new regime meant that nascent centre-right elites focused too narrowly on 
the ‘story’ and personalities of the December 1989 revolution so that broad coalition 
building and the crafting of forward-looking narratives was made difficult. So the second 
aim of the chapter is to explore in detail the events that followed immediately from the fall 
of Nicolae Ceausescu and how those events set the pattern for behaviour and attitudes of 
centre-right political leaders throughout the period of this study. 
3.1  Nation 
Modern Romania is formed from three historic provinces and the region of northern 
Dobrogea.  Walachia to the south and Moldavia to the east were both semi-autonomous 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  To the north and west of the Carpathian crescent lays 
Transylvania which for a long period had been part of the Hungarian lands of the Hapsburg 
Empire.  Dobrogea, which covers the area around the Danube delta in the south east of 
modern day Romanania was part of Bulgaria until the Balkan War of 1913. 
The southern and eastern provinces of Romania emerged from Turkish suzerainty through a 
series of steps in the second half of the nineteenth century.  A fully independent state was 
created from the Ottoman territories in 1878 following the Treaty of Berlin, (de facto union 
of Walachia and Moldavia had been achieved earlier by Ion Cuza who was elected as head 
of both principalities in 1859).  Following Cuza’s overthrow in 1866, Karl Hohenzollern 
was elected (as Carol I) in his place and Romania became one among the nascent states in 
this period whose monarch was supplied from the substantial fund of German royal 
houses.239   
National – or at least political - consciousness in the new state was dominated by attitudes 
to and relationships with its three imperial neighbours:  the Hapsburg, Russian and 
Ottoman empires and it is arguable that the legacy of that situation retains an influence 
today.  As Gallagher noted: 
                                                            
239 Keith Hitchens, Rumania 1866 – 1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994 has become one of the 
standard English language histories of pre-Communist Romania 
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Many, perhaps most Romanians who will not readily agree about politics manage to 
find common ground by acknowledging that it is the cycles of foreign domination 
which have prevented their country fulfilling its true potential.240   
Foreign policy, and where Romania positioned itself between the foreign powers in their 
long-running contest over control of the Balkan region, was a constant and significant 
factor in politics from before independence, through to the Great War and arguably beyond.  
Deep and long lasting distrust of Russia was created by the outcome of the Treaty of Berlin 
which had ended the Russo-Turkish war (1875-78) and given Romania its independence 
but which had also concluded with the eastern part of Moldavia (which now largely forms 
the independent republic of Moldova) and the northern region of Bukovina (now part of the 
Ukraine) being subsumed into the Russian Empire.  Policy makers retained an acute sense 
of Romania’s impotence in the face of Great Power politics and foreign policy thus tended 
to be characterised by opportunistic alliance-seeking that involve the minimum of concrete 
commitments and the maximum of prevarication.241   
A combination of diplomatic manoeuvring and good fortune, together with substantial loss 
of life in war, resulted in Romania gaining territory from Bulgaria (Dobrogea) after the 
Second Balkan War in 1913 and from Austria-Hungary (Transylvania) and Soviet Russia 
(Bukovina) in 1918.  The state created by proclamation in Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918 
and confirmed by the post-war treaties represented the Romanian state at its greatest ever 
extent. 242  Romanian nationalists had fought for the independence of Moldavia and 
Walachia in the revolutions of 1848 (without success) but it was Transylvania that became 
the focus of nationalist aspirations throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.  
The region was part of the Hapsburg Empire and was ethnically divided between 
Hungarians and Romanians (with substantial German and Jewish populations too).  The 
ethnic heterogeneity of Transylvania and the fact that its absorption into the Romanian state 
was not secured until after the second world war (part of the territory had been ceded back 
                                                            
240 Tom Gallagher, Theft of a Nation, Hurst & Co, London, 2005, page 1 
241 See for example, chapter 19 of Winston Churchill’s, The World Crisis 1911 – 1918, Penguin, London, 
2005 edition 
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to Hungary as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939), combined no doubt with 
its economic importance, to keep the region at the heart of Romanian national sentiments.  
Map of modern Romania showing current administrative counties and historic 
provinces243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regime of Nicolae Ceausescu has frequently been noted as among the most 
authoritarian and also one of the most nationalistic Communist regimes in Central & 
Eastern Europe.  But the independent route taken by the Communist Party had begun under 
Romania’s first Communist leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.  Through the 1950s the 
Romanian party leadership took an increasingly independent line from Moscow, spurred in 
particular by their rejection of Khruschev’s plans to make Romania the principal supplier of 
agricultural produce for the Communist economic bloc, COMECON – a plan which 
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conflicted with domestic objectives to invest in the rapid development of a heavy industrial 
base for Romania. 244  
Ceausescu came to power following the death of Dej in 1965.  The new regime’s principal 
break with Moscow came when Ceausescu opposed the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and began to build economic and diplomatic links outside the 
Soviet sphere.  Ceausescu’s programme of personalised nationalist-communism accelerated 
after a visit to North Korea in 1975.  The regime began to assimilate national myths from 
history and rehabilitate significant figures from the past, co-opting them into the 
Communist narrative of history.245  The government also developed distinctive policies 
towards Romania’s ethnic minorities:  Jewish and Saxon citizens were permitted to leave in 
large numbers as visas were sold to Israel and Germany, generating a source of hard 
currency for the regime. 246  The larger Hungarian community felt itself discriminated 
against in terms of its access to economic and political resources, the way in which 
Hungarian graduates were routinely placed in employment away from their home towns 
and the way in which the ‘Systematisation’ project was directed against their 
community.    
Following the collapse of Europe’s Communist regimes there was much talk of the re-
ignition of ‘frozen conflicts’ and inter-ethnic disputes.  In Romania, sensitivity about the 
integrity of the state’s borders retained a resonance throughout the 1990s.  As shall be see
in later chapters, the political contest between the Hungarian Democratic Union an
Romanian nationalist right was real and at times alarming.  Romanian nationalist 
formations were regularly accused of drawing their personnel from the ranks of the fo
Communist apparatus but it is far from clear that the nationalist right’s strength was 
247
n 
d the 
rmer 
                                                            
244 See Dennis Deletant, Romania Under Communist Rule, Centre for Romanian Studies, Oxford, 1999 
245 Katherine Verdery’s National Ideology is established as a key text on Ceausescu’s co-option of 
rception 
oulder, 1990. 
nationalism to bolster his regime’s legitimacy. 
246 Close to 15,000 people emigrated to Israel between 1980 and 1989, for example.  Yosef Govrin, Israeli-
Romanian relations at the end of the Ceausescu Era, Routledge, London, 2002. 
247 As Gillberg points out, the reality of systematic discrimination may differ somewhat from the pe
but what matteres for this study (because of its role in shaping the views of the Hungarian minority) was the 
perception that the Communist state apparatus was employing deliberately discriminatory policies towards 
them.  Trond Gillberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania, Westview Press, B
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particularly the result of policies peculiar to the Ceausescu regime.248  Instead, the inter-
communal divisions have deeper, pre-war roots and, as will be seen in chapter four, the 
appeals of the far right evolved quickly to be as much rooted in sentimentalism for a pre-
 and 
en 
 groups.249  The electoral process was also 
250
w of the 
 gave the king wide-ranging 
251
 the 
he 
                                                           
war golden age and anti-system rhetoric than in ethnic conflict. 
3.2  Democracy, monarchy and dictatorship 
The early politics of the independent Romanian state were dominated by conservative
liberal camps initially cleaved around issues dating back to the revolutions of 1848.  
Divisions over attitudes to republicanism, approaches to social policy and land reform, the 
status of Transylvania and economic protectionism also developed.  Dynasticism also 
became a significant factor in party divisions, with the leadership of the main parties oft
being supplied from within dominant family
widely perceived as corrupt and flawed.  
Following the creation of Greater Romania in 1918, the party political landscape changed 
with the decline of the Conservatives and the rise of the National Peasant Party.  Fe
election results in this period are seen as legitimate and institutional changes were 
introduced that were intended to give substantial parliamentary majorities to the party that 
secured a plurality of the popular vote.  The 1923 constitution
powers and democracy was far from securely established.  
Like other countries in Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, Romania suffered from
triple strains of severe economic and political dislocation (arising from the fusion of 
Hapsburg influenced Transylvania with the former Ottoman territories), proximity to t
 
248 A survey of parliamentarians after the 2000 election found that almost a third (31.7%) of Greater Romania 
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urban professional classes at the expense of the rural peasantry through the use of 
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249 See Robert Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians, Cambridge University Press 1934
prominent political dynasty was the Bratianu family which monopolized the leadership of the Liberals over 
long periods even re-appearing after the fall of Communism to lead one small liberal faction 
250 The electoral law passed by the Liberal government in 1884 for example skewed parliamentary elect
strongly in favour of the 
electoral colleges and indirect voting.  Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Cent
University Press, 1991 
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Soviet Union and the expansion of the Third Reich.252  The growth of fascism on the 
domestic and the international stage dominated politics in 1930s Romania with home-
grown fascism taking the form of the Iron Guard movement.  The Iron Guard programm
was a mix of national chauvinism, anti Semitism, anti-capitalism and despotism.  Repea
attempts to limit the growth of the Iron Guard movement failed and, in 1938, the king 
(Carol II) installed a ‘directed democracy’ in which only his own party – the Front for 
National Renewal – was legally allowed to operate.  The Royal dictatorship was short-
lived, however, thanks to Carol’s capitulation in 1940 to German and Soviet demands that 
Romanian territory be handed to the Soviet Union (northern Bukovin
e 
ted 
a) and to Hungary 
 
he 
 
nists should support the 
e 
f 
ced 
(about one third of Transylvania).  Carol was forced to abdicate and a military/fascist 
dictatorship installed under Marshall Antonescu which survived until it was overthrown in 
an August 1944 coup with the Red Army approaching Bucharest.253 
The left in the inter-war period was weak and divided – in the seven elections from 1926 to
1937, Social Democrat and Communist organisations only once polled more than 5% of t
vote between them.  The Communist Party was hampered both by the agrarian nature of 
society (and the corresponding lack of a large urban proletariat which Shafir calculates as
just 400,000 from a population of 20 million in 1938) and by its anti-national policies in 
respect of Bukovina (Moscow dictated that the Romanian Commu
return of the eastern provinces to the Soviet Union.)  The Communist Party was banned, 
hindering its organisational capacity, but its opponents also exploited the perception that 
the party was an alien entity led and influenced by foreigners.254 
Soviet military occupation and Communist control followed rapidly on the heels of the 
August 1944 coup.  Given the weakness of the pre-war left, it was inevitable that the 
Communist take-over relied heavily on the Red Army.  Coalition governments wer
initially installed but any pretence of co-operation effectively ended with the elections o
November 1946.  Other parties were either co-opted as partners of the new regime or fa
substantial (often violent) interference with their activities – significantly, Liberal 
                                                            
252 See Aldcroft, D. & Morewood, S., Economic Change in Eastern Europe Since 1918, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot, 1995 
253 Dennis Deletant, Communist Rule, pp. 30 - 51 
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politicians proved more willing to co-operate with the Communists than their National 
Peasant counterparts.  Communist Party records made public after the 1989 revolution 
reveal the extent of ballot rigging in the 1946 election undertaken to ensure a Commun
victory – an event which reinforced the National Peasant Party’s self-image as the deposed 
ist 
255
ame 
then 
 
t-
to popular ambivalence towards foreign powers; within the 
 the 
ting reforms who 
opposition lacked political capital as a result 
but, as shall be seen, the decisions made by the opposition in the immediate aftermath of 
ft by 
                                                           
legitimate rulers power in the state.   Following the election, opposition politicians were 
arrested and King Michael was forced to abdicate and sent into exile a year later.  Michael 
survived the long years in exile and his status – and his right to return to the country – 
briefly threatened to be a significant factor in post-Communist politics (see below).   
It is too simplistic to point to the weak roots of democracy in Romania as an explanation 
for the difficulties that post-Communist parties found in adjusting to democracy.  The s
or similar process of collapsing democratic experiments, dictatorships, occupation and 
Communist take-over are found in every country of the region.  There are specific aspects
of the country’s development that have shaped attitudes and behaviours among the pos
Communist political elites:  the far right drew on the legacy of the Iron Guard; the left 
attempted initially to tap in
opposition, the National Liberals were distrusted because of their record of collaboration 
with the Communists after 1944; and the National Peasants retained a strong sense of 
betrayal at their being denied power in 1946.  But each of these is specific and limited in its 
scope. 
Potentially the most significant element in Romania’s Communist-era development was
absence of a home-grown dissident movement.  Ceausescu refused to tolerate reform 
Communism and no significant internal opposition movement was allowed to develop.  
There was no Walesa or Havel to lead the revolution when it came in 1989 and there was 
no body of administrators who had practical experience of implemen
subsequently cleaved to the opposition.  The 
the revolution had a major impact too on their ability to counter the strength of the le
making full use of the opportunities and resources they did possess. 
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3.3  The fall of Ceausescu 
Romania in 1989 was the second largest state in Central and Eastern Europe (with a 
population of 22 million).  Its population was poor and rural even by the standards of the 
region, agriculture was overwhelmingly collectivised and there was little in the way of an 
independent market sector in other parts of the economy.  In the 1970s, Communist 
Romania had been extensively courted by Western governments because of Ceausescu’s 
maverick status within the Communist Bloc.  However, the regime’s oppressive nature, its 
treatment of ethnic minorities and its policy of ‘systematisation’ eventually led to a rising 
tide of international criticism.256  Ceausescu reacted by cutting links with the West and he 
ultimately embarked on a disas
foreign debt which did not m
trous programme of economic austerity aimed at paying off 
erely rob the population of consumer products and services but 
there 
 
  
rked by an obsessive pursuit of national goals – repayment of foreign 
debt, grandiose construction projects and the banning of contraception to boost the labour 
took the country to the edge of starvation.  Despite this – or perhaps because of it – 
seemed to be no popular response to the series of spectacular collapses in Communist 
power through 1989.  When it finally came, the cataclysm was sudden, late in the day and 
spectacularly violent. 
The exact nature of the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime is an enduring political 
enigma.257  It is well beyond the scope of this work to determine whether what took place
was a palace coup, a foreign-led putsch or a popular revolution. It is necessary, though, to 
try to establish some salient facts from within the myth-making. 
Firstly, it is clear that the years of Communist rule in Romania were marked by an absence 
of active popular resistance to the regime or of opposition activity at the elite level.  It is 
also evident that the regime itself did little to encourage reform either in theory or practice.  
A brief period of liberalisation in the late 1960s rapidly gave way to ideological atrophy.258
While Ceausescu’s economic policy could hardly be characterised as orthodox Marxism on 
one level (it was ma
                                                            
256 Systematisation involved the wholesale demolition of communities and the relocation of the population 
into more compact and thus more easily observed and managed units.  See Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and 
the Securitate, Coercion and Dissent in Romania 1965 – 1989, M E Sharpe, New York, 1995, pp. 294 - 321 
257 See chapter one above (Romanian Exceptionalism section) for a summary of the literature on Ceausescu’s 
overthrow 
258 Dennis Deletant, Communist Rule, pp. 112 - 114 
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pool) it certainly did not match the attempts by serious economic thinkers to reform and 
decentralise Communist economies via market mechanisms which were a feature of other 
states in the region.259   
Intellectual activity was dominated by nationalist themes too, rather than examining the 
changing nature of socialism or exploring liberal democratic western alternatives, a f
that was encouraged by the regime.
ocus 
isible opposition appeared – an open letter 
the 
re in 
nister noted for expressing dissent, and the 
rish which would have provided a 
less effective platform for his opposition.264  Protests grew in the city in the days following 
260  There was little sign of dissent.  Workers in the Jiu 
Valley (1977) and in Brasov (1987) had struck to secure local concessions in the face of 
economic austerity measures, but the protests were localised and were quickly 
suppressed.261  It was not until early 1989 that v
to Ceausescu from a group of dissident party members and intellectuals, published in 
west, being the most notable example.262  The dramatic reforms taking place elsewhe
the bloc seemed to be passing Romania by.   
Given the changes that were happening in the wake of Glasnost and Perestroika, it is 
difficult to believe that some in the governing class were not contemplating or even 
planning for the post-Ceausescu era.  But they lacked the numbers, confidence or 
organisation to act.  The 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, held in 
November 1989, might have seemed the most likely opportunity to move against the 
Ceausescu yet the meeting was marked by a reaffirmation of party orthodoxy and of his 
power leaving violent overthrow as one of the few remaining options for change.263 
The trigger for the fall came from an unexpected source – an ethnic Hungarian church 
mi decision of the regime to remove him from 
his parish in the western city of Timisoara to a rural pa
                                                            
259 Geoffrey and Nigel Swain, Eastern Europe Since 1945, Macmillan, London, 1993, pp. 142 - 144 
ucan, one 
ersion of events leading up to the publication of the letter 
ty through the 1980s) in Silviu Brucan, The Wasted 
ly 
s they had access to Hungarian TV and radio. 
260 Dennis Deletant, Securitate, pp. 107 – 150. 
261 Dennis Deletant, Communist Rule, pp. 130 – 135. 
262 Commonly known as ‘The Letter of Six’, the six referring to the number of signatories.  Silviu Br
of the signatories of the letter, presents his own v
(and the growth of hidden dissent within the par
Generation, Westview Press, New York, 1993. 
263 Peter Siani-Davies, Revolution, pp. 51 – 52. 
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16th December 1989 and the local and then national authorities struggled to contain t
eventually meeting the demonstrations with violence.265 
On 21st December, the press were informed that workers had organised impromptu 
meetings during the night to express their indignation at the actions of hooligans in 
Timisoara.  A mass meeting was to be held during the day in Palace Square.  The dram
hem, 
atic 
ittee member, appeared on the balcony of the Central Committee building and 
moment when Ceausescu’s speech to the rally was interrupted by boos and chants became 
one of the iconic images associated with the collapse of Communism.   
The following day Ceausescu struggled to control events as popular demonstrations grew in 
intensity.  Late in the morning, a second iconic image:  Ceausescu and his wife being flown 
from the roof of the Communist Party Central Committee building in a helicopter.  The 
momentum towards change was clear.  The actor Ion Caramitru led an unlikely take-over of 
State Television:  the means of projection had been seized and the stage set for the final act.  
The dramatis personae took shape:  senior Communists Constantin Dascalescu and then Ilie 
Verdet announced the formation of new governments each of which lasted only a few 
minutes as the crowd expressed their opposition.  Then Petre Roman, a 43 year old lecturer 
in engineering at Bucharest Polytechnic and son of a former Communist Party Central 
Comm
announced Ceausescu’s flight, the end of dictatorship and the beginning of popular 
power.266 
By the evening the nucleus of a new government – the National Salvation Front - had 
formed around Petre Roman and Ion Iliescu.  Iliescu, 59 at the time of the revolution, was a 
career member of the Communist apparatus, joining the Central Committee in 1965 and for 
some time had been identified as a potential rival to Ceausescu for the party leadership.  He 
had been increasingly marginalised by Ceausescu, losing his Central Committee place in 
1984 and being moved through a series of insignificant posts but he remained the focus of 
opposition within the Party.  With the departure of orthodox Party members such as Verdet 
and Dascalescu, the leadership of the Front passed to a group that was dominated by 
                                                            
265 Except where stated, the following details are taken from Peter Siani-Davies’ account of Ceausescu’s 
overthrow, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. 
266 The details given here are from Domnita Stefanescu’s account, Cinci ani din istoria Romaniei, Masina de 
Scris, Bucharest, 1995. 
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dissident Communists including Dumitru Mazilu and co-author of the Letter of Six, Silvi
Brucan but which also included numbers of non-Communists such as the poet Doina 
Cornea and Ion Caramitru.  Unco
u 
ordinated violence continued for a number of days 
e 
 
 
g 
 
f 
dy, what is most important is that by the end of the year power was in the 
unist 
apparatchiks; and that the manner in which they took power was soon to become a source 
 of 
of 
k of structural depth created the 
                                                           
throughout Bucharest and other cities and a significant number of people were killed across 
Romania.  On Christmas Day, Ceausescu and his wife Elena, who had been captured en 
route to a supposedly loyal base in the town of Targoviste, were executed there in the nam
of the provisional government.   
The intensity and confusion of events means there is no clear account of how power shifted
to those who became the National Salvation Front, the degree of pre-planning, of co-
ordination of events or the extent to which they had control over key decisions.  Petre 
Roman’s own account describes events unfolding as a series of accidents as he and a group 
of colleagues followed the crowd in occupying the Central Committee building.  The first
post-Communist Prime Minister claims that his initial moment of prominence – deliverin
the announcement of Ceausescu’s flight to the crowd arose simply because someone in the
crowd realised that he was a professor who ‘would know what to say.’267  From the point o
view of this stu
hands of the Front; that among its leaders were a number of middle-ranking Comm
of intense dispute with those who felt they should be playing a leading role in shaping the 
new Romania. 
3.4  ‘Events of January’ and the beginnings of the democratic opposition 
While the new government took shape, there was an explosion of political activity and
new political parties, many no more than a handful of members strong.268  The number 
these parties, the unfamiliarity of their leaders and their lac
space for the reappearance of older political forces which retained a degree of political 
capital from their pre-war political activity.  The three historic parties – the National 
 
267 Petre Roman, Libertatae ca Datorie, Dacia, Cluj, 1994, pp. 103 - 126 
268 Siani-Davies talks of parties having no organisational existence other than in the lobby of Bucharest’s 
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Peasants, the National Liberals and the Social Democrats, were to form the core of the 
‘democratic opposition’ to the National Salvation Front.   
National Peasant Party leader Corneliu Coposu met with other prominent Peasantists in 
Bucharest on 22nd December 1989 to proclaim the re-formation of the party.  The National 
Peasants rapi erged with the tiny Christian Democrat and Christian National Peasant 
Parties to establish the National Peasant Party – Christian Democrats.  The party was 
established at a m
dly m
eeting of over a hundred veteran and younger supporters on 26th 
cal 
at the beginning of January and formally 
air 
f 
thy 
asserted were the principal problems facing Romania:  democratisation and rapid 
s 
arrier 
ars that 
attempts were being made to recreate Communist hegemony.  The gulf between the 
                                                           
December and formally registered (following the promulgation of a new law on politi
parties on 31st December) at Bucharest’s Municipal Court on 8th January 1990.  Within a 
month the party was claiming 260,000 members, although Siani-Davies is sceptical of this 
claim.269   
The National Liberal Party was reactivated 
registered as a political party on 15th of the month.  Mihnea Marmeliuc was elected as ch
and a five person executive was headed by Radu Campeanu, a former political prisoner o
the Communist regime who had returned to Romania at the end of the year after a leng
period of exile in France.270 
Bolstered by their sense of inherited legitimacy, National Peasant leaders contacted the 
National Salvation Front leadership with an offer to support and work together with the 
new government, towards what National Peasant Party vice president Ion Diaconescu 
privatisation.271  A response to the offer took two weeks to arrive.  In the meantime it wa
becoming increasingly clear that the Front was planning to transform itself into a political 
party and that this, from the point of view of the National Peasants, was the biggest b
to possible co-operation. 
Discussions between the opposition and the Front leadership nevertheless took place on 
12th January.  They focused on the government’s future plans and the opposition’s fe
 
269 Siani-Davies, Revolution, page 240. 
270 Stan Stoica, Romania dupa 1989, Meronia, Bucharest, 2007, page 26. 
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generation of opposition leaders who had been active in pre-Communist politics and the 
new generation of revolutionaries was enormous.  A conversation between Diaconescu and 
Voican Voiculescu is revealing.  Voicules
political activities only a few m
governme
run 
tral Committee building cast in the role of the Bastille, the 
leaders of the Front acquired a level of political capital that the opposition leaders, denied a 
 the 
 the 
man and 
significant concessions including a promise to ban the Communist Party.  Eventually 
                                                           
cu had himself been released from jail for 
onths before the revolution and he went on to serve as a 
nt minister and a Senator representing the National Salvation Front:  
VV:  How is it possible for us, the young people who made the revolution, to now 
withdraw from politics and for you, the old ones, who didn’t participate in the 
revolution, to take over running the country? 
ID:  The fight against Communism began in 1944 and we, the old ones, were 
permanently at the barricades, in jail, illegally, and not just in the days of the 
revolution.  The war did not just consume two days. 272 
The problem for the older dissidents was that their opposition had made no enduring impact 
on the wider Romanian population.  The cathartic events of two days in December 1989, 
though, provided a form of collective absolution for four decades of passive acceptance of 
Communist rule.  Bolstered, too, by foreign dramatisation of the events as a romantic re-
of 1789 with the Communist Cen
place on the nation’s television screens by the exigency of being in exile, could neither 
comprehend nor hope to match. 
The events of 12th January marked a crucial turning point in the opposition’s attitude to
revolution and the Front.  On the 12th – an official day of mourning for the ‘heroes of
revolution’ protesters marched through the centre of Bucharest, led by a priest and by the 
evening a substantial crowd had gathered in Victory Square at the headquarters of the 
National Salvation Front Council, now serving as the country’s proto-parliament.273 
The new government clearly felt its grip on power to be far from secure.   Petre Ro
then Dumitru Mazilu – deputy leader of the Front - in turn addressed the crowd, making 
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Iliescu himself was forced to appear.  He reassured the crowd that the Front was a 
temporary structure and that a series of decrees would be forthcoming that would address 
sserted 
atives 
 
rd
11th 
selves out of power in Hungary 
and Poland but the official announcem
revolutionary m
y the 
ge but, 
appears to be a feature of our times:  ecologist movements in the west are not 
constituted as parties but they also participate in elections.  Solidarity in Poland won 
                                                           
the demands of the protesters.  The announcements, together with the cold January weather, 
combined to disperse the crowd.274   
In the breathing space that followed, the Front recovered its composure.  Iliescu rea
his leadership and, ultimately, engineered the departure of Mazilu from the Front’s 
leadership team after protesters adopted him as a supporter of their cause.275  Over 
succeeding days the promises to the crowd in Victory Square were abandoned as the 
opposition lost its momentum with the dispersal of the protests.  Opposition represent
who had forced the Front leadership to meet with them on the night of the 12th found that 
their subsequent offers of dialogue were ignored.276 The Front leadership had shown 
themselves capable of adapting rapidly to the new political landscape and took what proved
to be a momentous decision.  On 23  January, the Council of the National Salvation Front 
voted overwhelmingly to contest the elections scheduled for May 1990 as a political party. 
The significance of this decision cannot be underestimated in shaping both the short-term 
electoral landscape but also the longer term attitudes of the opposition.  On 5th January, 
Silviu Brucan had said that the Front was not a political party and would never be.  On 
and 12th, senior spokesmen confirmed that the Front was a transitional structure whose role 
was to prepare for elections.277  The opposition viewed the Front as comparable to the 
round-tables where Communist Parties had negotiated them
ent of the decision compared the Front to the popular 
ovements instead: 
The fact that it is not a political party but a Front, a mass movement, generated b
process of revolution, without the rigid structure of a party, is not a disadvanta
on the contrary, it can be a virtue, a positive and dynamic element – which also 
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276 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 16. 
277 Pavel and Huiu, pp. 26 – 27. 
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the election but it is not a party, and there are not parties but Forums in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.278 
3.5  Deepening conflict, hardening of responses 
In response to the decision of the Front to register as a political party, the opposition 
organised a protest rally on January 28th in central Bucharest which was attended by an 
estimated 100,000 people.279 Again shaken by the size of the protests the government 
agreed to meet with a delegation of protestors to discuss their demands.  But, once again, 
the National Salvation Front rapidly recovered its equilibrium.  Diaconescu tells of truck 
loads of workers arriving in the square outside the government building by the time the 
meeting with the delegation ended who were intent on breaking up the opposition 
protest.280  The events of the following day, though, were even more reminiscent of the 
Communists’ intimidation tactics employed as part of the post-war takeover. 
On 29th January, opposition offices around the country were attacked in the name of 
defending the revolution.  Industrial workers and miners formed the backbone of the pro-
Front activists who mounted demonstrations and carried out the attacks.  Demonstrators 
chanted that they had not left the country (as the exiled opposition figures had), “the Front 
= Romania, Liberals and Peasants = the West,” and “the workers do not want you, to the 
museum with the fossils.”281  One well known incident saw Prime Minister Petre Roman 
address a hostile crowd from the balcony of the National Peasant Party headquarters in 
Bucharest to calm what seemed close to becoming a bloody lynching.282   
The following day, Ana Blandiana, a dissident poet, quit the Front Council.  A week earlier, 
well known dissident writer Doina Cornea had resigned following the Front’s decision to 
establish itself as a political party.  The withdrawal of a succession of prominent non-
Communists from the leadership of the Front was changing its appearance to match the 
                                                            
278 Front Communique quoted in Pavel and Huiu, page 29. 
279 That the January conflict radicalised attitudes on both sides is illustrated by an interview given by Petre 
Roman in August 1994.  He was challenged to defend his claims (made at the time of the 28th January 
demonstrations) that the historic parties were planning a coup d’etat – he denied making such a statement but 
asserts instead that the parties were planning an act of aggression against the government.  Petre Roman, 
Romania Incotro, Scripta, Bucharest, 1995, page 56. 
280 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 22. 
281 Apostol Stan, page 220. 
282 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 23. 
98 
 
opposition’s accusations that it was no more than the Communist Party re-born.283  Many 
of those who abandoned the Front at this stage, including Cornea, Blandiana and Gabri
Andreescu, went on to become active opponents of the regime.  Most did not join the 
historic parties (Ion Caramitru is a notable exception as he joined the National Peasant 
Party and was Culture Minister in the 1996 – 2000 government) but instead they went on to 
form the nucleus of the leadership of the civic activist movement and particularly the Civic 
Alliance.
el 
                                                           
284 
Pressure from the opposition did finally succeed in breaking the Front’s monopoly of 
power.  On 1st February the Front Council announced plans to set up a multi-party 
provisional government.  On 9th February, the Provisional Council for National Unity was 
established to include representatives of other parties, ethnic minorities and civil society 
groups.  By this time, though, the landscape of the political contest had already formed.  
Even the setting up of the Provisional Council was absorbed into the growing opposition 
narrative of the stolen revolution: 40% of the places were reserved for the Front with a 
similar number allocated to other political parties but Diaconescu claims that the majority 
of the new parties represented on the Council were shell parties and clients of the 
government, either deliberately created or at best exploited by Frontists, leaving the real 
opposition, in his estimate, with just 10% of the places.285  
Opposition protests in various forms and sizes continued in February and March.  Against 
this uncertain background, on 14th March, the Provisional Council of National Unity voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of a new electoral law which set the date for national elections as 
20th May.286 
Shortly after this decision, the political division between the government and the opposition 
acquired a racial tone.  Between 16th and 20th March 1990 there was an outbreak of inter-
communal violence in the ethnically mixed Transylvanian city of Targu Mures.  Six people 
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died, 278 were injured and extensive damage was done to property.287  The government 
claimed that unrest had begun following demonstrations by ethnic Hungarians to mark the 
anniversary of the 1848 revolution but other reports state that violence started after the 
Romanian nationalist organisation, Romanian Hearth, laid siege to the offices of the 
Hungarian Democratic Union three days later.  Villagers who lived 50 kilometres from the 
city were identified as at the centre of the violence leading inevitably to accusations that 
they had been bussed into the city by former secret police officers now acting as agents of 
the National Salvation Front.288    
Whatever the truth about the events in the city its aftermath marked another step in the 
radicalisation of political discourse.  The notion that, in the wake of Targu Mures, 
Romanian Hearth’s radical position was bolstered by support from the state rapidly gained 
currency among commentators and the opposition.289  The government certainly adopted 
rhetoric that fuelled fears about Hungarian irredentism, creating the political space for 
radical right actors and obliging the democratic opposition to take positions that appeared 
to be damaging in the fevered pre-election atmosphere.290  In return, the opposition gained 
willing allies in the form of the newly emerging representatives of the Hungarian 
community who felt a shared sense of persecution under Communism and who feared that 
the Front represented a continuation of the regime in a different form.291 
3.6  Opening old wounds:  divisions between opposition elites 
The divide between the Front government and the emerging opposition established the 
landscape of post-Communist politics, but crucial divisions existed between the historic 
parties too.  The spirit of both the National Peasant Party and the National Liberals had 
been kept alive among its surviving cadres, either in exile or under cover in Romania.  
There appeared to be little of critical importance dividing their policy prospectuses (see 
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chapter five below).  The genetic memories of the two main historic parties, though, were 
quite different.   
Meaningful opposition activity from either organisation was negligible throughout the 
Communist era and this seriously damaged their credibility in the wake of Ceausescu’s 
ousting.  But while the National Peasant Party was sustained principally by the memory of 
the ‘stolen’ 1946 elections and its leaders’ self-image as the legitimate heirs to that 
dispossessed governing class, the National Liberals considered theirs to be the natural party 
of government from the pre-war era.  This engendered a sense of value in compromise and 
party sacrifice in favour of the ‘national interest’ – in part drawn from the need to justify 
participation in the early post-war coalition governments that were led by Communist front 
organisations.292  Diaconescu interprets the decision of the National Liberals to withdraw 
from the protests of January 28th after the arrival of counter-demonstrators as the first act of 
treachery by Radu Campeanu – an indication of the depth of personal animosity that had 
developed between the leaders of the parties.293 
Siani-Davies points out that the divisions were not simply between the leadership elites of 
the two historic parties but were also internal.  Among the National Liberals there were 
divisions between those who stayed in Romania and those who fled; the party leadership 
was dominated by Bucharest intellectuals and it had fewer technicians and foot-soldiers; 
political dynasties were resurrected as members of the Bratianu family took on prominent 
roles; and the breadth of interpretations of ‘liberal’ was wide with older generations looking 
to the paternalism of the pre-war party while younger activists such as Dinu Patriciu were 
inspired by western models of free market liberalism.294  Among the National Peasants, 
too, there were divisions over strategy:  in Iliescu’s opinion, for example, Ion Ratiu, as well 
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as Radu Campeanu, favoured co-operation with the National Salvation Front but the 
National Peasant leadership marginalised him.295 
                                                           
But the most critical divide within the emerging opposition was between the returning old-
guard and the young activists who were beginning to voice their opposition to the new 
regime.  Both groups came to share a vision of a stolen revolution.  Yet the nature of the 
popular protests, which grew from what Siani-Davies calls the raw energy of the streets, 
was essentially rejectionist and lacking a unifying alternative narrative.  The older 
politicians, and some of the younger cohort such as Calin Popescu Tariceanu and Patriciu 
among the liberals, were torn between oppositionism and the desire to engage directly in 
constructing a workable alternative vision of post-Communist Romania, which inevitably 
meant co-operating with the Front-led structures.296  Large numbers of the new generation 
of activists opted for involvement in non-party structures which prioritised ideological 
objectives over pragmatic policy delivery – it was a critical division which did much to 
undermine the Convention (which reunited the two sides in opposition) when it had to deal 
with the realities of power in government. 
3.7  Democratic Romania’s founding elections, May 1990 
Romania’s first post-Communist elections were a stunning defeat for the opposition.  In the 
presidential poll, Ion Iliescu won 85% of the votes cast on a turn-out exceeding 83%.  
National Liberal candidate Radu Campeanu finished second with 10.6% and Ion Ratiu of 
the National Peasants took just 4.3%.297  The National Salvation Front won a more than 
convincing victory in the parliamentary elections too, taking 91 of the 119 Senate seats and 
two thirds of the seats in the lower house (giving it a virtually free hand in the process of 
crafting the new constitution, one of the principal tasks of the first parliament.)  So 
complete was the defeat of the opposition parties that the second largest party in terms of 
popular support was the Hungarian Democratic Union which was limited to drawing its 
support from less than one in ten potential voters. 
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Table 14:  Results of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, May 1990 298 
Party Votes % Seats 
National Salvation Front  9,089,659 66.3 263 
Hungarian Democratic Union  991,601 7.2 29 
National Liberal Party  879,290 6.4 29 
Ecological Movement  358,864 2.6 12 
National Peasant Party  351,357 2.6 12 
Unity Alliance-National Unity Party  290,875 2.1 9 
Democratic Agrarian Party  250,403 1.8 9 
Ecologist Party  232,212 1.7 8 
Socialist Democratic Party 143,393 1.1 5 
Social Democratic Party  73,014 0.6 2 
Others  18 
 
A number of reasons have been advanced for the Front’s massive victory.  The Front won 
the ‘battle of the narratives’, in part because the government rapidly adopted a series of 
popular reforming measures, in part because the Front was able to neutralise the potential 
negative impact of association with the former Communist regime and, in part, because the 
opposition made poor choices for its own campaign themes.  The new government 
possessed a huge advantage in logistical terms – it was better resourced and better able to 
make effective use of those resources.  A final factor, which became the favoured 
explanation of the opposition was manipulation of the electoral process by the Front and its 
supporters. 
Siani-Davies sets considerable store by the role of the Front’s emerging narrative: that the 
shift from the language of consensus to that of national unity under the Front was a 
conscious effort to de-legitimise the opposition.299  This was combined with an attempt to 
particularise their political constituency among industrial workers.  Other factors also 
contributed to the success of the Front’s campaign themes.  In the first instance, the Front 
succeeded in personalising the ills of the former regime in the figure of Nicolae Ceausescu 
– beginning with the televised trial and execution of the dictator and his wife – and to cast 
the secret police (the Securitate), rather than the Communist Party, as the instrument of 
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repression.300  The Front’s leadership clearly gained substantial political capital from being 
the visible (televised) face of the revolution.  Polls showed 70% trust ratings for Ion Iliescu 
and only slightly lower figures for Prime Minister Petre Roman.  Radu Campeanu reached 
30% ratings but this fell away as he adopted a more adversarial position in respect of the 
government.  Ion Ratiu of the National Peasants and Sergiu Cunescu of the historic Social 
Democrats achieved no more than single-figure percentage ratings. 301 
The opposition suffered as a result of its radicalised opposition to the new regime.  Polls 
showed the disruptive impact of too many demonstrations as high among public concerns, 
public aversion to social discord and opposition to the University Square demonstrations.302  
Opposition to the student protests in University Square was particularly marked, with one 
poll showing 84% disapproval of the protests, 67% support for the government’s calls for 
the population to come to the capital to ‘defend the revolution’ and just 3% approval for the 
attacks on public buildings that accompanied the student protests.303  This is particularly 
significant when set against the key place that the University Square demonstrators won in 
the opposition’s own iconography (see below).  The electorate was uncertain about what 
the future held and nervous of radical change.  An IRSOP poll in April 1990 found that 
74% were ‘worried’ or ‘very worried’ about the impact of price liberalisation.304  As one 
observer summarised it:   
Ignoring the distinction between opponent and enemy was a fault … displayed by the 
historic opposition in an increasingly vicious campaign.  It did not calculate the effect 
of [its] stream of anti-communist propaganda upon ordinary citizens, especially the 
elderly, dependent on the existing administrative and economic structures of the state 
and fearful of any further disruption.  Strident anti-communism, allied to a constant 
emphasis on a clean anti-Communist record, was a particular feature of the National 
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Peasant Party which misread badly the mood of a people, few of whom had not made 
compromises with the system at one level or another.305 
While the opposition struggled to find its voice, the Front took full advantage of the assets 
it possessed.  There is no reason to doubt that the government was genuinely popular as it 
managed the transition away from the policies of the old regime.  Measures such as a legal 
guarantee of work for all who wanted it, for example, are likely to have been more 
appealing to the electorate than the more robust opposition commitments to market-based 
economic transformation.306   
The structure of society and the networks operating within it also no doubt offer an 
explanation for the extent of the Front’s victory.  Cities like Bucharest, Timisoara and 
Brasov experienced violent conflict which gave rise to competing narratives around the 
change of regime.  They also possessed the media penetration and the scope for extensive 
human interaction which heightened and spread the notion of a conflicted transition.  While 
it is important not to caricature village life in Romania at the time as wholly isolated and 
inward-looking, it is necessary to acknowledge the very different revolution experienced 
outside of the major cities.  There, the new leadership attained a level of unchallenged 
popular legitimacy that was lacking in the bigger cities.  Nelson identifies four reasons for 
this: the personal appeal of leaders (who appear to have been drawn from a wide base 
including numerous military personnel); economic factors (the fear of radical change); the 
weak organisational structures of the opposition (the initial, spontaneous transfer of power 
had been done under auspices of the Front who thereafter maintained a political 
dominance); and, to some extent, manipulation.307  Given the real power that local 
structures possessed over vital issues like access to farm machinery etc, it is not surprising 
that voters were willing to transfer allegiance to the Front at a national level if they had few 
reasons to question the legitimacy of their local representatives and, indeed, perhaps 
depended upon them for access to vital economic resources.  
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For the opposition, the outcome and conduct of the election reinforced its perception of a 
stolen revolution evolving into a dysfunctional democracy.  For them, the Front’s ability to 
exploit its advantages went well beyond the ‘soft’ power structures just mentioned.   Ballot 
rigging, intimidation and media bias in favour of the government emerged as favoured 
explanations for the scale of the defeat. 308  
Gallagher cites Silviu Brucan as conceding that the Front engaged in ‘calumny, 
intimidation and vote buying,’ but he also concedes that its is not clear to what extent this 
was unco-ordinated local activism or directed from the centre.309  Dennis Deletant’s 
experiences as an observer of the election are also at least ambiguous in respect of electoral 
fraud allegations.  In particular he offers a plausible explanation of the large number of 
voters who cast their votes from ‘special electoral lists.’  These lists were made up of voters 
who came to the polling stations to cast their votes but who did not appear on the official 
electoral roll.  The opposition drew the conclusion that these votes were illegitimately cast 
but Deletant points out the explanation of local electoral officials is at least as likely – that 
the official rolls had been drawn up some years earlier during the Communist era, that there 
had been no time to update them and that the records were hopelessly out of date (not to 
mention the incentives that might have existed under the old regime for citizens to avoid 
registration).310  Once again, though, with the narrative of a stolen revolution already firmly 
set in the minds of opposition politicians, it was their perception of fraud which shaped 
their future behaviour. 
3.8  University Square, the miners and the birth of opposition co-operation 
The electoral and organisational weakness of the historic parties exposed by the 1990 
elections was reinforced by their strategic choices in January and February of that year.  
The results of the elections reinforced their sense of weakness which in turn influenced 
their future strategy, drawing the opposition towards co-operation and shifting the focus of 
opposition activities to more informal settings.  Student protests in Bucharest’s University 
Square in particular came to symbolise resistance to the Front regime.  On 22nd April 1990, 
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a collection of protest groups came together to organise a demonstration in University 
Square.  The core of their manifesto was point 8 of the Timisoara Declaration (see chapter 
4) which demanded that Communist era functionaries should be barred from involvement 
in politics.311  The Square was declared a ‘Communist-free Zone’ and at the end of April 
some of the protesters started a hunger strike. 
The regime was clearly unsettled by the protests (which mirrored similar events in 
Bulgaria) but were uncertain how to act.  Petre Roman claims that he resisted pressure to 
clear the protestors from University Square before the elections of 20th May.  For the Prime 
Minister the results of the elections removed any legitimacy from the protestors who were 
merely ‘sordid’ and ‘promiscuous’.  Efforts to clear the Square began shortly after the 
election results were known.312  In a television broadcast on 13th June, Ion Iliescu issued a 
plea for the population to resist threats to the revolution from ‘hooligan’ elements.313  Over 
the following two days a reported 10,000 miners from the Jiu Valley arrived in Bucharest 
and proceeded to break up the demonstration.  They also ransacked offices of the 
opposition parties and of newspapers seen as critical of the regime.314 
This second ‘Mineriada’ effectively broke the back of the extra-parliamentary opposition 
movement although lower level protests continued throughout the year.  During the autumn 
of 1990, moves developed to bring together the diverse groups of anti-Commmunist 
protesters into a more organised structure.  On 6th November this gave rise to the formation 
of the Civic Alliance, under the slogan, “we can only succeed together”.315  The scale of 
initial enthusiasm for the Alliance appears to have overwhelmed its nascent organisation 
and as a result it failed to capitalise on the momentum provided by huge demonstrations 
held on 15th November to mark the anniversary of the 1987 strike in Brasov.  By January 
1991, Alliance leaders were having to deal with questions about declining numbers at 
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meetings and frustrated members who felt they were not being involved in Alliance 
activities.316 
Politics remained sharply divided in 1991, not simply over the Front’s policies but over its 
legitimacy to govern.  Radicalised, street-based opposition gained new momentum at the 
end of 1990 with demonstrations to mark the first anniversary of the revolution.  A general 
strike was called in Timisoara and backed by the Civic Alliance.317  Two issues dominated 
the opposition’s discourse through the year – the future shape of Romania’s constitution, 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  However, it was a third – the state of the economy 
and progress towards liberalisation – that ultimately led to the downfall of the Roman 
government in the autumn. 
Through 1991, the constitutional form of the new Romania became increasingly significant 
in political debate.  The bodies elected in May 1990 had the role, effectively, of a 
constituent assembly, drafting a new constitution and a referendum was promised before 
the end of the year.  At the heart of divisions over the constitutional design was the position 
of the monarchy. 
King Michael had attempted to return to Romania in December 1990 but was deported with 
his family on Christmas Day.  The government linked the Timisoara protesters and the pro-
monarchists together as reactionary forces attempting to overthrow the popular revolution 
of December 1989 – sparking a predictably furious reaction from the opposition.318  In 
January 1991, National Liberals in the Chamber of Deputies proposed that the king be 
extended an official invitation to visit the country.  The Front responded by deferring the 
suggestion for further discussion.319  In July, a new National Liberal policy prospectus was 
launched which underlined that most liberals favoured the restoration of the monarchy but 
that a decision between a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary republic should be 
taken by the people in a referendum.320 
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Romania Libera ran stories about the possible restoration of the monarchy throughout the 
year.321  Yet, opposition efforts failed to raise the levels of popular support for the 
monarchy failed to make an impact.  In January 1991, an IRSOP poll showed 13% of 
voters preferring a monarchy with support for a republic at 80%.  In August, the figures 
were 11% and 78%.322 
The collapse of the Soviet Union also added considerably to the tense and polarised nature 
of political debate in 1991.  Events in Lithuania and Latvia at the beginning of the year 
heightened the debate within Romania about the future of Moldova.323  The Civic Alliance 
stood in solidarity with those pressing for independence in Moldova.  For the ‘civic 
activists’ they saw common cause with citizens ‘fighting for the ideals of democracy and 
independence.’  National solidarity with other ethnic Romanians was a secondary issue.324  
In August, the Moscow Coup intensified the debates, raised concerns about external threats 
to Romania’s independence and started a shift in thinking on the left about Romania’s 
position relative to Western Europe. 
Economic problems were beginning to mount for the government and the new privatisation 
law became the focus of bitter domestic debate in the summer of 1991.  By the middle of 
the year, divisions within the National Salvation Front were becoming clear.  The 
formation’s national convention in March saw a fierce battle between reformers grouped 
around the Prime Minister and the conservative left wing around President Iliescu – it was 
clear that the organisation was facing the possibility of a permanent split.325 
On 26th September, the Roman government resigned following the return to the streets of 
the capital of protesting miners from the Jiu Valley.326  The congress of the National 
Peasant Party was taking place at the same time and it is clear that there was some 
confusion over how to react to the removal of the Roman government being achieved by 
their own erstwhile enemies.  There was also a good deal of fear for the future of Romanian 
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democracy.327  National Peasant Party president Corneliu Coposu called for the setting up 
of an interim government led by independents – he ruled out the National Peasant Party co-
operating in a government if the ‘remnants of crypto-Communism’ remained in power.328  
But, in another move that reinforced pre-conceptions on both sides of the opposition, the 
National Liberals decided to join the interim government that was set up by economist 
Theodor Stolojan.  The government was still dominated by figures from the National 
Salvation Front although non-party figures and those representing other parties too did join 
while the National Peasants refused to co-operate.329 
Despite this division, the approach of the next set of parliamentary and presidential 
elections prompted further moves toward co-operation among the parties opposed to the 
Front.  The success of the launch of the Civic Alliance had created the conditions and 
motivation for closer co-operation among the democratic opposition: their supporters 
viewed their political capital as being the potential to act as honest brokers.330  Among the 
historic parties, the National Liberals were more sceptical of any co-operation project – 
party vice president Valeriu Stoica claimed in July that it would be a difficult objective to 
achieve.331  But the historic Social Democrats and the National Peasants, who had been left 
in an even weaker position than the liberals by the elections of May 1990, embraced the 
idea.  A National Peasant rally in Bucharest in May 1991 – where speakers included 
representatives of the National Liberals and the historic Social Democrats - heard calls for 
co-operation in the 1992 elections.332   
The Democratic Convention finally came into being at the beginning of November 1991.  
On 14th November, the National Peasants held a press conference at which they called for 
co-operation between opposition parties and anti-Communist civil society groups aimed at 
recapturing the ‘solidarity of December 1989 – January 1990’.  A joint programme should 
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be based on the installation of democratic institutions, guaranteeing the right to private 
property, opening up a market economy and stopping the process of national decline.333 
The ambitions for the new Democratic Convention, though, were clearly limited in scope.  
At a round table discussion of opposition leaders, Radu Campeanu made this clear: 
It is a club.  An association of people who share a major objective and who 
understand that from time to time we will discuss issues of importance to the country 
in order to fix an identity for us all.  We are not talking about a fusion of the parties.  
Each will keep its identity and point of view.  But when important questions turn up 
then we can consult together and reach an understanding.  The Democratic 
Convention does not have a structure.  It is the name of a coalition between these 
parties so the principle pylon remains the National Convention for the Installation of 
Democracy.334 
Campeanu made it clear that the local organisations of the parties were free to continue 
their activities and that the scope of the Convention’s ambitions was to find common 
candidates for the local elections – no mention was made of the national poll.  Diaconescu 
suggested that a small executive bureau would be necessary but Social Democrat leader 
Sergiu Cunescu disagreed – proposing instead two standing commissions, one to deal with 
local disputes and to organise election material and the other to compile the joint lists. 
Whatever the limits on the scope of co-operation and the strength of differences over co-
operation with the Front, a significant moment in the development of the Romanian centre-
right had arrived.  The division in the National Salvation Front between Petre Roman and 
Ion Iliescu (which was to result in the formation formally splitting in the spring of 1992) 
and the increasingly tough economic conditions, created an environment where the 
opposition could realistically begin to think about winning the 1992 elections. 
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3.9   Romanian exceptionalism: the role of legacies 
The description above shows that elements of Romania’s pre-democratic history were 
important in shaping the post-Communist political landscape.  
The battles fought to secure the creation of a Romanian state meant that the preservation of 
a unified national state was a significant motif. It contributed to the creation of an ethnic 
divide within politics which affected the broad landscape of politics but the contention here 
is that the impact was less significant than is often imagined, both by western and 
Romanian commentators, particularly so in relation to the centre-right. The centre-right 
may have been weakened electorally by its inability to monopolise nationalist themes. It 
may also have suffered organisationally because the ethnic Hungarian community reacted 
to the perceived threat to its integrity by coalescing in a distinct political formation which 
then had no incentive to integrate fully into centre-right structures (this is explored in more 
detail in chapter 5 below). But the centre-right remained consistent in broadly rejecting 
radical nationalism because of its pro-Western stance. A pro/anti-EU divide did not appear 
in Romanian politics (although the left briefly maintained a Soviet-oriented foreign policy). 
And, while the radical right attracted much attention outside of Romania the period of 
extra-parliamentary conflict on ethnic issues was brief and limited in scope. The high 
profile success of Vadim Tudor and the Greater Romania Party in 2000 was both short-
lived and more due to economic failure and anti-system rhetoric than to explicitly ethnic 
appeals. 
Another common theme in analysis of Romania’s transition from Communism has been to 
suggest that the severity of the Ceausescu regime contributed to an incomplete process of 
democratisation. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore those issues in full. In terms 
of the development of the centre right, it is apparent that the absence of any organised 
domestic opposition elites during the Communist era contributed to the  reappearance of the 
historic parties and the conflict that then ensued between those elites and the new 
generation of activists who were politicised in the transition. This is explored in more detail 
in chapter 4 below. 
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The main contention of this chapter, though, is that it was the intensity of the battle that 
took place in December 1989/January 1990, and the unsatisfactory nature of the outcome 
(from the point of view of the opposition elites) that had the biggest and most enduring 
impact on their subsequent strategic choices. The following section attempts to explain 
why. 
3.10 The radicalisation of politics - why it mattered 
Why did the events of January – March 1990 assume such significance for the post-
Communist politics of Romania?  What led the opposition to respond in the way it did and 
how did those choices determine the performance of the centre-right thereafter? 
Gallagher refers to the Front’s decision to contest the elections as creating an ‘irreparable 
breach’ between those who had earlier stood together to bring down the Ceausescu regime, 
one that ran deep into Romanian society.335  By the end of January, events had led to a 
hardening of attitudes which shaped the outlook of the opposition – and the National 
Peasants in particular – for a decade or more.  Diaconescu concedes that both sides could 
be viewed as continuing an old struggle – with the opposition seeing Communism re-born 
in the events of 28th and 29th of January while the leaders of the Front viewed the National 
Peasants as right-wing extremists.336 
Tismaneanu quotes Iliescu and Brucan making public statements opposed to political 
pluralism in the weeks after the revolution and their pursuit of the ‘Gorbachevian model’ of 
a supra-ideological body with no need for other parties to exist.337  The same commentator 
identifies a hardening of the Front’s initially pragmatic attitude towards the opposition after 
the resignation of Dumitru Mazilu.338  But there is a clear sense that the Front was feeling 
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its way into the new political landscape.  That Iliescu and others at the top of the 
organisation may well have initially harboured thoughts of Gorbachev-style limited reforms 
is hardly surprising given their background.  What is perhaps more surprising is that they 
proved sufficiently adaptable to marshal the diverse political assets they found at their 
disposal to craft an enduring and highly successful narrative in the context of open political 
competition. 
The Front rapidly distanced itself from Communism in its choice of language:  as early as 
22nd December, its communiqués were referring to the ‘power structures of the Ceausescu 
clan’.339  But association of the ills of the former regime with the person of Ceausescu did 
not lead directly to an attempt to rehabilitate socialism.  Instead the language of national 
unity was employed, reflecting the breadth of interests assembled in the Front in its early 
days and, it would seem, the ability of the Front’s leaders to read and adapt to the new 
political environment.  Taken together with other adjustments to popular pressure that were 
made by the Front it perhaps also indicates the leadership’s awareness of their own 
vulnerability – and points to the opportunities that might have existed had the opposition 
been able to find space within the new power structures at an early stage. 
Pavel and Huiu, writing as academic observers but also as informed insiders, identify the 
conflict with the Front as forging the Democratic Convention from the first days of January 
1990.  Although the formation was officially launched in November 1991, they see the 
Convention from the beginning as an opposition movement, born from the resistance of one 
part of civil society to the monopoly and abuse of power.  The twin axes of the Democratic 
Convention’s initial activity were anti-Communism and ‘anti-Frontism’.340   
From the very beginning, National Peasant politicians were suspicious of the new 
government.  Coposu had been refused entry to the Central Committee building on 22nd 
December and he clearly drew a direct link between this early exclusion and the violence 
which was inflicted on party offices at the end of January.341  Whatever the truth behind the 
attacks on the National Peasant Party and its leaders, there is no doubting the depth of fear 
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and bitterness they generated.  These feelings shaped the attitudes of National Peasant 
politicians beyond even their electoral victory in 1996.  
Academic analysis and journalistic commentary confirmed the opposition’s interpretation 
of the political landscape and the reasons why it had developed the way it did.  Even as the 
notion of an electoral alliance between the opposition parties was beginning to evolve, the 
nature of the Communist regime – with its repression, destruction of civil society and 
promotion of racism - were being discussed as reasons for the opposition’s weakness.342  
The clash between the older generation of dissidents and the leaders of Romania’s televised 
revolution thus became a source of division and weakness in the opposition ranks.  It led to 
a loss of potential recruits, resources and legitimation as the historic parties were pushed 
into the role of critical outsiders.  And that perception of the parties own weakness in turn 
influenced future decisions about strategy and organisation.  
The bitterness of the division between the opposition and the Front exposed the divisions 
within the opposition also.  National Liberal leader Radu Campeanu in particular became 
the focus of criticism for his choice of co-operation with the regime.  In January 1991, the 
National Liberals’ Executive Secretary – Eugen Mailat – resigned because of Campeanu’s 
ambiguous stance on the status of the monarch, a stance which Mailat claimed was an 
indication of Campeanu’s decision to compromise with the Front.343 
With the fall of the Roman government, the National Liberals decided to participate in the 
new interim government led by Theodor Stolojan – a decision that created enduring 
damage to relations between the party and the National Peasant Party.  In keeping with the 
National Liberals’ traditionally more pragmatic approach they advanced three reasons for 
joining the government, all rooted in the notion that their decision was taken in the national 
interest:  that firm measures were needed to reduce the suffering of the population and to 
correct the errors of the previous Front government; that greater transparency was needed 
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in the way government was conducted; and it was necessary to ensure that equitable 
conditions were created for the next round of national elections.344     
The formation of the Civic Alliance created a breach with elements of the National Liberal 
leadership which persisted through the Democratic Convention era.  One commentator talks 
of ‘panic’ in the ranks of the Liberal leadership on the formation of the Alliance and of 
Campeanu’s ‘irritation’.  Liberalism had seemed to be the ideology of the moment 
following the collapse of Communism and was particularly appealing to young people.  
The National Liberals had suffered a heavy defeat at the May 1990 elections but the result 
was good enough for Campeanu to see himself as leader of the opposition.  This ideological 
and electoral leadership of the opposition was clearly threatened by a new civic movement 
that could bring 200,000 demonstrators on to the streets of Bucharest as it had on 15th 
November 1990.345 
The results of the 1990 elections deepened the sense of division between the opposition and 
the Front.  The opposition parties sought to rationalise the scale of their defeat by adding to 
their narrative of a stolen revolution – for them the elections were a corrupt process 
managed by an illegitimate government.  But public opinion in relation to the elections 
illustrates one of the core reasons for their early weakness.  Only 8% of those polled after 
the elections felt that they had been conducted in an incorrect way.346  While the opposition 
continued to focus on the Front’s lack of legitimacy and to focus on their passionate 
opposition to Communism, the electorate had largely accepted the Front as the leaders of 
the revolution and as the legitimate leaders of the country.  Only with defeat in the 1992 
elections and the gradual generational changes in the leadership did the opposition leaders 
begin to shift their emphasis on to wider, more electorally resonant concerns.  Yet, even 
then, the extent to which strident anti-Communism constituted the formation’s genetic 
make-up meant that it faced huge internal pressures once it finally won power, as shown in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
                                                            
344 PNL: participarea noastra la un nou guvern nu constituie o aprobare a asa-zisie reforme Roman, Romania 
Libera, 18 October 1991, page 2. 
345 Miscarea liberala din Romania la momentul adeverului, Romania Libera, 26 January 1991, page 2. 
346 Peter Siani Davies, Traditional Parties. 
116 
 
So assumptions that underpinned opposition behaviour were set early.  Its political 
narrative was radicalised in a way that risked alienating large parts of the electorate 
(particularly in relation to the former regime since so many citizens had passively co-
operated with its existence).  The theme of the stolen revolution carried through into 
repeated questioning of the legitimacy of the Front and its successors to govern (including 
challenging Iliescu’s constitutional right to stand for election in 1996 and 2000 on the 
grounds that he was limited to two terms in office) which meant that the opposition 
persisted in focusing on issues that were not of central concern to the electorate.  The 
electoral and organisational weakness of the historic parties drove them towards co-
operation.  Yet an atmosphere of distrust was generated between the National Liberals and 
the National Peasants that persisted through to the end of the Convention (see chapter 5 
below).  Meanwhile the Civic Alliance became the home of a new generation of 
ideologically motivated activists and the organisation grew to be both the glue which held 
the centre-right together in opposition and the force which pushed the Convention apart in 
government. 
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Chapter four:  Elites, legacies and organisational cohesion 
This chapter explores the role of personal relationships among the Convention’s leadership 
group as an explanatory factor in its development and ultimate failure.  This follows the 
work of Hanley et al. who determined that ‘elite cohesion’ was a significant variable in 
deciding the success of centre-right parties in Central and Eastern Europe.347 But it also 
links directly to the legacy explanations explored in chapter three above. 
Sean Hanley built on this theme in his study of the post-Communist Czech right.  He 
identified elite cohesion as one important element in the success of the Czech Civic 
Democrats thanks to the shared experiences – in particular the ‘normalisation’ period after 
the Prague Spring of 1968 -  of a number of its leaders which had a significant influence on 
their early political development and on their post-Communist outlook.348   
This chapter shows that there were significant divisions among the centre-right elite in 
Romania and locates the reason for those divisions in the nature of the opposition to the 
Communist regime and its eventual overthrow. 
The story of the Democratic Convention does seem to be a story of cross-cutting divisions, 
the most important one of which was a generational divide between one group of leaders 
who shared experience of political activism that pre-dates the Communist takeover in 
Romania and another who were brought into politics by the Communist regime’s downfall.  
Thus, this chapter concentrates on those two identifiable groups: the older group of 
Communist-era dissidents who became known as the Seniors; and the civic activists who 
entered the political arena via the revolution of December 1989. 
This chapter does not claim that they represent the whole of the political elite on the post-
Communist centre right.  Ethnic nationalists – both Romanian and Hungarian – are not 
included in this analysis, for example.  The political representatives of the Hungarian 
minority were highly cohesive in the sense that the vast majority of them pooled their 
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resources in the Hungarian Democratic Union rather than risk diluting their strength by 
dividing along ideological lines.  Their numbers and limited electoral potential meant that 
their influence on the Convention’s strategic development was less direct and is dealt with 
more fully elsewhere.   The Romanian nationalists exerted a pull factor on the ideological 
and electoral direction of the Convention but they were never themselves part of the centre-
right or the Convention leadership group.  Similarly, the Democrat Party had a significant 
influence in shaping the competitive arena in which the Convention operated.  Its 
leadership demonstrated a high degree of cohesion and partisan loyalty and it is possible to 
trace a shared and influential background for many of them as mid-tier bureaucrats within 
the former Communist regime.  However, while this might suggest that the Democrat Party 
offers an interesting case study by which to test the significance of elite cohesion, it was 
never part of the Convention and its influence on the formation was as an exogenous actor 
not as a part of the Convention’s leadership.   
Other sub-groups and individuals who cannot be easily classified were present within the 
Convention but it was the competing strategic visions offered by the two groups identified 
– the Seniors and the civic activists - that that most influenced the political direction of the 
Convention between 1991 and 2000. 
4.1  The Seniors 
The group commonly referred to as the Seniors consisted of the ageing cohort of National 
Peasant and, to a lesser extent, National Liberal politicians who had opposed Communist 
rule in its early years and who had returned to active politics on the fall of Ceausescu.  
Some of this group had been imprisoned in Romania and others had carried on their 
opposition activities in exile.   
Chapter three above explored the factors that resulted in an absence of active domestic 
opposition to the Romanian Communist regime.  This history meant that there were no 
proto-parties around which opponents of the regime could coalesce when its power 
suddenly collapsed as there had been in Poland and Hungary.  It also meant there were no 
credible dissident elites to rally opposition forces as there had been in Czechoslovakia.  
There had been no popular uprising (such as 1968 in Czechoslovakia or 1980 in Poland) to 
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forge a either an intellectual narrative or a leadership group for the opposition.  There were 
no protest movements, no free trades unions (or campaign groups such as Bulgaria’s Eco-
glasnost349) and no underground universities such as existed in Poland.  As a result the 
leadership of the opposition fell to the re-formed historic parties who could call upon 
activists who had a strong institutional loyalty to their party and to new activists who had 
been politicised by the 1989 revolution.  The dominance of the group of Seniors influenced 
the development of the Convention in three ways: in its choices of political strategy; its 
public image; and its ability to cope with the pressures of government.  The role of the 
Seniors, though, also led to a regular tensions over political strategy with the younger and 
ultimately more implacable members of the Convention.  These two factors – the strength 
of the Seniors’ loyalty to their old party and the lack of connection with the new generation 
of opposition leaders – can be anticipated as having a major impact on the Convention. 
On the National Peasant Party side, the party leadership was completely dominated by 
survivors of its pre-Communist era membership.  Of the ten members of the National 
Peasants’ political bureau elected at the party’s first congress at least eight were activists 
from the pre-war era (the share might have been higher but it was not possible to find 
biographical details for the other two members.)350  Party president Corneliu Coposu was 
born in 1914, had served as personal secretary to pre-war party leader Iuliu Maniu and had 
been imprisoned by the Communist authorities between 1947 and 1964.351  Ion 
Diaconescu, Coposu’s deputy, was born in 1917 and had joined the party in 1936 – 
also imprisoned between 1947 and 1964.  Serban Ghica, born in 1919, was captain of the 
pre-war national rugby team and was imprisoned with Coposu for his anti-Commun
activism.
he was 
ist 
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details are available for Valentin Gabrielescu (born in 1916) or for Ioan Barbus but it would 
appear that both were active in the National Peasant Party in the pre-Communist era with 
Barbus leading the party’s youth wing in the immediate post-War period.354  Of this 
leadership group three men – Corneliu Coposu, Ion Diaconescu and Ion Ratiu – were the 
dominant characters within the party. 
Corneliu Coposu held a unique position within the National Peasant Party and then within 
the Convention.  Coposu’s influence on the party in the years between 1990 and his death 
in 1995 is hard to overstate.  He led the party through this time and was a member of the 
Romanian Senate between 1992 and 1995.   
During its first years of existence the party benefited tremendously from Coposu’s 
moral standing, organisational skills and moral standing.355 
His personal links with Iuliu Maniu carried great weight and his colleagues acknowledge 
Coposu’s skills as a mediator.356 These together meant that he was able to shape the 
direction the party took considerably.  As discussed in chapter five he secured membership 
of the Christian Democrat International for the National Peasant Party in 1987 and evoked 
the words of Maniu to develop a Christian Democrat identity for the party.  He is widely 
seen as the driving force behind the creation of the Convention.  He used his personal 
authority to endorse Emil Constantinescu as presidential candidate in 1992 (and his 
continued sponsorship of Constantinescu thereafter) which had a direct impact on the 
political strategy pursued by the Convention beyond his (Coposu’s) death in 1995: 
The Democratic Convention was an alliance of forces against Communism, against 
Iliescu.  It was left, centre and right, a coalition put together by Corneliu Coposu.357 
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Coposu’s successor as party president was his friend and long-term collaborator, Ion 
Diaconescu.  Diaconescu, inevitably, is personally associated with the National Peasants' 
calamitous performance in the general election of 2000 which effectively brought to an end 
the party’s time as a significant political actor.  Presidential adviser Simona Vrabiescu 
criticises Diaconescu for lacking the political skills and personality of Coposu and for being 
conflicted by simultaneously holding the roles of president of the National Peasants, the 
Democratic Convention and the Chamber of Deputies.358  This analysis is echoed from 
within the National Peasants at local level too: 
Ion Diaconescu made lots of mistakes.  He was outdated.  He didn’t understand the 
economic changes that were taking place.  He held too many positions and couldn’t 
cope and he neglected the party.359 
Diaconescu himself suggests that the animosity created by the 1992 candidate selection and 
by Ratiu’s challenge to Constantinescu’s candidacy after Coposu’s death led to 
Constantinescu vetoing Ratiu as a nominee for the post of President of the Chamber of 
Deputies.360  Given that Diaconescu himself ended up in the post it is reasonable to treat 
this claim warily but the end result was the perceived weakening of the Convention’s 
organisational leadership since Diaconescu had to combine the presidencies of the 
Convention, the National Peasant Party and the Chamber of Deputies.   Of course party 
leaders frequently combine multiple roles but in this case it meant there was no drive from 
the leadership to further the interests of the Convention – Diaconescu’s first loyalty was to 
the National Peasant Party.  And given his age, he had no further personal political 
ambitions to pursue.  
Ion Ratiu was a more divisive figure.  His resistance story is perhaps rather less heroic 
having opted for exile while serving as a diplomat in London in 1940 and going on to have 
a very successful business career.361  His personal style was anachronistic (he was rarely 
seen without a bow tie) and his long exile and personal wealth alienating to Romanians 
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who had suffered the privations of the Communist regime (synthesising both of these 
aspects of his personality he offered expensive perfumes to women who voted in the 1990 
elections).362  His wealth and willingness to stand made him an attractive choice for 
National Peasant Party candidate in the 1990 presidential elections but thereafter he was a 
constant source of tension within the leadership, repeatedly seeking a position at the head 
of the formation while meeting resistance from colleagues who judged that he would 
damage the party’s electoral prospects. 
Although no individual matched Corneliu Coposu’s influence within the National Peasant 
Party the other Seniors held immense political capital thanks to their long histories of 
association with the party and their records of either exile from the homeland or 
imprisonment within it because of their political beliefs.  Yet for many outside observers 
what marked them out was their capacity for bitter feuding, personal in-fighting and 
cronyism: 
Ionescu-Galbeni and Tepelea established themselves as the party’s two-headed 
eminence grise, known for their endless manipulations designed to promote their 
personal protégés’ and block the careers of their opponents.363 
Tepelea had joined the National Peasant Party in the 1930s when both he and Coposu were 
law students at university in Cluj.364  He served as a member of parliament between 1990 
and 2000 and was a vice-president of the party throughout this time.  Ionescu-Galbeni was 
born in 1926, joined the National Peasants in 1945 and was imprisoned between 1947 and 
1955.  Suspicions about Ionescu-Galbeni’s possible collaboration with the Communist-era 
security services fuelled antipathy towards him.365 
The personal feuding was not limited to the National Peasant Party leadership.  It played a 
crucial and damaging role in shaping relations between the National Peasants and the 
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National Liberals too with Radu Campeanu, leader of the National Liberals, taking much of 
the blame for reinforcing divisions within the opposition. 
Campeanu, born in 1922, had led the youth wing of the National Liberal Party before the 
Second World War and was imprisoned then exiled by the Communist regime.366  The 
divisive character of Campeanu has been clear from the beginning of the story.367  He 
achieved a degree of political capital as a result of gaining second place in the 1990 poll 
and opted for a determinedly independent line for his party – Ratiu, for example, reports 
Campeanu’s opinion that National Liberal candidates lost votes in the 1992 local 
government elections because of their association with the Convention.368  It was assumed 
that his decisions to withdraw the party from the Convention and to join the Stolojan 
government were calculated on the basis that he would assume the premiership once Ion 
Iliescu was re-elected as president.369  Such assumptions made by National Peasant 
politicians had deep roots based on a reading of the National Liberals’ history as being one 
of compromise and deal-making to retain a role in government.370  As has been referred to 
in chapter two, it should be said that these attitudes – the willingness to compromise with 
larger forces in order to gain power - formed part of the National Liberals’ own self identity 
too.371 
The Seniors reinforced their control over the Democratic Convention’s political strategy via 
their close links with a number of interest groups that joined the Convention, in particular 
the Association of Former Political Detainees and the World Union of Free Romanians.  
Leading Seniors within the National Peasant Party had close ties with the Association of 
Former Political Detainees - although Coposu turned down the presidency of the 
organisation to avoid it being seen as an adjunct of the party, the post was taken by 
Constantin Latea who was himself a local leader of the National Peasant Party in 
Bucharest.372  The Association was committed to promoting lustration measures to bring 
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former members of the Communist regime to account.373  Ion Ratiu was president of the 
World Union of Free Romanians.  His diaries reveal the closeness of his personal 
relationship with the royal family and the influence of the émigré organisation in promoting 
a strongly pro-monarchist line.374 
The diaspora maintained influential links with the Convention leadership thanks to their 
personal connections with the Seniors.  Constantinescu made a number of trips to the 
United States to court the émigré community after his selection as the Convention’s 
presidential candidate.375   Simona Vrabiescu Klechner was a New York based activist 
within the Romanian émigré community who went on to become an adviser to President 
Constantinescu.376  In her memoirs, she claims for herself a significant role in persuading 
the Convention leadership to adopt a political programme along the lines of the Republican 
Party’s Contract with America.  This led to the adoption of the Contract with Romania as 
the basis of the Convention’s electoral programme for the 1996 elections.377   
There is no evidence of conflicting priorities during the opposition years between the 
Seniors and these sponsor organisations – it seems that they worked together towards 
shared policy objectives.  But it should be noted that it has not been possible to build a full 
picture of those groups’ membership and internal debates.  What is clear is that the political 
approach of the Seniors was heavily influenced by their experiences during the Communist 
era and their memories of a lost Golden Age.  As one young political consultant put it, 
expressing her frustrations with the outmoded preoccupations of the senior Convention 
politicians: 
They were completely out of touch.  They couldn’t open their mouths without 
mentioning the nineteenth century and the monarchy.378 
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Ultimately, though, the split within the Convention was not caused by the Seniors’ 
dogmatic attachment to the demands of their sponsor organisations.  Rather it led on from a 
clash between the pragmatism of the Seniors and the more intransigent ideologists around 
the Civic Alliance.  This may be derived from many of the Seniors having to live a life time 
of compromise to survive as known dissidents under the Communist regime or from an 
increased hunger for power derived from a life time in opposition.  The conflict over the 
Dumitrescu lustration laws, examimed in chapter five above, is illustrative.  Although Ticu 
Dumitrescu himself was one of the old guard of National Peasant leaders his radical 
proposals brought him into conflict with other Seniors who led efforts to block and 
emasculate the legislation because of fears over its impact on the coalition (and, no doubt, 
in some cases fear of what disclosure laws would reveal about their own relationships with 
the former regime.)  A further, surprising, illustration is the revelation that leading members 
of the Convention considered entering a coalition with Iliescu’s Social Democrats after the 
1996 elections.379  While the option, which would have seen National Peasant Party 
General Secretary Radu Vasile installed as Prime Minister, seems only to have been 
considered briefly in the wake of the first round of voting in the elections, the fact that it 
was considered at all suggests that leading Seniors were willing to consider the most 
difficult compromise in order to bring the party into power.  
4.2  The civic activists 
While the Seniors were re-activating their long-dormant party structures, the demonstrators 
who took to the streets in December 1989 merged with members of the ruling apparatus 
who made their move against the Ceausescu regime as it became clear its end was near to 
form the National Salvation Front.  The Front became the new governing entity but it split 
almost immediately – once the more radical members realised the extent to which former 
Communist apparatchiks had gained control of the provisional governing structure. When 
these more liberal members of the Front began to peel away to the nascent opposition few 
of them were well known and none had a popular following or had created a political 
organisation. Known apparatchiks such as Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman and Dumitru Mazilu 
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had ‘seized the means of projection’ and their prominence meant that others had not gained 
the public profile to invest them with the credentials to lead the opposition.380   
Generally the civic activists were much younger than the Seniors, less experienced in 
politics and more radical in their outlook (in the sense of being less pragmatic towards the 
former regime).381   The civic activists dominated the Civic Alliance and the Civic Alliance 
Party but were also found in the historic parties and other civil society groups such as the 
Group for Social Dialogue and University Solidarity.  Their distinguishing feature was their 
prioritising of policy objectives (particularly around lustration and related issues) over 
public office as has been discussed in chapter four. 
Ana Blandiana was the de-facto leader of this group. Blandiana was born into a dissident 
family and she had begun to write poetry that was critical of the Communist regime during 
the 1980s.382  She led the Civic Alliance between 1991 and 2001 and was clearly an 
important link between the ‘Seniors’ and the new generation of civic activists – in the 
words of President Constantinescu’s chief adviser, she was, “extremely respectful to the old 
gentlemen and devoted to the co-operation project.”383  She had a strong relationship with 
Coposu in particular, forged, she claimed, as a result of a shared experience of being the 
victim of negative attacks by the National Salvation Front.384 
The strategic choice of the Civic Alliance leadership was not to accept any elected public 
office and this generated tensions which led to the creation of the Civic Alliance Party.  
Although the Civic Alliance Party adopted the Civic Alliance’s political programme as its 
own (see chapter 4 above), there was no cross-over of personnel between the Governing 
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Council of the Civic Alliance and the National Council of the Civic Alliance Party, both 
elected at the Civic Alliance congress in July 1991.385 
Two of the three leaders of the Civic Alliance Party fit the profile of dissident liberal 
intellectuals.  Party leader Nicolae Manolescu was the oldest of the three – sixty one when 
the party was formed but he was a distinguished literary critic and academic with a strong 
family pedigree of dissidence as his father had been a prominent member of the National 
Liberals who spent two years as a political prisoner in the 1950s.  Party vice president 
Stelian Tanase was 13 years younger, he had graduated in Philosophy in 1977 and had 
spent much of the 1980s under observation by the security services because of his dissident 
activities.  The party’s other vice president, Alexandru Popovici, did not fit the stereotype 
so well.  Sixty years old, he was a professor but at a provincial institute of engineering, not 
of liberal arts in the capital.386 
The Civic Alliance Party deliberately cast itself as an elite party, not a mass party.387  This 
together with its failure to attract more of the civic movement’s leaders meant that the party 
lacked the political capital of the Civic Alliance.  Manolescu himself was also not well 
suited to the role of party leader in a democratic setting, being seen as arrogant and 
divisive.388  In the end Manolescu and the party were marginalised within the Convention 
and left the formation in 1995 to pursue an alliance with other excluded liberal forces 
which failed to make an impact in the 1996 elections. 
The third significant leader from the civic liberal wing of the opposition was, of course, 
Emil Constantinescu.  Constantinescu was born in 1939 into a comfortably middle-class 
family.  He became a professor of geology at Bucharest University and subsequently the 
Rector of the university.  He joined University Solidarity and then the Civic Alliance after 
the 1989 revolution, becoming one of the Civic Alliance’s vice presidents.389  Two related 
aspects of his political make-up had a major influence on his approach to his leadership of 
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the Convention: the first was his lack of a party base within the Convention; and the second 
was his firmly held intellectual conception of the role of state president.  Constantinescu 
showed no interest in, or aptitude for, party-building.   
Constantinescu’s approach led to his separation from other civic activists who maintained a 
more hard-line approach to dealing with the Communist past.  As described in chapter five, 
Constantinescu took a constitutionally correct but narrow view of his role as president, 
prioritising foreign affairs and Romania’s place in the world.  He did, though, see the 
presidency as a tool to engineer a form of social revolution in Romania that would lead to a 
new civic culture and as part of that vision he did set out a radical programme of political 
and administrative reforms as part of his 1996 election campaign.390   
The relationship between two other leading civic activists had a significant impact on the 
politics of the period and the fate of the Convention in particular: Valerian Stan and Victor 
Ciorbea.  Valerian Stan was vice-president of Civic Alliance and minister responsible for 
investigating corruption.  His route into post-Communist politics was as the spokesman for 
a group of radical junior army officers at the time of the 1989 revolution.  As described in 
chapter four he disregarded the demands of coalition politics and published a dossier 
detailing the illegal occupation of nationalised property which named members of the 
Democratic Party among the offenders.391  The failure to pursue anti-corruption measures 
in office was the trigger for the defining crisis in the Convention’s history – the events 
leading up to the dismissal of Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea which began with the removal 
of Valerian Stan from his ministerial post (see chapter five below for details).  The crisis 
left Emil Constantinescu isolated from the political forces that made up the Convention 
(and particularly those who were Constantinescu’s most natural allies in the Civic Alliance) 
and further denied the Convention meaningful leadership which led to it drifting to defeat 
and break-up in 2000.   
Constantinescu distanced himself from the radicals in the Convention, in the process 
leaving the formation effectively leaderless.  Constantinescu’s own background may have 
contributed to his reluctance to pursue the same rigidly dogmatic line as did others among 
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the civic activists.  His supporters defend his approach as one based on constitutional 
propriety and criticise those who demanded extra-constitutional acts to pursue divisive 
political strategies.392  
The central importance of the Timisoara Declaration to the identity of the civic activists 
(and in particular point 8 of the Declaration, which called for former members of the 
nomenklatura to be barred from public office) has been discussed above.  Emil 
Constantinescu’s legitimacy as a candidate was challenged directly in those terms and he 
addressed the challenge directly too: 
It is well known that of the candidates [to be the Convention’s presidential candidate] 
I am the only one who was a member of the [Communist] Party.  I was not secretary 
of the Party or a member of its university committee as has been insinuated.  I joined 
the Party in 1965 at a time when the hope of liberalisation created at the university an 
illusion of internal change.393 
Pavel and Huiu criticise Constantinescu for abandoning the Convention after his election 
victory.  They contrast his approach – attempting to place himself above partisan politics 
and represent ‘all Romanians’ with that of Ion Iliescu who remained involved in running 
the Social Democrats.  Indeed they go further and assert that Constantinescu never gave 
anything back to the Convention, neither as its president or as an ordinary member.394 
Vrabiescu Klechner considers that, although relations between Constantinescu and the 
Civic Alliance were damaged by Valerian Stan’s dismissal, the President opted to join the 
‘club of the frustrated’ with the radicals after the affair.395  Academic analysts Tismaneanu 
and Kligman echo these views of Constantinescu whom they accuse of isolating himself 
from his coalition allies and launching generalised attacks on the political class: 
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Enamoured of his own image, Constantinescu had become increasingly convinced 
that Romanians had failed him rather than vice versa.396 
This sentiment is echoed in Constantinescu’s own words from his autobiography which 
illustrate his frustration with the political realities of being president but also underline his 
tendency to feel let down by the demands of an ungrateful electorate: 
The first democratic presidents after the change of regimes in the east European 
countries in the 90’s had rather similar experiences.  Brought to power by crowds 
filled with enthusiasm, they had to learn quickly that a president elected by a 
democratic vote of the people must be a prophet, a manager and a garbage man.397 
The division between the civic activists and the party politicians appears to have been 
present from the earliest stages in the Democratic Convention but the separation between 
Constantinescu’s team and the rest of the civic activists also appears to have deep roots.  
Pavel and Huiu point out that there was a division in the management of the 1992 election 
campaign, the consequences of which seem to have been long-lasting.  The leading figures 
in the political parties and the Civic Alliance were engaged in managing the parliamentary 
campaign.  The running of the presidential campaign, though, was left to a group of 
Constantinescu’s personal contacts, particularly colleagues from University Solidarity who 
had little previous experience of involvement in politics.398  These colleagues went on to 
found the Romanian Foundation for Democracy as the vehicle for Constantinescu’s 
continued involvement in politics.399 
That this division remained is confirmed by Zoe Petre.  Her almost comic account of 
attempts to professionalise the 1996 presidential campaign illustrate both the isolation of 
the Constantinescu team from the rest of the Convention leadership and the extent to which 
their ‘other-worldly’ outlook might have contributed to that isolation: 
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Some of the campaign advisors came with the attitude ‘you are an ignorant African 
tribe and we are here to teach you.’  They did not know how to speak to us so we had 
to invent our own way.  It was OK.  We read some books.  We were university 
people so we had some insight into semiotics.400 
4.3  The inter-generational shift and the imperative of victory 
Anti-Communism and the belief that the National Salvation Front represented continuing 
Communist power united the Seniors with the new generation of dissident activists in the 
early 1990s.  It provided sufficient glue to ultimately bind the opposition into the 
Democratic Convention.  Over time awareness grew of the potential electoral cost to the 
Convention as a result of being seen to be dominated by the Seniors.  The need for a 
generational shift in the leadership of the National Peasant Party (and by extension of the 
Convention) at the very least provided a pretext for intra-party contestation. 
The selection of the Convention’s presidential candidate for the elections of 1992 
represented a significant step in the attempt to broaden the opposition’s leadership.  Ion 
Ratiu’s account reveals the tensions and manoeuvres that consumed the energies of the 
Convention’s leadership in the first half of 1992.401  Central to the unfolding drama were 
Nicolae Manolescu (leader of the Civic Alliance Party), Corneliu Coposu, Radu Campeanu,  
Emil Constantinescu and Ratiu himself.   
Ratiu was anxious to be the Democratic Convention presidential candidate but grew 
increasingly frustrated with the Convention’s organisational short-comings and the repeated 
requests for financial support from the National Peasants which Ratiu interpreted as a 
requirement upon him to buy the candidacy.402  He complains about long and disorganised 
meetings of the Convention’s national leadership committee and their inability to make a 
decision about the choice of candidate.403  He frequently mused on whether the Convention 
has a purpose at all.404  
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Manolescu began the year as Ratiu’s main contender for the candidacy.  Early in January he 
proposed that each party or group in the Convention should have just one representative on 
the national executive – clearly an attempt to lessen the dominance of the National 
Peasants.405  He began to fade from view, though, during the spring, perhaps as a result of 
Campeanu’s decision to withdrawal the National Liberals from the Convention, perhaps as 
a result of realising that the Convention leadership was determined to find a compromise 
candidate who would be less divisive within the organisation than himself or Ratiu. 
Convention president Corneliu Coposu played the role of king-maker.  It can be assumed 
from his lack of early backing that he has considerable doubts about Ratiu but he was 
unwilling to close down Ratiu’s ambitions for fear of its impact on party unity (and, no 
doubt, funding).406  Diaconescu is cast (by Ratiu at least) as Coposu’s shadowy enforcer as 
Ratiu became increasingly bitter about the lack of support he received from the National 
Peasant Party leadership.407 
Constantinescu defeated Ratiu by 46 votes to 18 in the selection meeting on 27th June 1992 
after Manolescu and Sergiu Cunescu, leader of the historic Social Democrats, had been 
eliminated in the first rounds of voting.  Ratiu was understandably bitter: 
Doina [Cornea] thinks it was a dirty game.  It is certain that all the liberals and all the 
Hungarians voted against me.  Also the Civic Alliance and the Civic Alliance Party 
etc.  From the National Peasants one was always against me.  The Ecologist Party was 
loyal.  What did the Christian Democratic Union do, Simina Mezincescu and their 
partners, the 21st December Organisation?  At least I am sure I had the two votes of 
the World Union of Free Romanians.  Why did Coposu introduce all these aliens into 
the Convention after Campeanu left?  So he could block me?  They all voted against 
me.  So there it is, the coming election will be between two former Communists for 
president: Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu.  What will the others do?  What will 
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[Petre] Roman do?  What will the Orthodox Church do?  The West will draw its 
conclusions.408 
The selection of Constantinescu as presidential candidate marked a watershed for the 
Convention, changing the formation’s public face while at the same time cementing 
divisions that would later lead to the departure of both Manolescu’s Civic Alliance Party 
and Cunescu’s historic Social Democrats.  Personal animosities and suspicions about the 
motivations of individuals continued to influence the formation’s development: for example 
in the case of Dinu Patriciu, leader of the neo-liberal National Liberal Youth Wing, 
attempts were made to exclude his party from the Convention unless he was removed as 
leader but the party was admitted after Manolescu gave his support.409  The Convention 
suffered a period of considerable turbulence in early 1995 following the withdrawal of 
Hungarian Democratic Union (discussed above in chapters three and four), the return of the 
National Liberals and during difficult negotiations with Petre Roman’s Union of Social 
Democrats over the extent of possible collaboration in the following year’s elections.410 In 
March, Ratiu and Constantinescu (and a third candidate representing a minor party) 
contested the presidency of the Convention with Constantinescu winning 13 of the 17 votes 
in the Convention’s National Council.411 
The death of Corneliu Coposu towards the end of 1995 marked another turning point in the 
Convention’s development and led to another step away from the dominance of the 
formation by the Seniors.  Coposu’s death seems to have brought the contest between 
generations in the National Peasant Party into the open.412  It also triggered another brief 
challenge to Constantinescu’s leadership of the Convention from Ion Ratiu with Ratiu 
appearing to question Constantinescu’s suitability as a candidate to oppose Iliescu in the 
1996 elections.413  But despite the fears of immediate splits in the National Peasants and, as 
a consequence, the break-up of the Convention both held together until the elections. 
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The National Peasant Party’s second Congress of the post-Communist era, held in January 
1996, represented a real threat to internal unity, particularly as the centre-piece of the 
Congress was an internal election contest to choose a new party president.  The National 
Peasants were aware of the potential for damage to be caused by their gerontocratic image.  
In the run-up to the 1996 party congress, Remus Opris, a leading figure among the younger 
generation of Peasantists and an important link between the older generation of leaders and 
the wider party, issued an analysis of the candidates for the party’s Central Bureau and 
Leadership Committee.  The analysis claimed to show the diversity of candidates on offer 
but with just 12% being under 35 years old, 11 of 156 candidates being women and both of 
the candidates for the party presidency (Ratiu and Diaconescu) having been born in 1917, 
the figures hardly stood up to scrutiny.414  In the end, Diaconescu, the less divisive 
‘continuity candidate’ comfortably defeated Ratiu in the contest for the party presidency, 
securing 539 of the 703 votes cast.415  The reactions of other opposition leaders to the 
outcome of the National Peasant Congress ranged from enthusiasm to cynicism (largely 
depending on whether they were members of the Convention) but they all shared the view 
that the National Peasants had opted for unity in order to preserve a credible challenge to 
Iliescu’s Social Democrats.416 
A further effort to dispel the ‘Seniors’ image of the Convention was made with the June 
1996 local elections.  A rally for candidates stressed the youth of a ‘new generation’ of 
dynamic and competent politicians.  Young candidates were paraded before for the 
delegates and the media – Radu Sarbu, mayoral candidate for Cluj (who was himself in his 
mid 40s) proudly announced that the formation’s lead candidate for the city council was 
just 35 years old.  If nothing else the rally suggested a more united and professional 
approach to the campaign than had been the case in 1992 with its co-ordinated messages 
and even a stage-managed display of flag waving from 5,000 delegates to greet the 
Convention’s candidate for mayor of Bucharest.417 
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The dominance of the National Peasant’s Political Bureau by the Seniors has been referred 
to above.  The list of supplementary members of the Bureau did include a number of 
younger men such as Ulm Spineanu, an engineer born in 1943; Ioan Alexandru, a poet born 
in 1941, Remus Opris a doctor born in 1958 who joined party after revolution; and 
Constantin ‘Dudu’ Ionescu born in 1956 and, like Spineanu, an aviation engineer.418  And 
over time these men did begin to take on more significant roles in managing the party.419  
By the time the Convention came to power at the end of 1996, the leadership of its main 
constituent party had begun to change.  Only three of the 22-strong National Peasant Party 
leadership group were former political prisoners by this stage – albeit that these men 
(Diaconescu, Ionescu-Galbeni and Ratiu) held the very top positions.420  The party’s 
parliamentary group was also more diverse (a quarter of its Deputies elected in 1992 had 
been political prisoners) but the parliamentary group were ‘weak actors’ according to 
Lavinia Stan which failed to exert substantial influence on the party.421 
Once in government, the Convention had to deal with the strains of steering the country 
through a process of substantial change without a majority of its own in parliament and it 
faced internal pressures as sponsor groups who prioritised radical de-Communisation 
pressed for action on their policy agenda.  Those more radical actors shared a background 
as having been politically activated by the revolution of December 1989 but they were also 
separated generationally and in terms of their experience of Communist rule from the older 
leaders of the historic parties. 
The National Peasants suffered internal strains because of the determination of party 
‘seniors’ not to relinquish control to a generation of younger activists and this has been 
seen as causing a ‘crisis of  human resources’ within the party.422 Ion Diaconescu plays 
down the significance of this division (unsurprisingly given his position among the leading 
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party ‘seniors’).  He points in particular to the party congress of September 1991, the first 
to be held since 1936, as a sign of the harmony within the party.423  It is true that the 
National Peasants initially maintained a greater degree of organisational unity than the 
National Liberals – the cracks in the party appeared later (at a time when the liberal family 
was in the process of re-uniting after a string of splits).  The spark for the crisis within the 
National Peasants was the prolonged demise of Victor Ciorbea’s government which is 
described in detail in chapter three.  The focus of discontent with the party’s ageing 
leadership at this time was the Brasov Group, named after a meeting of 40 parliamentarians 
and local leaders who met in the ski resort of Poiana Brasov.424  The Brasov Group quickly 
became associated with a bid to topple Ciorbea and replace him as Prime Minister with 
party General Secretary Radu Vasile. 425   
Radu Vasile was the leader of a younger cohort of political leaders within the Convention 
whose political roots did not trace back to the Seniors or to the leading figures of the 1989 
revolution.  Vasile succeeded Victor Ciorbea as Prime Minister thanks in part to the support 
of Petre Roman and the Democrats (see chapter three above) and he seems to have been 
perceived as something of a cuckoo in the nest. Ciorbea’s weak position meant that 
Constantinescu effectively ran the government as the key decision maker.  But the 
dynamics changed when Vasile took over: 
Emil Constantinescu had a harder time running the show when Radu Vasile took 
over.  Vasile had a base in the National Peasants and so he was able to oppose 
Constantinescu.  Vasile was more skilled at negotiation.426 
Yet, despite the perception that Vasile was a stronger, more political astute Prime Minister, 
even he complained of his inability to sack ministers for political reasons.427  Ultimately he, 
too, fell victim to unmet expectations and coalition manoeuvrings, being replaced in late 
1999 by Mugur Isarescu. 
                                                            
423 Diaconescu, Revolutie, pp. 81 – 88. 
424 Grupul Brasov se ridica impotriva influentei dlor Gabriel Tepelea si Nicolae Ionescu-Galbeni, Romania 
Libera, 26 March 1998, page 3 
425 Un sindrom al luptei pentru putere din PNTCD, Romania Libera, 27 March 1998, page 2.  Diaconescu also 
identifies the Brasov Group having been formed by supporters of Vasile:  Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 223. 
426 Interview with Daniel Daianu. 
427 Liliana Pop. 
137 
 
The enduring significance of the Brasov Group as a faction within the National Peasant 
Party is difficult to discern (once its objective of removing Ciorbea had been achieved) and 
it may well represent no more than the first steps in a leadership bid based on personality 
rather than a coherent programme for internal party reform.  But it was symbolic of the 
inter-generational strains within the formation that it was created at all.  A further schism 
within the National Peasants followed Ciorbea’s removal from office as the former premier 
became a focus for more radical anti-Communist voices among the National Peasants.  The 
summer of 1998 saw the first appearance of the description of this group as the National 
Peasant’s Taliban.428  Ciorbea eventually led a break-away party – the National Christian 
Democratic Alliance – which made little electoral impact before re-merging with the 
National Peasants following the 2000 election defeat.429  Further initiatives to prompt 
internal reform followed.  Dudu Ionescu, who at a later date briefly led the National 
Peasants, launched the Initiative for Unity of the National Peasant Party which called for 
improved internal communication and an effort to re-assert Christian Democratic ideals as 
the leading force within the government.430  But, in the absence of a significant and 
coherent alternative centre of power within the party the gerontocracy retained its leading 
role until the election of 2000, even as the vitality of the party ebbed away in the face of 
impending electoral defeat. 
The changes of strategy made by the family of liberal parties seems to have been less 
driven by inter-generational differences in outlook.  The withdrawal of the National 
Liberals from the Convention, the splits within the party, its return to the Convention and 
subsequent reunification are as significant in influencing the development of the 
Convention as the changes that took place in the National Peasant Party, though.  Both 
Campeanu and the party’s much younger executive secretary Valeriu Stoica were seen as 
pragmatists who promoted a centrist agenda.431  Mircea Ionescu-Quintus was one of the 
                                                            
428 Pragmatismul talibanilor, Romania Libera, 13 July 1998, page 2. 
429 The Alliance was formed in April 1999 and ran candidates in the 2000 local elections.  It joined the 
Democratic Convention 2000 alliance for the General Election of that year (see below) and merged with the 
National Peasants in June 2001.  Preda and Soare, page 179. 
430 Initiativa pentru Unitatea PNTCD, Romania Libera, 17 October 1998, page 2.  The failure of National 
Peasant leaders to assert Christian Democrat values within the government was a common theme of criticism 
after 1998 – a reflection of the feeling that the party had lost the initiative within the coalition to the Democrat 
Party.  
431 Lucrarile Forumului ideilor liberale, Romania Libera, 27 July 1991, page 3. 
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Seniors but once he assumed the leadership of the party he allowed a younger cohort of 
leaders to determine the direction of the party.  Among those who stayed loyal to the 
National Liberal Party throughout there seemed to be a shared acceptance of the party’s 
role as a moderating influence that should be achieved by seeking accommodation with the 
party in power.  Ideology and personality played a role in the internal battles:  the neo-
liberal businessman Dinu Patriciu seemed regularly to be at the centre of controversies 
within the liberal movement.432 
That said, Valeriu Stoica considers an opportunity for liberal unity to have been missed in 
early 1993 thanks to the division that had grown up between the Seniors and the young 
radicals.  Stoica quit his executive post but not the party in protest at Campeanu’s decision 
to leave the Convention.  Following the disastrous performance of the National Liberals in 
the parliamentary elections he led efforts to get the party leadership to take responsibility 
for the results and he supported the successful move to replace Campeanu as leader of the 
party with Mircea Ionescu-Quintus.  Almost simultaneous to the change of National Liberal 
leadership was the congress which formed the Liberal Party ’93 from the National Liberal 
Youth Wing and the National Liberal Party - Democratic Convention.  Stoica pushed for 
reunification of the liberal groups but he and others were expelled from the National 
Liberal Party instead.433  
4.4  Conclusion 
The evidence of contemporary perceptions suggests that the different historical experiences 
that divided the key Convention elites played an important role in the organisational 
development of the centre right, at least initially.  
The views of those involved at the time are inevitably coloured by their own partisan 
considerations but their perceptions are nonetheless significant in understanding the internal 
dynamics of the Convention.  For Varujan Vosganian, for example, the problem at the core 
of the Convention was the division between the civic society activists and the historic 
parties and the lack of a clearly dominant force: 
                                                            
432 Banii si politica in PNL-AT, Romania Libera, 2 July 1992, page 3. 
433 Valeriu Stoica, Provocari, pp. 28 – 36. 
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The Convention was a big balloon but each party within it had a small level of 
support.  There was a difference in quality between the National Liberals and the 
National Peasants: the liberals were more skilled, younger and more involved in 
economic life.  The National Peasant Party was an anachronism.  Its leaders were 
motivated by anti-Communism but the main priority [for the country] was 
modernisation.  They had no ideas about the future.  There was a fundamental 
structural problem for the Convention: it was a Centaur, half party and half civil 
society organisation.  The civil society organisations had the capacity to vote and that 
created strange pressures in the Convention.434 
For Valerian Stan the Seniors were the main block on Convention unity as they re-fought 
old battles between the National Peasants and the National Liberals and refused to allow a 
new generation of leaders to come to develop: 
The old leaders were very important.  They refused to allow new leaders to come 
through.  Some of these new people remained in marginal roles, some gave up, 
some joined other parties such as the Democrats.435 
It is clear that when the Democratic Convention was formed there was no intention that it 
should evolve into a single party or even a permanent alliance.  It was a more substantial 
structure than co-operation projects that had previously been discussed where parties had 
discussed collaborating in two-stage local election contests or even running joint lists of 
candidates but with a minimal common manifesto.  The arrival on the scene of the Civic 
Alliance created the glue for the new project but its aim was still minimal in scope – the 
creation of a politics without Communism and quasi-Communists.436 
Zoe Petre summarises the situation: 
The Democratic Convention was basically an electoral alliance.  The parties were so 
jealous of their autonomy that they never accepted anything more than this.  As proof, 
they had separate parliamentary groups, although this did give them more positions in 
                                                            
434 Interview with Varujan Vosganian. 
435 Interview with Valerian Stan. 
436 Opozitia Unita – o alternative, Romania Libera, 14 November 1991, page 1. 
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the parliamentary structure.  Each week we on the outside were puzzled and frustrated 
that another co-operation project was dropped by the parties.437 
The elites within the historic parties retained greater loyalty to those parties than to the 
Convention itself, driven in large part by the dominant position of leadership cadres who 
had been active within those parties before the Communist era. This legacy factor resulted 
in resistence to complete organisational integration on the centre-right and a particular set 
of values being dominant among an important element of the Convention leadership.   
But by the time the Convention came to power these legacy factors were beginning to fade. 
Internally both of the main historic parties faced pressures from a cohort of new 
‘professional politicians’ who were ambitious to advance their careers and ideas.  For 
whatever reason the National Liberals seemed better able to cope with this transition from 
an old to a new generation of leaders with the likes of Valeriu Stoica, Dinu Patriciu and 
Calin Tariceanu gaining leadership positions with the support of older leaders like Mircea 
Ionescu Quintus.  Perhaps it was because ideological division gave some greater form to 
the contest (with the younger generation promoting more radical liberalisation of the 
economy); perhaps it was because the structural divisions within the party created by 
Campeanu’s decision to leave the Convention created the opportunity for the younger 
leaders to gain greater leverage.  Perhaps it was something to do with the party’s genetics, 
its self image as being more open, forward looking and pragmatic. 
 Within the National Peasants, the death of Corneliu Coposu seemed to bring these internal 
divisions to a point of crisis.  Coposu’s successor, Ion Diaconescu acknowledges the 
leading role of Coposu in developing the post-Communist version of the party but, 
understandably, he rejects claims that Coposu’s death meant the death of the National 
Peasant Party: 
Of course, Coposu was chosen by us as president of the party, as the first among 
equals, because of his multiple qualities. A leader of the party from the gallery of 
great Romanian political figures, descending from Maniu and Michalache, Coposu 
had a profound understanding and a wide vision of politics and the Romanian nation. 
                                                            
437 Interview with Zoe Petre, February 2009, Bucharest. 
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But tens of thousands of others who were devoted to this party also fought... the 
sacrifice was not limited to Coposu.  The large part of the old guard who formed the 
party  leadership of the National Peasant Party shared a similar background to 
Coposu, starting in the 1930s before the Second World War, fighting against all 
dictatorship and culminating in the dramatic battle against the Communist regime.  It 
is clear that this event at the last moment [Coposu’s death] was not a fatal blow to the 
National Peasant Party.438 
Pavel and Huiu suggest that Coposu’s death in fact led to the ‘unblocking’ of opposition 
politics as  Constantinescu, freed from obligations to his sponsor, was able to take the more 
pragmatic line that resulted in the break with the more radical anti-Communists associated 
with the Civic Alliance.439  But Constantinescu lacked the will, and the power base, to craft 
a united formation.  His academic background made him poorly suited to the demands of 
mass electoral politics and he proved to be a poor leader of a complex political organism. 
And as Pavel and Huiu suggest, Constantinescu’s election to the presidency meant that the 
Convention had no one to lead it after the 1996 election victory: 
After Constantinescu’s victory the Convention no longer had a leader who would be 
preoccupied with... the accommodation of divergent points of view and finding a 
consensus.  This role had historically been performed by Coposu and then by 
Constantinescu, helped by the National Peasant Party (because the Convention had 
proved an excellent electoral vehicle) and the civic society associations.  The new 
president elected by the Convention was Ion Diaconescu who was also president of 
the National Peasant Party.  A few days later Diaconescu became the Triple President 
as he was elected president of the Chamber of Deputies.440   
In office the Seniors themselves seem to have been more flexible than might have been 
expected.  The battles over the Dumitrescu lustration laws and the contemplation of 
coalition options with the Social Democrats mentioned above appear to underline two 
points.  The first is that some of the Seniors were willing to compromise the unity of the 
                                                            
438 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 169. 
439 Pavel and Huiu, page 242 and 461. 
440 Pavel and Huiu page 318. 
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Convention to protect their own personal positions.  But both events could also be 
characterised as underlining the strength of institutionalised loyalty to the National Peasant 
Party itself.  Very few of the Seniors split from the party in the decade up to the 2000 
elections (and indeed the survivors of the group largely stayed loyal to the party after it fell 
from power after 2000) despite the many difficult decisions the Party faced.  Ion Ratiu is a 
good example of this.  Despite his defeat by Emil Constantinescu in the contest to be 
Convention presidential candidate in 1992 Ratiu remained loyal to the National Peasant 
Party and the Democratic Convention despite regular exhortations from his friends to run as 
an independent candidate.441  He appears to have come closest to wavering when in mid 
August 1992 (he claims) he was offered the candidacy of the National Liberal Party, 
believing this would force Constantinescu to withdraw in his favour.  The scheme came to 
nothing.442  Even Dumitrescu was expelled rather that resigning as the conflict over his 
lustration law deepened.443  Instead it tended to be the younger, newer recruits to the party 
who left it when it didn’t meet their own immediate aims – Prime Ministers Victor Ciorbea 
and Radu Vasile included and ultimately President Constantinescu too who had joined the 
party in the mid 1990s at Coposu’s request.  The loyalty to the party was a source of 
strength for the National Peasants as an organisation but also, potentially, a block on wider 
opposition unity – on any efforts to craft a new centre-right force out of the Convention 
project. This sense of shared interest may well have been reinforced by the patronage 
networks that were constructed by a number of the Seniors and which are referred to in the 
early part of this chapter.  But it is important to note that whatever their personal 
animosities – and they often appeared to be intense – most of the Seniors group remained 
with their parties to the end.   
Although dominant at the beginning, the Seniors were challenged by younger leaders 
because of their age and outlook.  As will be shown in chapter five, it was the Civic 
Alliance that was the motive force behind the creation of the Democratic Convention.  But 
the Civic Alliance was essentially an anti-party that gave far greater priority to the 
implementation of policy demands than to electoral concerns or structural party building.  
                                                            
441 Ratiu, page 219, page 245 etc. 
442 Ratiu, page 274. 
443 Lavinia Stan, Lustration. 
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As such it was unable to contribute to strategic choices that would have consolidated the 
Convention’s position. Its genesis was the moment of Ceausescu’s overthrow. The absence 
of a Communist-era domestic opposition meant that its leaders were unused to the practice 
of politics and their values were forged in the heady, idealistic days of December 1989. 
The civic activists were disappointed by the Convention’s failure to follow their idealistic 
approach in government and were particularly surprised to find that one of their number – 
Emil Constantinescu – was chief among the pragmatists.  But as has been shown, 
Constantinescu’s background was rather different from the leading dissidents who shaped 
the Civic Alliance and he appears to have been practically excluded from the pack by other 
civic activists even before he was elected. 
So the evidence here suggests that the Convention’s dominant leadership elites were shaped 
by formative experiences and that those experiences were very different. 
It is also apparent that the importance of the division between the two elite groups eroded 
over time.  This means that, while it is possible to attribute some of the structural 
weaknesses that characterised the Convention to the dominance of this legacy of division, it 
does not seem to offer a complete explanation for its ultimate failure: by the time the 
Convention entered government a new generation of leaders (and potential leaders) had 
appeared who had the option of developing new strategies for the centre right that were less 
influenced by either events of December 1989 or the memories of what had gone before.  
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Chapter 5:  Exit, voice and precious little loyalty, case studies in the organisational 
development of the Democratic Convention 
Under any economic, social, or political system, individuals, business firms, 
and organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient, rational, law 
abiding, virtuous or otherwise functional behaviour.  No matter how well a 
society’s basic institutions are devised, failures of some actors to live up to the 
behaviour which is expected of them are bound to occur if only for the most 
accidental of reasons.444 
This chapter aims to explore the organisational choices made by Convention leaders and 
how they might have contributed to its ultime failure. Refering back to chapter one, the 
general proposition made was that a unified structure would present higher barriers to exit 
for elite actors and thus will be more likely to succeed than an electoral coalition. In the 
specific case of the Democratic Convention it is suggested that the involvement of non-
party formations would weaken its organisational coherence (by diversifying its objectives 
and incentive structures). It is also proposed that the ‘flat’ organisational structure which 
evened out power among the various members would reduce its ability to cohere around a 
single set of objectives. And the elite-centred nature of the organisation is also expected to 
weaken the organisation’s ability to endure and broaden its appeal as constituent entities 
lacked the incentives to substitute their own goals for those of the Convention.  
The first part of the chapter gives further detail on the Convention’s organisational 
structure, adding to the information provided in chapter two above. It explores the inner 
tensions of the Convention further by focusing on three key points in its history.  It attempts 
to test mpact of the Convention’s organisational choices on its viability and breadth via its 
responses to three key crises each affecting different parts of the alliance and each 
illustrating organisational responses to the differing incentive structures affecting the main 
member organisations.  
The Convention was a loose alliance operating in a highly polarised political environment.  
Its leaders lacked experience of running mass parties and in fighting elections; many were 
                                                            
444 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit ,Voice and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, page 1. 
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also unfamiliar with the electoral battleground because they had lived for decades as exiles 
from Romanian society.   And the feedback mechanisms available to political leaders in the 
early years of democratic politics in Romania were crude and often distrusted.445  Within 
the relatively small body of work exploring the performance of the Democratic Convention, 
there has been almost no attempt to examine the reasons for and the effects of the 
formation’s choice of organisational structure.  Huiu and Pavel describe the Convention’s 
internal structures in some detail but theirs is a largely narrative account aimed in the main 
at determining whether the Convention existed in a ‘real’ or a ‘virtual’ form outside of 
elections and whether it ceased to exist at all in any meaningful sense after the 1996 
election victory.446  Roper offers a study of the views of local party leaders regarding the 
performance and future development of the Convention but it does not seek to place its 
findings in a broader context.447  Lazaroiu’s contribution is set out in chapter 1 but although 
it identifies a number of possible explainations for the Convention’s defeat in the 2000 
elections, it does not explore why the Convention’s organisational structure was unable to 
cope with the strains of governing.448  The journal Sfera Politicii has published a number of 
insightful articles, particularly focusing on aspects of the formation’s collapse but these are 
generally (well informed) opinion pieces rather than derived from systematic research.449  
So it is necessary to reconstruct motives behind the Convention’s organisational choices. 
  5.1  Convention governance structures 
The three main elements of Democratic Convention governance at a national level were the 
Council, the Executive Committee and the Presidency.450  A National Consultative 
Committee was added later.451  The Executive Committee consisted of two representatives 
                                                            
445 Politicians contesting the early elections lacked a base of knowledge about voting patterns and electoral 
behaviour.  The parties of the Democratic Convention in particular sought to fill this gap by obtaining input 
from foreign agencies and sister parties but this was prone to misapplication.  Polling was in its infancy, was 
unregulated and often either slanted to the desires of those procuring the data or simply inaccurate (as late as 
2000, for example, Romania Libera carried extensive inquests into how polling organisations missed the rise 
of Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania Party and the impending catastrophe facing the Convention). 
446 Pavel and Huiu, particularly Chapter 6. 
447 Roper, Unity and Fragmentation.  
448 Sebastian Lazaroiu authored the Romanian case study in Ucen and Surochak. 
449 See in particular Sfera Politicii 87/88, their special edition dealing with the 2000 elections, published by 
FSC, Bucharest, 2001 
450 Pavel and Huiu, page 290. 
451 Pavel and Huiu, page 292. 
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from each party plus representatives of the Association of Former Political Prisoners and 
the Civic Alliance.  It was responsible for operational decisions and was effectively the 
most important body within the structure.452  The Council had a more strategic remit, being 
responsible for approving decisions of the Executive Committee and deciding on the 
membership of the Convention.  Every formation belonging to the Convention could send 
two representatives to the Council but the member organisations had just one vote each.453  
The President of the Convention (initially, National Peasant Party leader Corneliu Coposu) 
acted as chair and figurehead.  He was elected by a simple majority of the executive 
committee for a two year term (with no limits on the number of terms that could be 
served).454  In 1996, the National Consultative Committee was set up to involve prominent 
figures from the worlds of culture and business in the development of the Convention’s 
identity – there is little indication that it fulfilled this role effectively.  The Democratic 
Convention also operated a number of administrative departments and policy study groups 
although it is unclear how active these parts of the organisation ever became, particularly in 
view of later criticism by Civic Alliance leaders.455 
Thus the formal structures of the Convention were relatively egalitarian in that each 
member party was equally represented regardless of relative size.  This was clearly 
intended to avoid any one formation gaining dominance of the Convention but, despite this, 
the National Peasant Party quickly came to be seen as the dominant party.  The National 
Liberals split in 1992 with a significant section of the party leaving the Convention and 
although the liberals were re-united within the Convention in time for the 1996 elections, 
by then both the historic Social Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Union had left 
which meant that the National Peasants were clearly the largest political party in the 
Convention for a significant part of its history.  However, the governance mechanisms of 
the Convention constrained the ability of the National Peasant Party to fully exploit its 
leading role.  Instead, the external sponsor organisations – the civic society groups – held a 
pivotal position.  The Civic Alliance gained a moral authority not just from its leading 
                                                            
452 Pavel and Huiu, page 290. 
453 Pavel and Huiu, page 291. 
454 Pavel and Huiu, page 291. 
455 Interview with Iulia Huiu (co-author of the only book-length history of the Convention), August 2008, 
Bucharest.  See also Civic Alliance, Conditiile Ramanerii Aliantei Civice In Conventia Democrata, 
Bucharest, 12 December 1997.  www.aliantacivica.ro/documente, accessed 17 May 2008. 
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members’ refusal to pursue state office but also from the active role it played in bringing 
together the opposition parties and in holding the Convention together: 
The Civic Alliance people were essential for their capacity for political 
communication between the parties.  [Civic Alliance leader] Anna Blandiana was 
extremely respectful to the old gentlemen and devoted to the co-operation project and 
she never wanted an official position.456   
But as well as acting as a binding agent in opposition, when the objectives were clear and 
un-muddied by the realities of power, the seeds of a destructive disillusionment lay in the 
origin and organisational objectives of the Civic Alliance which set it apart from the 
historic parties and gave it both a sense of moral superiority and a clearly different set of 
objectives that were policy based rather than based on the pursuit of office: 
The Civic Alliance is a unique movement.  It was born in the confusion and despair 
of 1990.  It was based on the sacrifice of those who were killed or injured in the 
Revolution, the sacrifice of those who were beaten by the miners, their sacrifice 
meant they gave up their personal lives to campaign for an idea...  The Civic 
Alliance is an organisation born after the fall of Communism, it gains its legitimacy 
from belief and sacrifice.  It was born not in the courts but in the streets, in the 
arena, in a moment in which history stood in a dangerous balance towards a 
disastrous future for Romania.457 
So the structures of the Convention were designed to balance power between member 
parties whose relative strength had been barely tested in the electoral arena.  The balance 
was shifted by the National Liberals’ decision to leave the formation at a crucial time, 
giving the National Peasant Party the opportunity to establish an internal dominance thanks 
to its close links with civil society member organisations.  But the party’s leading position 
was not so complete as to allow it to use the Convention to dominate the centre-right space 
                                                            
456 Interview with Zoe Petre, chief political counsellor to President Emil Constantinescu (and one of the 
President’s closest and longest serving collaborators), February 2009, Bucharest. 
457 Emil Constantinescu addressing the 4th National Congress of the Civic Alliance.  Congresul Aliantei 
Civice, Romania Libera, 26 February 1996, page 3. 
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in politics.  Instead it relied on the Convention to provide the shield of a wider 
organisational reach and public credibility. 
Table 15: Organisational structure of the Democratic Convention 
President 
De facto leader of 
the Convention
Consultative 
committee 
Admin and policy 
directorates 
Executive 
Responsible for operational 
decisions. Each member 
organisation elects two 
representatives 
Council 
Responsible for strategic 
decisions. Member organisations 
elect two representatives but they 
have only one vote 
 
Member party 
Retain independent 
existence. Day‐to‐
day political activity 
continues 
Member NGO 
Retain independent 
existence. Formal 
links weakened in 
government 
Parliamentarians 
No formal 
relationship to 
Convention 
structure
Local groups  
Ad hoc structures to 
select local election 
candidates and 
make appointments
5.2  The party continues: political activity in the constituent organisations 
The core purpose of the Convention was to create a unified opposition to the Communist 
successor left: bringing together the historic parties which had established themselves as the 
leading opposition organisations in the wake of the revolution; civil society groups; and a 
number of newer political formations that had established themselves organisationally to a 
greater or lesser extent (most notably the Hungarian Democratic Union and the Ecologist 
parties.)  Throughout the Convention’s existence, though, the constituent parties retained 
their independent identities with the elements of normal political life – party congresses, the 
constitution of parliamentary caucuses for example – operating at a party level rather than 
being organised in the name of the Convention.  Civil society groups – particularly the 
Civic Alliance - provided the pressure for co-operation and worked hard to keep the 
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fractious alliance together and this gave them a powerful role within the organisation.  
Nevertheless, the internal life of the Convention was dominated by disputes between the 
political parties as they strove to attain their own operational goals.    
The National Peasant Party was ever-present in the Convention and was the dominant force 
within the formation.  As the successors to the pre-Communist National Peasant Party, the 
leaders of the party shared a powerful institutionalised memory of ‘stolen victory’ in the 
1946 election and of pre-war electoral strength.458  Despite winning less than 3% of the 
vote in the presidential elections of 1990, the party saw its natural role to be leading the 
opposition to the ‘continuing Communism’ of the National Salvation Front (and 
subsequently Ion Iliescu’s Social Democrats).  As the dominant party in the Convention, 
the National Peasants retained a strong commitment to the formation, seeing it as the most 
effective vehicle for delivering its primary objective:  control of government at a nation 
level.  At the same time its clear leadership role was a source of tension with the other 
parties.  The National Peasants were often accused (by their liberal colleagues) of using the 
civil society groups to reinforce their control of the organisation.459  The links between two 
of the leading civil society groups and the National Peasant Party are clear:  the party’s 
presidential candidate in 1990, Ion Ratiu, led the World Union of Free Romanians;460 and 
party leader Corneliu Coposu turned down the invitation to lead the Association of Former 
Political Prisoners because of a desire for the organisations to be seen as separate – instead 
the Association’s first president was a less well known National Peasant Party official, 
Constantin Latea.461  But this should not, perhaps, be overplayed since the Civic Alliance 
was the civil society group with by far the biggest influence and it strenuously maintained 
its party political independence. 
The liberal family showed a remarkable tendency to fracture throughout the 1990s due both 
to disputes over strategy and over ideology.  But this was coupled with an institutional 
resilience on the part of the National Liberal Party which led to the party remaining the 
focal point for liberal elites.  The almost dizzying list of breakaways and mergers in this 
                                                            
458 See Chapter 2 above. 
459 Interview with Iulia Huiu, August 2008, Bucharest.       
460 Ion Ratiu, page 12  
461 Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 19 
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time included the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention which was established by 
those favouring co-operation with the Convention when National Liberal leader Radu 
Campeanu withdrew the National Liberals from the Convention in April 1992462; the 
National Liberal Party – Youth Wing formed in July 1990 to promote a radical (neo-) 
liberal platform; the Youth Wing in turn evolved into the Liberal Party ’93 which joined, 
then left the Democratic Convention before forming the National Liberal Alliance with the 
Civic Alliance Party for the 1996 elections.463   The Liberal Party ‘93 fused with the 
National Liberal Party – Democratic Convention in 1997 to form the Liberal Party which 
subsequently merged back into the National Liberals.464  The dynamics of the relationship 
between the Convention and its liberal members changed with the revolving membership of 
the various parties.   
At the beginning the National Liberals sat as uneasy but effectively equal partners with the 
National Peasants.  Campeanu’s calculation that he would achieve a better result if the 
National Liberals ran on its own in the elections changed this dynamic entirely.  The 
smaller liberal formations could not compete with the National Peasants for influence 
within the Convention and by the time the National Liberal Party returned for the 1996 
elections the National Peasants had firmly entrenched their leading position, leading one 
analyst to see Campeanu’s decision as the biggest single cause of structural weakness in the 
Democratic Convention as it created a disequilibrium that endured to the end.465 
After the 1996 elections, momentum grew for a reunification of the liberal family under the 
umbrella of the National Liberal Party.  Justice minister Valeriu Stoica, launched the 
process of re-uniting the various factions following the party’s 1997 Congress where he 
was elected as ‘First Vice-President’ of the party.466  Not for the first, or the last, time the 
party’s internal arguments were seen as proxies for battles between business interests 
competing for influence within the party.467  Stoica had a clear vision to create a broad, 
                                                            
462 Cristian Preda and Sorina Soare, Regimul, Partidele si Sistemul Politic din Romania, Nemira, Bucharest, 
2008, page 206.  The party ran candidates on the Democratic Convention list in 1992 and 1996 
463 Cristian Preda and Sorina Soare, page 205.  The National Liberal Alliance failed to cross the threshold to 
secure parliamentary representation in the elections of 1996 
464 Stan Stoica 
465 Laurentiu Stefan-Scalat, Fantoma lui Radu Campeanu, Sfera Politicii 87-88, FSC, Bucharest, 2000 
466  De facto leader behind eighty year old party president Mircea Ionescu-Quintus.  Abraham, page 369 
467 Congresul PNL – o sansa pentru o miscare liberala puternica, Romania Libera, 19 May 1997, p. 2 
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centre-right formation based on a single party structure with the National Liberals at its 
centre but he did not possess the political capital to drive such a project forward in the 
1990s.468  The critical mass belonging to the National Liberal Party meant that in the short 
term a strategy based on consumption of the smaller factions was a more credible option 
than co-operation, as Table 8 illustrates. 
Table 16: Relative strength of various liberal parties, 1998469 
Party Number of 
members 
No. of local 
branches 
Number 
of offices 
Elected 
mayors 
National Liberal Party 55,175 1,546 305 235
Liberal Party (’93 + Dem. Convention)  7,029 347 33 19
Civic Alliance Party 6,672 262 45 28
Alternative Romania Party470 4,671 114 14 1
National Liberal Party – Campeanu471 2,142 157 14 6
Union of Liberals ‘Bratianu’472 50 3 2 0
 
The Civic Alliance Party also had a difficult relationship with the Convention but the 
source of this tension was more personalised. One commentator in the run-up to the 1992 
elections asked who could gain from the division between the Civic Alliance and the Civic 
Alliance Party since he claimed that there was ‘no fundamental difference of strategy or 
philosophy’ between them.473  The decision to form the party had been taken at the 
Alliance congress in June 1991.474  The party had a liberal orientation and there was a 
cross-over in membership with the Civic Alliance movement, whichconsciously modelled 
                                                            
468 Valeriu Stoica, Unificarea dreptei, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2008, particularly chapter 2. 
469 The table appears in a newspaper report of a strategy meeting of the National Liberal’s Permanent Central 
Bureau.  The origin of the figures is unclear.  Strategia liberala prinde contur, Romania Libera, 26 March 
1998, page 2. 
470 A small neo-liberal formation that evolved into the Union of Right Forces. Having run as part of the 
Democratic Convention 2000 in the 2000 elections it merged into the National Liberal Party in 2001. 
471 After Ionescu-Quintus led the National Liberals back into the Democratic Convention Campeanu left the 
party with his followers in March 1995.  Campeanu did not re-join the National Liberals until 2003.  Florin 
Abraham, pp. 369 – 370. 
472 The Liberal Union ‘Bratianu’ was formed in 1990 professing a ‘centrist-liberal’ ideology.  It won less than 
1% of the vote in each of the parliamentary elections it contested (running alone in 1990, 1992 and 2000 and 
together with Campeanu’s party in 1996).  Preda and Soare, page 226. 
473 De ce tensiune intre AC si PAC?, Romania Libera, 6 February 1992, page 2. 
474 Alianta Civica Va Avea Un Partid, Romania Libera, 6 July 1991, page 2. 
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itself on the Czech Civic Forum.475  The Civic Alliance Party never established a 
membership or organisation close to the size of its civil society cousin.476 The Civic 
Alliance Party gained strength within the Democratic Convention from not being one of th
historic parties but the dominating and abrasive character of party leader Nicolae 
Manolescu meant that the party was prone to defections and to conflicts with the 
Convention leadership.
e 
 
 
 party merged with the National Liberals.478 
                                                           
477  Frustrated in attempts to establish a leading role for itself, the
Civic Alliance Party broke from the Convention, it co-founded the National Liberal 
Alliance but the formation failed to cross the 3% threshold to secure parliamentary
representation in the 1996 elections and Manolescu won just 0.7% of the vote in the 
presidential poll.  Manolescu acknowledged that his party had lost out as a result of leaving 
the Convention and in March 1998 the
The third party (alongside the National Liberals and the Civic Alliance Party) which 
initially sought to compete with the National Peasants for a leading role in the Convention 
and which ultimately opted for exit having failed in its bid was the ‘historic’ Social 
Democratic Party.  The party was the re-incarnation of a pre-Communist formation which 
had been forcibly merged into the Communist Party in the 1940s.  The party’s leader –
Sergiu Cunescu – shared the antagonism towards the Communist-successor left felt by the 
leaders of the other historic parties and supported cross-party co-operation among the 
opposition but the party was the poor relation of the triumvirate because of its smaller size 
and lack of a heroic resistance story.479  The party’s social democratic political programme 
also made it a rather incongruous member of the Convention and its size meant 
opportunities to gain the benefits of office were limited by the operation of the ‘algorithm’ 
within the Convention.  Cunescu failed in his bid to become the Convention’s presidential 
candidate in 1992 despite being a potential compromise choice between the divisive options 
 
475 As the new party was being formed, one Alliance conference in Sibiu was addressed by a representative of 
the Civic Forum who set out the strategy, beliefs and approach of the Czech party.  De ce un nou partid?  
Romania Libera, 26 June 1991, page 1. 
476 Civic Alliance leader, Ana Blandiana, stated in March 1992 that PAC had just 6,000 members across the 
country and the Civic Alliance, 85,000.  Ion Ratiu, page 78. 
477 Interview with civil society activist Renate Weber, Brussels, June 2008. 
478 PAC a pierdut prin iesirea din Conventie, Romania Libera, 6 November 1997, page 3. 
479 Noi nu ne vom reorienta politica, Romania Libera, 7 July 1990, page 3 (interview with Cunescu).  The 
Social Democrats only fought one election – the 1990 parliamentary poll – as an independent force, winning a 
little over 0.5% of the vote and electing two Deputies. 
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of Ratiu and Manolescu.480  Ahead of the 1996 elections the historic Social Democrats left 
the Conventon and formed the Union of Social Democrats with Petre Roman’s Democrat 
Party.481   
5.3   The Convention at the grass roots 
All of the parties that comprised the Convention were characterised by strong central 
leaderships and rigid vertical power structures.  There is little sign that alternative internal 
power structures developed in any of the main parties – for example in parliamentary 
caucuses.  The importance of local government, though, and in particular of the large 
number of elected mayors, does appear to have generated a lively local political scene. 
More so even than at the national level, on a local level the Democratic Convention never 
attained a distinctive existence beyond that of an election symbol.  Local structures were set 
up to manage relations between the member groups although in many places one party was 
dominant meaning they had an effective monopoly on decision making.482   
The role of personalised resource networks helps to explain resistance to the substitution of 
the individual party organisations either with a more permanent and tangible Convention 
presence or with a single unified party, since these structures (and the rent-seeking 
opportunities they offered) would potentially be threatened by such a move – a lesson 
possibly learned from the organisation of the National Salvation Front.  By virtue of its 
dominance in the process of power-shift in 1989-90, the National Salvation Front 
established formidable local political power bases that in many places persist for the Social 
Democrats today.  For voters, the rationale for opting to support the party which controlled 
local economic resources in a state-dominated economy is clear.  This rationality was 
maintained as the process of privatisation spread – it was an obvious choice for those who 
hoped to gain from the privatisation process to ally themselves with the parties who would 
control the process.  The parties within the Convention began to see an expansion of active 
support in the run up to the 1996 election and a corresponding decline in that backing as the 
                                                            
480 See chapter six below for more on the presidential candidate selection. 
481 The party subsequently split with the Democrat Party and went on to form the ‘Social Democratic Pole’ 
with the Iliescu-led Social Democrats for the 2000 elections (despite opposition from Cunescu) before 
merging into Iliescu’s party. 
482 Pavel and Huiu, pp. 286 – 310. 
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2000 elections approached and it became apparent that the formation would struggle to 
hold on to power.   
The evolution of party support in the north western county of Mures is illustrative of this 
process.483  Small groups of National Peasant Party sympathisers had been initially set up 
in virtually every commune in the county.  Often the motivation for joining the party wa
ideological – in an area where the National Liberals were relatively weak, the National 
Peasants were the most obvious home for opponents of Communism.  Party membership 
began to grow in 1994-5 as people reacted to a sense of change at the national level but 
ideological commitment was less significant for these new members: 
s 
                                                           
They [the new members] were seeking an opportunity to gain a position of power or 
they were people who had power in their communities; sometimes people with money 
and sometimes people who organised other people.  They joined because they feared 
losing their positions.  Some were members of the Social Democrats.  Some joined 
openly and others stayed in the background.484   
Funding structures, too, illustrate the extent to which success was dependent on control of 
local power structures.  Biturca identifies four principal sources of funding for local party 
activities:  membership fees, levies on officials, individual donations and support from the 
party nationally.  Direct assistance from the national party was limited and came in the 
form of election materials and the purchase of outdoor and media advertising within the 
region.  Individual membership subscriptions were important and naturally ebbed and 
flowed with the fortunes of the party.  Donations were often linked to calculations of likely 
returns - individuals would be more inclined to make donations if the party was perceived 
as able to deliver a return by gaining power either locally or nationally.  The levies on 
elected officials and on party appointees were crucial: members of parliament, councillors, 
mayors and the directors of the local privatisation funds all paid a percentage of their 
income into party funds. 
 
483 I am grateful to Petru Biturca for the information provided here.  Mr Biturca was a member of the Mures 
County executive bureau of the National Peasant Party from 1996 to 2000 and from 2000-2003 was the 
party’s county general secretary. 
484 Interview with Petru Biturca, 17 May 2008, Targu Mures. 
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As the Democratic Convention came to power in 1996 with a programme promising 
accelerated privatisation, it became clear that the presidency of the local privatisation fund 
(FPS) would take on considerable significance – as significant perhaps as the elected 
positions of mayors and councillors.  The algorithm that dominated negotiations between 
coalition parties at national level was replicated at local level.  In Mures, every public 
position was negotiated and a ratio of 3:1 established between appointees of the National 
Peasant Party and the Hungarian Democratic Union.  There were no fewer than 258 
directorships of the FPS to be allocated, each of whom would be expected to make a 
contribution to party funds. 
Senior National Peasant Ion Ratiu claimed that his party was the only one in the 
Convention which had an organisation at local level but other evidence suggests a 
patchwork of local organisation across the country and across parties. 485  Although the data 
refers to a point after the collapse of the Democratic Convention, a local government 
survey from 2001 shows how all parties achieved limited penetration of communities 
outside the larger urban centres.486  Thirty eight per cent of municipalities (all rural) 
reported having no political organisation on their territory and 55% reported having 
organisations for less than half the number of parties that were represented in parliament.  
Iliescu’s Social Democrats had the strongest organisational network with a 100% presence 
in urban areas and 56% overall.  For the other parties, the figures are shown in Table nine. 
There is some indication from the same survey, though, that personal networks were 
significant since 94% of mayors belonged to a political party suggesting that local power 
brokers were able to create organisational structures if only for the temporary purposes of 
an election campaign.  This is supported by individual cases – the National Peasant mayors 
of Timisoara and Targu Mures for example – both significant cities – were able to construct 
coalitions of support in their communities that were strong enough to survive the collapse 
of their party at a national level.   
                                                            
485 Ion Ratiu, page15. 
486 Survey by the Centre for Urban and Regional Sociology conducted in April 2001, reported in G Soos, G 
Toka and G Wright, The State of Local Democracy in Central Europe, Local Government Initiative, 2002. 
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Table 17: Percentage of municipalities reporting a party organisation, 2001487 
 
 Democrat Party*  37%  
 National Liberals*+  33%    
 Alliance for Romania  30%    
 Greater Romania Party* 27%    
 National Peasants+  20%    
 Hungarian Dem. Union*+ 11%    
*Parties with representation in parliament after 2000 
+ Parties that were some-time members of the Democratic Convention 
  
It is notable that the large majority of mayors and local councillors are elected as party 
representatives not as independents.  Party affiliation for local elected officials had a utility 
in defining their relationship to national power structures – but the degree of influence that 
central government had over local government meant that governing parties at national 
level exercised considerable pull over local officials.  An illustration of the vertical pull 
exercised over these local power networks by national power is provided by a 2001 report 
of the Romanian Institute of Public Policy.  It found that 22% of the mayors elected in 2000 
had changed parties within a year.  Eighty two per cent of those had joined the Social 
Democrats – the new governing party at national level which thus controlled both the 
allocation of economic resources to localities and the appointment of influential county 
prefects.488   
The apparently low barriers to transfer between parties and the attraction of plentiful 
tradable resources at local level thus meant there was no discernable pressure from below 
for a stronger and more effective central organisation for the Convention.  There was no 
clear incentive for closer co-operation at local level either since local leaders were able to 
operate effectively both in terms of election campaigns and in post election alliance 
building at the head of branches of the constituent parties without any clear advantage 
                                                            
487 The mayor of Targu Mures was elected in 2000 as a candidate of the National Peasant Party and re-elected 
in 2004 running as an independent.  In Timisoara, Gheorghe Ciuhandu was re-elected in 2000, 2004 and 2008 
under the National Peasant Party banner despite the collapse of the party on a national level. 
488 Reported in Romania Libera, 5 September 2001.  It should be noted that some of these transfers may have 
been ideologically driven since both the Democrat Party and the Alliance for Romania, parties with a social 
democratic outlook, moved towards closer co-operation with the National Liberals (and thus to the political 
right) after the 2000 elections. 
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being offered by the Convention structure.  As a result of the absence of pressures to create 
a more integrated leadership structure for the Convention it was unable to withstand the 
pressures placed on it as an organisation that arose when the various member entities 
sought to secure their own objective preferences.   
The constituent organisations retained their separate identities at a national and a local level 
and there was a lack of Convention-focused leadership which meant that the political actors 
retained a greater loyalty to their party than to the Convention.  In addition the inclusion of 
civic society groups that specifically rejected the rewards that political parties often strive 
for – office holding and the ability to distribute resources to supporters – meant that there 
was a part of the Convention that had substantially different incentive structures to the 
political parties. 
5.4 Crisis points: case studies in organisational failure 
The following sections focus on three key crisis points in the Convention’s history in order 
to illustrate the organisational weaknesses in the organisation which contributed to its 
ultimate failure. 
The decision to focus on crisis points is derived from the assumption that it is how an entity 
responds to crises that will best expose the resilience of its organisational structure.  The 
withdrawal of the Hungarian Democratic Union from the Convention in 1995 is the first 
event examined.  It illustrates both the tensions caused by the policy demands of nationalist 
groups and the problem of the lack of electoral benefit that the Convention offered to the 
Hungarian Democratic Union (since the formation had already maximised its support 
within its potential electoral constituency and had constructed an organisation that appeared 
capable of maintaining that loyalty).  The second period examined is the extended conflict 
within the Convention-led coalition government which resulted in the dismissal of Victor 
Ciorbea as Prime Minister at the end of March 1998.  This period throws the role of civil 
society groups (particularly the Civic Alliance) within the Convention into the spotlight.489  
                                                            
489  Use of the term ‘civil society group’ is potentially problematic as, in general useage, the term covers 
a range of different activities and organisations.  It is used in this text to refer to the non-party, non-
governmental groups that established themselves in Romania after December 1989 to campaign for 
democracy, civil rights and, in general, against the Iliescu-led left.  This is the context in which the term was 
commonly used in Romania during the period studied.  
158 
 
The Convention was confronted with the challenges of governing in coalition with the 
pragmatic and politically savvy former ‘Frontists’ in the Democrat Party while trying to 
reconcile the ideologically driven policy objectives of the civil society groups.  The crisis 
placed enormous centrifugal pressures on the Convention as other members responded to 
the internal weaknesses it exposed with their own increased demands.  The analysis 
concludes with the period running up to the electoral calamity of November 2000 as 
Convention members struggled to re-create a competitive formation.  The National 
Peasants had established a leading (but not completely dominant) position in the 
Convention and, as the election approached, the other major national party in the formation 
– the National Liberal Party – sought to gain a higher price in terms of internal influence in 
return for remaining within the Democratic Convention.   
The three crises each have different origins – the first arose from the internal policy 
demands of a group (the Hungarian Democratic Union) that had a markedly different 
incentive structure for membership of the Convention than the other member organisations; 
the second was created by exogenous pressure from one of the Convention’s coalition 
partners in government (the Democrat Party); the third was a bid for an enlarged internal 
role by the National Liberal Party in response to perceptions of organisational decline and 
calculations of the potential electoral consequences of possible break-up.  In a broad sense 
the crises also touch on each of the three ideological tensions within the formation: 
nationalism versus the demands of ethnic minorities; anti-Communism versus pragmatism 
towards reform; and the liberalism of the National Liberals versus the Christian Democracy 
of the National Peasants. 
5. 5  The other nation:  The Hungarian Democratic Union and the Convention 
The politics of nationalism has attracted much academic interest and a rich and varied 
literature over many years.  Following the fall of Communism in Europe there was a burst 
of interest in radical nationalism spurred by images of the region as an ethnic powder-keg 
awaiting re-ignition by the sparks of irredentism and revenge politics.     
While the worst fears of recidivism and inter-ethnic conflict in most of the region were not 
realised, ethnicity operated as a influential cleavage in post-Communist Romanian politics.  
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As a result, the Hungarian Democratic Union established and maintained a near monopoly 
on the votes of Romania’s ethnic Hungarian community.490    Brubaker indicated that for 
the ethnic Hungarian community in Cluj, voting for the Hungarian Democratic Union was 
the equivalent of participation in a national census – turnout was thus maximised and for 
most it was simply inconceivable to vote for any other party.491  One ethnic-Hungarian 
politician suggests that the social homogeneity of the village-based Hungarian community 
also aids the Democratic Union in retaining its political monopoly.492   
Part of the explanation for its sustained success may lie in the formation’s unusual 
organisational structure.  It was not constituted as a political party in the ordinary sense but 
as an alliance of political and civic society groups representing the Hungarian minority in 
Romania.  By May 1991 it was reporting a membership of 533,000, around one third of the 
ethnic Hungarian population.493  A variety of platforms exist within the formation which, 
nominally at least, represent the various strands of opinion within the community – liberal, 
social democrat, Christian democrat and reformist.494  In effect, the formation offered the 
community a shadow governing structure:  the president is elected for a four year term and 
he is supported by an executive president whose functions are designed to mirror those of a 
prime minister.495  The links between the Union’s political structure and its allies in civil 
society – e.g. businesses and the Church, keep the formation rooted in the parochial 
concerns of the community.496   
Whatever the full explanation as to why the Hungarian Democratic Union so quickly 
established a monopoly of support among the ethnic-Hungarian community in Romania, 
the results are clear.  The politics of ethnicity were radicalised; some political actors in the 
majority ethnic community responded by setting up movements of their own; the narrative 
                                                            
490 The Hungarian Democratic Union so rapidly captured the support of Romania’s Hungarian minority that it 
emerged as the second largest party in the Romanian parliament after the elections of May 1990. 
491 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
492 Interview with Csaba Sogor, former priest and current Euro MP representing the Hungarian Democratic 
Union, June 2008, Brussels. 
493 Jonathan Stein (ed), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post Communist Europe, East West 
Institute, New York, page 104. 
494 One commentator, at least, claims that the platforms are as much vehicles for individual personalities as of 
ideological currents.  Dan Oprescu, UDMR in 2000, Sfera Politicii, nr. 79, FSC, Bucharest, 2000, page 9. 
495 Interview with Csaba Takacs, January 2009, Cluj. 
496 Dan Oprescu, page 11. 
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of politics became, if not dominated by, at least suffused with the language of nationalist 
conflict; and the areas with a predominantly ethnic-Hungarian population were rapidly lost 
to all the ‘Romanian’ parties, and they have stayed lost ever since.  The Democratic 
Union’s monopoly of voting preferences among the Hungarian community created a barrier 
to integration on the centre-right:  there was no visible gain in votes to be made by the 
formation (and indeed a risk of votes being lost to breakaway organisations if Democratic 
Union politicians associated too closely with ethnic Romanian parties; and the option of 
exit – coalition formation with other parties as happened after 2000 – would be made more 
problematic.497  Nor was there any likely benefit for alternative structures to try to compete 
for votes within the community – as one respondent in Brubaker’s research tellingly 
remarks: 
If this stupid ultranationalist trash would disappear, there would be not much reason 
for the DAHR [Hungarian Democratic Union] to exist either…  Because then you 
could just join the Peasant Party or the Liberal Party or whatever.  But the way it is 
now the Hungarians… make it out to be our national obligation to join the DAHR.498 
The Hungarian Democratic Union was fully committed to the ‘anti-Iliescu’ project.  It 
signed the Timisoara Declaration and the National Convention for the Installation of 
Democracy agreement and it participated in the Democratic Anti-Totalitarian Forum.  It 
went on to be a founder member of the Democratic Convention.  But the radicalism of 
some ethnic-Hungarian politicians was a regular source of tension within the Democratic 
Convention throughout the years in opposition, and the ‘Romanian’ parties showed an 
ambivalent attitude to the concerns of the Hungarian Democratic Union.  National Liberal 
leader Radu Campeanu objected to its membership of the Convention in the run up to the 
1992 election (although he may well have been using this as part of his plan to disengage 
                                                            
497 It is worth noting that the monopoly hold over the community’s political support was not quite complete.  
Ethnic-Hungarians have held relatively senior positions in all the major mainstream ‘Romanian’ parties at 
various times.  There also appears to have been some penetration by the Romanian parties into Hungarian 
communities.  Petru Biturca, for example, claims that the National Peasants gained a number of members in 
the Hungarian communes of Mures county.  But the dominance of the Hungarian Democratic Union lowered 
exit barriers for these members when the Convention began to lose its grip on power since the formation 
offered a ‘natural’ home for them.  
498 Rogers Brubaker, page 344. 
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from the Convention).499  After the local elections of that year, Ion Ratiu ordered the 
National Peasants in Cluj to back Gheorghe Funar’s Romanian National Unity Party in 
preference to the National Salvation Front on the county council – a move which showed 
little sensitivity to the concerns of his ethnic Hungarian alliance partners.500  At the 1992 
General Election the Democratic Union remained part of the Democratic Convention and 
backed Emil Constantinescu’s candidacy for the presidency but it ran a separate list of 
candidates for parliament. 
Early in 1993 Laszlo Tokes made a series of controversial statements about the treatment of 
the Hungarian minority in Romania while on a lecture tour of the United States.501  His 
comments attracted criticism from government and opposition politicians in Romania and 
tensions remained high between the Democratic Union and other Convention members 
throughout the rest of the year.502  As Csaba Takacs points out, the wider political 
environment was heavily charged with inter-ethnic tension – the government was supported 
by radical nationalist parties which were keen to talk up the threats to Romanian territorial 
integrity posed by Hungarian recidivism – and he suggests that the Convention responded 
by developing a more nationalist emphasis in its own narrative.503  In June 1994, the 
Chamber of Deputies passed an education bill which the Democratic Union opposed 
because of its impact on minority rights – the only other party to vote against the bill in 
parliament was the Liberal Party ’93.  The failure of National Peasant Deputies in particular 
to support moderating amendments to the law was a severe blow to the Hungarian 
Democratic Union and their attitude to the Convention.504  The formation of a special 
council of ethnic-Hungarian local government officials led to the Democratic Union being 
threatened with expulsion from the Convention at the end of 1994 – the issue went to the 
                                                            
499 Interview with Csaba Takacs, January 2009, Cluj. 
500 Ion Ratiu.  Funar was an outspoken radical nationalist whose period as mayor of Cluj was marked by a 
series of anti-Hungarian stunts such as painting all the street bollards and park benches in the colours of the 
Romanian flag. 
501 Bishop Tokes was probably the highest profile ethnic Hungarian on the Romanian political scene 
following his leading role in the December 1989 revolution.  Threats by the Communist authorities to move 
him from his Timisoara parish led to violent confrontations with protestors (from all communities) and in turn 
sparked the nationwide popular uprising against the Ceausescu regime. 
502 Pavel and Huiu, page 190. 
503 Interview with Csaba Takacs, January 2009, Cluj 
504 Ethnic Hungarian leaders had negotiated an agreement with the Democratic Convention’s Steering 
Committee whereby its deputies would support the amendments but the National Peasant Deputies defied 
their leadership.  Jonathan Stein (ed), page 111. 
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heart of the dispute over the status of Harghita and Covasna Counties which had 
overwhelmingly Hungarian populations and which the Democratic Union had been 
pressing to be given a degree of autonomy from the Romanian state.  In February 1995, the 
Central Bureau of the National Liberal Party declared that the Democratic Union “persists 
with an attitude of not understanding the character of the Romanian nation and state,” and 
that made continued collaboration impossible.505 Emil Constantinescu issued an ultimatum 
to the Democratic Union to explicitly recognise the unified national character of the 
Romanian state and on February 16th it withdrew from the Convention.506 
The statement announcing the Democratic Union’s withdrawal from the Convention 
confirmed its continued support for the formation’s basic objectives and the experience of 
the crisis seemed to lead to a moderation of behaviour on both sides.  Despite being outside 
the formal structures of the Convention, the Democratic Union backed Constantinescu in 
the 1996 presidential run-off and entered government for the first time as partner of the 
Convention after the elections.507   
The Hungarian Democratic Union is widely acknowledged by ministers as a reliable and 
loyal coalition partner and the Convention-led government took some note-worthy steps in 
key areas of concern to the Hungarian community.508  But one issue - minority language 
education - remained a source of tension between the Democratic Union and its partners 
throughout the 1990s.  In 1998 the issue threatened to force the formation out of 
government.  The creation of a Hungarian-language university at Cluj had been a long-term 
aim and the government’s education law stopped short of delivering on this policy – the 
government’s reforming education minister could only offer Hungarian language classes 
within a structure where Romanian remained the dominant language.509  The debate went 
                                                            
505 Newspaper report in Adevarul 2 February 1995, quoted in Pavel and Huiu, op cit, p. 219. 
506 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report for Romania, Quarters 4 of 1994 and 1 of 1995. 
507 The Hungarian Democratic Union signed a secret ‘protocol’ with the parties of the Democratic Convention 
on 7th November 1996 – between the first and second ballots of the presidential election.  The formations 
agreed to co-operate in the new parliament with the Hungarian Democratic Union joining the new 
government.  Emil Constantinescu, pp. 253 - 254. 
508 Leading civil society activist Gabriel Andreescu identifies the normalisation of relations with Hungary as 
the 1996 – 2000 government’s greatest achievement for example.  Interview with Andreescu, Bucharest 
509 Interview with Andrei Marga, January 2009, Cluj. 
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on for a number of months and only concluded in October when the Democratic Union’s 
Council of Representatives voted narrowly to remain in the coalition.510   
The coalition was already facing substantial political difficulties by this time but the 
Democratic Union opted to remain loyal to the government even though it had failed to 
secure one of its key political objectives.  The indication is that the Union was confident 
that it could achieve other policy objectives by remaining in government.  The lower cost 
option of withdrawing from the Convention was no longer available (since the formation 
already sat outside the Convention) and the cost of complete withdrawal from the 
government would have been too high because they would have lost all influence over 
policy making.  Indeed, it is possible to argue that simply by being in government the 
Democratic Union had secured the key political objective of demonstrating its future 
coalitionability to other parties, including the Social Democrats.  This opened the door to 
future co-operation with the Social Democrats with the Hungarian Democratic Union 
secure in the knowledge that they did not risk a major loss of electoral support if such a 
coalition came about.  The same calculation was not made by the other policy-prioritising 
formations – the civil society groups – following the drawn-out demise of the first 
Democratic Convention government led by Victor Ciorbea.  Rather, their prioritising of 
policy-based objectives outweighed electoral calculations and led to a cataclysmic eruption 
within the Convention while in government.  
5.6  Coalition of the disgruntled – the dismissal of Victor Ciorbea and the role of the 
civic society groups 
The Convention’s election victory in November 1996 was met with a positive international 
reaction and popular enthusiasm at home.  The government’s honeymoon period lasted 
until the late summer of 1997 as economic reforms and negotiations over NATO 
membership progressed.  The coalition government’s inherent weakness was rapidly 
exposed, however, as it embarked on political reforms that had been delayed by the years of 
Social Democrat rule.  The tension arose from conflict between the civil society groups at 
the core of the Convention who were intent on pursuing their radical political reforms and 
                                                            
510 The Council voted 59-37 in favour of remaining part of the coalition after reportedly debating the issue for 
ten hours.  UDMR ramane, dar nu se preda!, Romania Libera, 5 October 1998, page 3. 
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the Democrat Party, their coalition partner and a determined defender of its supporters’ 
interests.  The attacks on Democrat ministers – and on Traian Basescu in particular – began 
immediately after the Convention came to power. On 7th December 1996 Ana Blandiana 
demanded that the Convention respect all of the pledges made in the Contract for Romania 
– specifically referring to point 15 which stated that membership of the government was 
incompatible with retaining links to businesses.  Democrats Basescu and Adrian Severin 
were identified as those who should resign their business interests if they were to serve in 
the government.511  Three days later the press carried stories of how the Transport minister 
was still living in a villa that had been subject to a successful restitution claim.512 
The tipping point into crisis was the dismissal of Valerian Stan from his post as head of the 
government’s co-ordination body (effectively he was minister responsible for anti-
corruption measures) at the end of August 1997.  It was a decision rapidly identified as 
driven by political expediency, aimed at maintaining Democrat support for the government.  
Stan had called a press conference at which he had been expected to announce the results of 
his enquiries into abuses of state-owned properties since 1989.  Amid vaguely comic scenes 
the press conference was cancelled and hastily replaced with an announcement of Stan’s 
departure from the government.513  Six months of turmoil within the government followed 
which eventually resulted in the replacement of Victor Ciorbea as Prime Minister and the 
reconstitution of the government under the leadership of Radu Vasile.   
The Democrat Party was, itself, reacting from a position of weakness.  The party faced the 
prospect of being squeezed from the scene after the 1996 elections as opinion polls 
registered strong support for the Convention.  Iliescu’s Social Democrats were weakened 
by their defeat but they remained clearly the largest party on the left and they began the 
process of internal reform as they sought rehabilitation.  In the short term, the Democrats 
faced an additional challenge with the setting up of the Alliance for Romania, a centrist 
break-away from the Social Democrats established in the autumn of 1997 which laid claim 
to much of the Democrats’ political territory without the encumbrance of having to take 
                                                            
511 Conventia trebui sa-si respecte promisiunile facute in campania electoral, Romania Libera, 7th December 
1996, page 3. 
512 Basescule, vila inapoi! Romania Libera, 10th December 1996, page 1. 
513 Romania Libera, Din ratiune politice, coruptii vor ramane nepedepsiti? 29/8/97 page 1. 
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responsibility for unpopular government decisions.514  The Democrats also clearly feared 
the prospect of early parliamentary elections which many in the Convention had been 
proposing for months in order to capitalise on the formation’s popular support.515  The 
Democrat Party responded by making use of their political assets - party discipline, political 
experience and a group of influential supporter/clients.   
Democrat transport minister, Traian Basescu, gave an interview to the Evenimentul Zilei 
newspaper which was published on 27th December 1997.  In it, Basescu launched: 
…a violent attack against the Prime Minister who, he says, chairs long inefficient 
government meetings, is incapable of making decisions, as well as against the 
National Peasant Party – an obsolete party in the Romanian political environment, he 
says.  Hence reform stagnation is their [the National Peasants’] fault.516 
On 29th December, Ciorbea responded to the challenge to his authority by demanding a 
retraction or Basescu’s resignation.  Basescu duly resigned from the government but in 
January the Democrat Party proposed that he should be reinstated.517 A few days later the 
Democrats’ Permanent National Bureau (BPN) met and expressed its dissatisfaction with 
the record of the government in its first year. The BPN statement had a distinctly leftist 
tone.  It blamed a lack of progress towards reform on the prioritising of a ‘populist’ 
campaign for entry into NATO and divisive obsessions with restitution of property, 
nostalgia for the Monarchy and the opening of Securitate files.  It reiterated themes from 
the Union of Social Democrats’ manifesto of 1996 calling for the government to prioritise 
measures to tackle poverty and to create opportunities for young people by generating 
economic growth, with the social costs of restructuring to be paid for via progressive 
                                                            
514 The Alliance for Romania was formed on 4 September 1997.  It stressed that 80% of its members had 
never previously been involved in politics (thereby distancing itself from Iliescu’s party) and that most of its 
members were intellectuals or young people.  Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report for Romania, 
Quarter 4 1997, page 11. 
515 In fact Zoe Petre claims that early elections were never seriously considered by President Constantinescu, 
despite the strong pressure from some in the Convention, because of the constitutional difficulties involved in 
triggering the elections.  She estimates that the process could have taken up to three months and the 
Democrats could have reacted by deserting the government in favour of a coalition with the Social Democrats 
– the crucial political card that allowed the Democrats so much apparent control over the government’s 
direction.  Interview with Zoe Petre, February 2009, Bucharest. 
516 Emil Constantinescu, page 269. 
517 Romania Libera, PD il propune Basescu in loc lui Basescu, 8/1/98 page 3. 
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taxation.518  The Democrat Party subsequently withdrew all of its ministers from the 
government and in the weeks that followed it became clear that Prime Minister Victor 
Ciorbea was losing the support of the National Liberals and the National Peasants.  Even 
Civic Alliance leaders eventually deserted Ciorbea’s corner, proposing, according to 
Constantinescu, Andrei Marga in his place.519 On March 22nd, the ‘Brasov Group’ within 
the National Peasant Party made its public move in favour of party General Secretary, Radu 
Vasile.520   During the following week the National Liberals delivered the coup de grace 
when Valeriu Stoica publicly demanded a change of prime minister.521  After National 
Liberal ministers backed their party leader when Ciorbea asked for his resignation, the 
National Peasants responded by authorising their party leadership to approve Ciorbea’s 
dismissal.522 On March 30th Ciorbea’s resignation was announced and the Convention’s 
unity and self-confidence seemed to be shattered for good.523 
The impact of the crisis was most pronounced on the Civic Alliance and the Alliance’s 
response highlights the organisational strains created by the ‘half-way-house’ status of the 
civic society groups within the Convention – a core member of the Convention but, because 
of its non-party status, effectively excluded from the day-to-day operation of the 
government.524  The importance of the civic society groups to the Convention is widely 
accepted by commentators.  The biggest group - Civic Alliance – saw its role as providing 
civic education, preparing people for democracy and explaining their rights, engaging in 
‘civic militancy’.525  According to Valerian Stan the Alliance consciously modelled itself 
on the Czech Civic Forum.  Few Alliance members were also members of the political 
parties.  Organisationally it had a wide reach and tried to fashion a new organisational 
structure to match that ambition.  One of the Alliance’s founders, Iulian Cornateanu (the 
first of the hunger strikers from the University Square protests in 1990 and a vice president 
                                                            
518 Partidul Democrat – ziua cea mai lunga, Romania Libera, 15 January 1998, page 2. 
519 Emil Constantinescu, page 281. 
520 Un sindrom al luptei pentru putere din PNTCD, Romania Libera, 27th March 1998, page 3. 
521 Sedinta CDR se cauta solutii pentru iesirea din criza, Romania Libera, 28 March 1998, page 3. 
522 Emil Constantinescu, page 285. 
523 Victor Ciorbea a demisionat, Romania Libera, 31 March, 1998, page 1. 
524 It is interesting to note that the civil society members of the Democratic Convention were not invited to 
sign the protocol between the Hungarian Democratic Union and the Convention that decided the shape of the 
new government in November 1996 (referred to above).  Even at this early stage, political decisions had 
clearly passed into the realm of the parties only. 
525 Interview with Valerian Stan, 29 January 2009, Bucharest. 
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of the Independent Group for Democracy) set out the organisational approach of the 
Alliance in January 1991 and it bears reproducing in detail: 
The Alliance is not the kind of organisation whose structure can be reduced to a 
standard diagram.  Because of its multiple functions and its involvement in many 
political, economic, social and cultural areas, the structure of the Alliance had to be 
tailored to both current realities and to hammering out a long term strategy.  Its 
national leadership is exercised by a Steering Council made up of 27 members elected 
at the national conference, who are joined by representatives of county branches.   
Activities are carried out within three departments: Operations Sections; a Civic 
Academy; and the Citizens’ Department.  The Operations Sections deal with technical 
matters such as personnel, bookkeeping, administration, mass media etc.  They are 
also in charge of establishing regional branches and economic sections.  The Civic 
Academy incorporates commissions of experts in charge of hammering out Civic 
Alliance programmes (economic, legal, environmental, social, cultural etc).  Similarly 
the Academy organises activities to spread historical truth and the concepts of 
democracy and civil liberty.  Finally the Citizens’ Department ensures links between 
the Alliance and the people.  We plan to establish offices which will examine abuses, 
something that is extremely important, especially in small towns and villages, where 
life continues to be managed by the same local henchmen.  We also plan to take 
public opinion polls and to offer legal or social assistance.526 
The anti-party (or at least party-sceptic) themes that characterise the discourse of the civil 
society groups are derived from their role in the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime – 
opposed to both the Communist Party and the apparatchiks of the National Salvation Front 
which succeeded it.  While the groups saw themselves in a similar role to student and 
intellectual-led opposition movements in other Central and Eastern European states, they 
lacked the political capital and leadership of the Czech Civic Forum or the Hungarian 
opposition groups.   Some opted for non-party opposition in response to the victory of the 
National Salvation Front with the Group for Social Dialogue and others promoting a human 
rights agenda.  Others pursued more direct opposition via membership of the Civic Alliance 
                                                            
526 Interviu cu domnii Gabriel Andreescu si Iulian Cornateanu, Romania Libera, 17 January 1991, page 5. 
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and affiliation to the Democratic Convention (some also joined the political parties 
associated with the Convention).527   
The Civic Alliance frequently acted as broker between the parties that made up the 
Convention, as mentioned above, and it was able to promote Emil Constantinescu as a 
compromise candidate for the presidency between the potentially divisive candidacies of 
Ion Ratiu, Radu Campeanu and Nicolae Manolescu.  As a return on its political capital the 
Civic Alliance sought radical political reforms – it was the failure of the government to 
deliver them which led directly to its rapid loss of faith in the Convention after the 
dismissal of first Valerian Stan and then Victor Ciorbea in the face of Democrat 
pressure.528
ention 
ting 
structures of the Convention to involve the civil society groups in 
 a functioning state the local and central structures of 
 the research departments and communication functions of the 
 
Widespread disquiet was expressed at the National Council of the Civic Alliance in 
November 1997 with some calls for the Alliance to withdraw from the Convention.  
According to speakers, efforts to re-launch the organisational elements of the Conv
had failed and as a result the Civic Alliance had been excluded from all the major 
government decisions.529    In December the Civic Alliance published its conditions for 
remaining part of the Democratic Convention.  The demands all focused on re-activa
the organisational 
decision making: 
1. Reorganising and putting into
the Democratic Convention 
2. Reactivating
Convention 
                                                            
527 Interviews with Valerian Stan, Gabriel Andreescu, Renate Weber and Zoe Petre. 
528 As early as January 1997, the Civic Alliance and the Association of Former Political Prisoners had been 
identified as a source of centrifugal pressures within the Convention, see:  CDR, identitatea politice si iluziil
solidarita
e 
ti, Romania Libera, 28 January 1997, page 3.  The author blames this on the Convention’s lack of a 
ups. 
ge 
‘rigorous, delimited political platform,’ emphasising the significance of policy demands to the civil society 
gro
529 Partidele din CDR au rupt relatiile de fond cu formatiunile civice, Romania Libera, 3 November 1997 pa
3. 
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3. Participation of civil society formations in decision making at the local and central 
level…530 
Following the Convention’s National Council discussion of the Civic Alliance motion, the 
Alliance published a declaration on the state of the Convention which emphasised its 
continued unhappiness.531  The Alliance’s position of weakness after the election victory is 
illustrated by the declaration being published as a reaction to the signing of a protocol 
between the  parties only within the government (including the Democrat Party but not the 
civil society groups) illustrating the Alliance’s outsider role.  As pressure on Ciorb
position grew, the Civic Alliance publicly backed the Prime Minister as the best option for
resolving the political crisis (and presumably the option least likely to the further 
marginalisation of the Alliance).
ea’s 
 
 the Alliance withdrew from 
 
nal 
r 
s 
t 
532   Following his dismissal,
the Convention claiming that it had paid the ultimate price for backing Ciorbea to the end 
and that the Convention had effectively ceased to exist.533     
The dismissal of Ciorbea as Prime Minister did not end the political crisis – instead the 
turmoil intensified over the summer as each of the parties in the government assessed the 
impact of the change on their own position and how to respond to it.  Within the National 
Peasant Party criticism of the party’s leadership was made public by the ‘Brasov Group’.  
At the party’s summer school, Ciorbea laid the blame for the government crisis at the door 
of the Democrats and admitted that the dismissal of Valerian Stan – at the insistence of the
Democrats – was a major mistake.  The former Prime Minister called for a re-launch of the 
Convention (with the readmission of the Civic Alliance) but also clearly saw the Natio
Peasant Party as retaining a leading role in the formation and acting as the driving force fo
reform – the possibility that this very formulation had been a major contributor to the 
break-up of the government does not appear to have been entertained.534  Ciorbea and hi
supporters eventually left the National Peasants but the leading role in the government tha
was retained by the party meant that barriers to exit were relatively high.  The National 
                                                            
530 Civic Alliance, Conditiile Ramanerii Aliantei Civice In Conventia Democrata, Bucharest, 12 December 
1997.  www.aliantacivica.ro/documente , accessed 17 May 2008. 
531 Declaratia Aliantei Civic despre starea Coalitiei, Romania Libera, 10 February, 1998, page 3. 
532 AC sprijina in continuare guvernul si pe primul ministru Victor Ciorbea, Romania Libera,  17 March 1998 
page 3. 
533 Un ultim semnal de alarma, Romania Libera, 8 April 1998 page 3. 
534  PNT-CD la rascruce, Romania Libera, 8 June 1998, page 3. 
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Liberals’ agitation for an enlarged role in the Convention grew increasingly vocal as the 
crisis went on and ultimately fed into the end-game of the Convention discussed below.  
ess 
er 
e Democrat Party which in turn damaged the relationship with the Civic 
Allianc 537
Governm
Convention: 
 against Iliescu.  But parties and NGOs 
y at their exclusion after 1996.538 
The degree of anim
former finance m
nt at 
lines.  Intellectuals wanting to act as referees on political life.  
Ultimately, though, the Civic Alliance was the only major departure from the formation at 
this stage because the benefit it sought was policy change not office and it did not feel those 
changes were being delivered.535 
The dismissal of the Ciorbea government is often told as a story of the weakness of the 
National Peasants: the problems of running a coalition of coalitions; the factionalism it 
exposed within the party; the party’s lack of experience in government; and the failings of 
individual leaders, particularly party president Ion Diaconescu. In Ciorbea’s own view, the 
government’s reform programme was ‘confiscated’ by the Democrats and the National 
Peasant’s participation in government became merely ‘decorative’.536  But more telling is 
the light it casts on the role played by the Civic Alliance.  According to Fati, the weakn
of the National Peasants derived from internal divisions but the damaging consequence for 
the Convention was the creation of the impression that control had been ceded to the form
Frontists in th
e.   But could the Alliance ever have been reconciled to the realities of governing?  
ent minister Virgil Petrescu points to the problematic role of NGOs within the 
The Convention was a broad movement
couldn’t govern together.  The NGOs were angr
osity created by the influential NGOs is apparent in the comments of 
inister Daniel Daianu: 
[Civil society groups] would bicker from the side but wanted to run the governme
the same time.  They needed to get into politics but they wanted to sit on the side-
539
                                                            
535 The Alternative Romania Party left the Convention in October 1998 citing a failure of the governme
follow the provisions of the party’s ‘Manifesto of the Right’.  The media reported that a number of its 
parliamentarians responded by quitting to join parties that remained w
nt to 
ithin the government.  Parlamentarii 
 in CDR – o alianta depasita, Sfera Politicii nr. 79, FSC, Bucharest, 2000, page 20. 
education minister 1996-98. 
incep sa paraseasca PAR, Romania Libera, 29 October 1998 page 1. 
536 Quoted by Sabina Fati
537 Sabina Fati, page 20. 
538 Interview with Virgil Petrescu, 
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This sense of frustration can be understood given the extent to which the civic society 
groups were driven by policy objectives rather than party-based concerns – a point made b
Renate Weber who moved from civil society campaigning into party politics.
y 
nal 
he case 
isputes with neighbouring countries; the stabilising of the 
541 e 
blic 
cal 
ce 
 was 
its current speed), indicating that, at that stage at least, a large part of the electorate had not 
                                                                                                    
540  The views 
of Gabriel Andreescu, a leading Human Rights campaigner (and member of the Natio
Salvation Front Council in December 1989), back up this interpretation.  He makes t
for a positive view of the 1996-2000 government which is entirely policy based:  the 
reduction of ethnic tensions by the inclusion of the Hungarian Democratic Union in 
government; the resolution of d
economy; privatisation and the growth of inward economic investment.   The party gam
was of secondary importance. 
The dismissal of Stan and then Ciorbea marked an end to innocence for the Democratic 
Convention.  It exposed the different priorities of the member organisations and the 
inherent difficulties of involving non-party groups in the process of government.  Pu
support for the government began to decline which meant it carried forward less politi
capital into the second half of its term in office where it faced the severe challenges 
associated with implementing its reform programme.  Constantinescu points to a poll 
published in March showing a 14 percentage point drop in support for the Convention sin
the beginning of the year (and a 10% increase for the Democrats).542  Support for the 
Convention had rallied somewhat by June but the most damaging long term effect was a 
dramatic loss of public confidence in the direction that the government was taking the 
country.  Fifty two per cent of respondents to the June CURS poll felt that the country
going in the wrong direction, with just 25% saying it was going in the right direction.  The 
same poll showed that 59% of people felt that privatisation needed to be accelerated 
(against 7% who felt it should be slowed down and 10% saying it should be maintained at 
                                                                                  
er was a leading human rights activist who went 
 
g from 8% to 18%. 
539 Interview with Daniel Daianu. 
540 Interview with Renate Weber, Brussels, May 2008.  Web
on to be a Member of the European Parliament representing the National Liberal Party. 
541 Interview with Gabriel Andreescu. 
542 Emil Constantinescu, page 281.  Support for the Democratic Convention fell from 42% in January to 28%
in March, with the Democrat Party risin
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lost faith in the reform programme, just in the government’s ability to deliver it.543  While 
Valerian Stan does not claim his dismissal ended the Convention, he sees it as effectively 
the beginning of the end: 
on.  
 
that led to lots of other people deserting but it was the beginning of the 
544
tary 
he two 
 of 
that 
 
ly forging institutionalised loyalty to their 
545
It is a subjective view.  My dismissal was a bad sign for the fight against corrupti
My department did nothing after I left.  The Civic Alliance leadership protested 
because they felt the government moderated its views on corruption after coming to 
office.  The public saw this and the government’s credibility was affected.  It wasn’t
my leaving 
decline.  
5.7  End game – the break-up of the Convention  
The story of the Democratic Convention’s collapse from government to extra-parliamen
formation is, in contrast to the idealistic disillusionment of the Civic Alliance’s rupture 
with the Convention, entirely one of party calculation and internal division between t
largest parties in the formation.  It illustrates the weaknesses inherent in partnership 
structures – co-operation between two parties which held similar levels of political capital 
was constantly disrupted by calculations of whether greater gains could be made outside
the Convention.  The weakness of the Convention was exacerbated by the fact that one 
partner – the National Peasant Party – held a dominant position within the organisation 
was out of line with its real strength in relation to the National Liberals.  The National 
Peasants did not have the political capital to defeat or absorb the National Liberals but they
were unwilling to give up their position of leadership within the Convention.  The leaders 
of the National Liberals responded by conscious
own party as distinct from the Convention.    
                                                            
543 Intarzierea privatizarii indreapta tara spre o directia gresita, Romania Libera, 26 June 1998, page 1.  The 
CURS poll showed voting intentions for the parliamentary elections as: Democratic Convention 34%, Social 
Democrats 22%, Greater Romania Party 14%, Democrat Party 13%, Alliance for Romania 7%, Hungarian 
Democratic Union 6% and others 4%. 
544 Interview with Valerian Stan. 
545 Valeriu Stoica acknowledges the effort to reorganise the National Liberals between 1997 and 2000 in order 
to create a stable structure, with an ‘institutional configuration’ which permitted the affirmation of a clear 
political position.  Valeriu Stoica, Provocari. 
173 
 
As evidence showed popular support for the Convention waning, and as the election drew 
nearer, the rationale for exit was strengthened.  A CURS opinion poll in October 1999 
showed the Democratic Convention backed by just 17% of voters and Emil 
Constantinescu’s support at the same low level.546  Faced with such levels of unpo
just a year before the General Election, Convention leaders made what amounted to t
last throw of the dice with the removal of Radu Vasile as Prime Minister.  Vasile’s 
premiership had failed to end the parliamentary blockage that was holding up the 
Convention’s legislative programme and, rather than improving relations within the 
coalition, his leadership was causing them to worsen.
pularity 
heir 
 
osition as party president.    After 
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lly 
 
cause 
f 1992) 
which left Isarescu as the only viable option for the National Peasants.  Isarescu was 
547  The first concern of National 
Peasant leader Ion Diaconescu’s was heading off the potential for a split in his own party
and the perceived threat (from Vasile) to his own p
receiving representations from a delegation of National Peasant Deputies, Diaconescu 
decided to initiate negotiations over the recasting of the government as an essential step 
towards reviving the Democratic Convention.548   
The coalition leaders accepted the nomination of National Bank chief Mugur Isarescu as 
premier and after a protracted struggle Vasile finally accepted his removal from office in 
December 1999.  That Isarescu was a non-party technocrat is a further indication of th
erosion of National Peasant authority within the Convention and the coalition (and equa
the lack of any dominant alternative).  Isarescu’s case appears to have been promoted by
President Constantinescu, whose connections to any political party had always been 
tenuous.549  Democrat leader Petre Roman vetoed the National Peasant candidates who 
were proposed and the choice that appears to have emerged was between former Prime 
Minister Theodor Stolojan and Isarescu. 550  Stolojan was ruled out by Diaconescu be
of his association with the National Salvation Front (Stolojan had led an Front dominated 
interim government between the fall of Petre Roman in 1991 and the elections o
                                                            
546 Quoted in Pavel and Huiu, page569.  MMT polls gave the Convention 22% support in May 1999, falling 
easant Party in particular.  Tom Gallagher, Theft, pp 226-229.  
 pp 237-250. 
 
to just 15% in May 2000.  
547 Vasile’s leadership style and his close relations with the Democrat Party and opposition figures 
undermined his relations with the National P
548 Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie,
549 Interview with Zoe Petre. 
550 Ion Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 244.
174 
 
acceptable to the National Liberals because he accepted the party’s economic programm
(and presumably also because he was not a National Peasant Party member).
e 
xploring exit strategies based 
 
o
g 
destabilised by offers of a coalition agreement from the Social Democrats and the loss of 
                                                           
551 
At the end of 1999, National Liberal leader Valeriu Stoica had approached Stolojan to 
recruit him to the Liberal leadership.  Stoica states that both men were of the opinion that 
the 2000 election was lost to the Social Democrats unless the centre-right in its broadest 
sense could be brought together in a more effective formation than the Convention.552  The 
National Liberals thus sought to exploit the weakened position of the National Peasants by 
proposing a realignment of power within the Convention, giving their party an enhanced 
position. The party leadership pursued a parallel strategy of e
either on building new alliances or on strengthening their own political assets to run a
campaign independent of the Convention. 
In January, the National Liberals announced that they would run separately from the 
Democratic Convention in the local elections, but the party signed an agreement with the 
National Peasants that they would support each other’s mayoral candidates in any run-off 
ballots.553  The Civic Alliance initiated and mediated negotiations between the centre right 
parties aimed at re-establishing the Democratic Convention, stressing that it did so to 
ensure the progress of reform and that it was not seeking candidate places f r its own 
organisation.554  Diaconescu, though, appeared to publicly write off the chances of revivin
the Convention – even within his own very limited definition of its scope.555 
The coalition government experienced a turbulent spring with the Democrats again at the 
centre of the storm.  This time, though, the Democrats were themselves struggling to stay 
afloat.  Roman was re-elected leader at the party congress in January but the party was 
 
a Libera 2000, Oferta si conditiile Aliantei Civice 
es of civil society running a single list of candidates for all elections but that the CDR had 
551 Valeriu Stoica, Unificarea, page 25. 
552 Valeriu Stoica, Unificarea, page 23. 
553 Romania Libera, Impreuna dar separate!, 5 January 2000, page 3. 
554 Romania Libera, PNT-CD, PNL, UFD si ANCD au convenit sa se solidarizeze impotriva ‘stangii 
antireformatoare’, 11 January 2000, page 3 and Romani
pentru alegerile din anul 2000, 4 March 2000, page 3. 
555 Diaconescu claimed that the National Peasants remained committed to a formation composed of parties 
and representativ
lost its purpose. 
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key members – including one serving minister, Victor Babiuc, to the National Liberals 
which led to renewed threats from the Democrats to withdraw from the government.556   
In the local elections, the Convention won 7.5% of the vote and the National Liberals, 
7.0%.  Of potential competitors and collaborators on the centre and centre-right, only the 
 
berals settled on the option of running 
ojan as 
built around the National Peasant Party was announced.  Only one senior figure in the 
Convention – education minister Andrei Marga – suggested that an alternative route out of 
                                                           
Democrats exceeded even these meagre tallies, leaving Iliescu’s Social Democrats as the
clear winners.557 
In the wake of the June local elections, Stoica identified his main objective as being the 
establishment of a different type of alliance with a single presidential candidate, his second 
objective being simply how not to lose the party’s place in parliament.558  Asked later 
whether the Democratic Convention could have been the basis for the right to recover its 
equilibrium, Stoica replied that it was not only a matter of the political vehicle but the fuel 
that went into it and the way it worked.559  He sought an alliance with the Alliance for 
Romania but this proved a difficult task: many of his colleagues were resistant to co-
operation with the left and the Alliance for Romania demanded more from the deal than its 
political capital could justify.560  The National Li
their campaign independent of the Convention and banking on the standing of Stol
their standard bearer to maximise their support.   
The National Peasants continued through the early part of the summer to seek the 
reconstruction of the Democratic Convention but the National Liberals did not appear 
receptive to the move and in August two senior members left the party to re-allign with the 
Convention.561  In September, the creation of a new Democratic Convention formation 
 
556 Partidul Democrat a creat o criza parlamentara, Romania Libera, 23 February 2000, page 3. 
557 Share of vote for County Councils (Consiliile Judetene).  The PD polled 9.9%, the ApR 7.4% and Victor 
Ciorbea’s ANCD just 1.3%.  The Social Democrats won 27.4% of the vote and the Greater Romania Party 
gave no clue to its dramatic success a few months later by securing 6.6%.  Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, page 246. 
558 Stoica, Provocare, page 152. 
559 Stoica, Provocare, page 153. 
560 Revolta in PNL, Romania Libera, 3 July 2000, page 3.  Teodor Melescanu, leader of the Alliance for 
Romania, had polled strongly until he became linked to the Costea scandal and the party’s poll rating had 
fallen by more than half to 6% in August 2000.  Gallagher, Theft, page 242. 
561 Ministrul Decebal Traian Remes si senatorul Dan Amedeu Lazarescu au parasit PNL, Romania Libera,  24 
August 2000, page 1. 
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the impasse between the National Liberals and the National Peasants might be the creation 
of a new reform party.562  His proposal did not come to fruition. 
President Constantinescu himself ultimately opted for exit, stunning the Romanian political 
class by announcing in mid July that he would not seek re-election.  The way was open for 
Isarescu to run for the presidency but the polls showed him trailing Stolojan.  Late efforts 
were made to re-establish co-operation between the National Liberals and the National 
Peasants behind a Stolojan (for president) – Isarescu (for prime minister) ticket but 
Diaconescu appears to have decided that it was too late to forge a new alliance.563 
Table 18: Votes cast in the presidential election, November/December 2000 564 
  Round I  Round II  
 Votes % Votes % 
Ion Iliescu 4 076 273 36.4 6 696 623 66.8
Corneliu Vadim Tudor 3 178 293 28.3 3 324 247 33.2
Theodor Stolojan  1 321 420 11.8  
Mugur Isarescu 1 069 463 9.5  
Gyorgy Frunda 696 989 6.2  
Petre Roman 334 852 3.0  
Others 535 684 4.8  
 
Table 19: Result of the parliamentary election, November 2000565 
  Vote* %* Deputies 
elected 
Senators 
elected 
Social Democrats 3 968 464 36.6 155 65
Greater Romania Party 2 112 027 19.5 84 37
Democrat Party 762 365 7.0 31 13
National Liberal Party 747 263 6.9 30 13
Hungarian Democratic Union 736 863 6.8 27 12
Democratic Convention 2000 546 135 5.0 0 0
Alliance for Romania 441 228 4.1 0 0
Others 2 438 892 19.9 18** 0
* Chamber of Deputies.  ** Representing the ethnic minorities 
                                                            
562 Andrei Marga, Interviuri, speranta si ratiunii, Fundatia Pentru Studii Europene, Cluj, 2006, pp. 213 – 215 
reproduces Marga’s declaration, published in Evenimentul Zilei on 18 July 2000. 
563 Gallagher, Theft, page 242. 
564 Stan Stoica, Dupa ‘89, pp. 241 – 242. 
565 Stan Stoica, Dupa ‘89, pp. 231 – 234. 
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Ultimately, if success for the Convention was to be achieved either by the fusion of liberal 
and conservative interests, or by the absorption of one into the other, the member 
organisations proved too weak to do either.  Instead, the Convention was undone by deep-
seated differences over strategic choices which gave rise to bitter animosity.  National 
Peasant Secretary General Remus Opris seemed to reveal more than merely his party’s 
election theme when asked to assess the attitude of the National Liberals.  The National 
Peasants had kept liberalism alive in the face of the National Liberals’ self-destructive 
tendencies and their flirtations with the left and were being repaid with further duplicity: 
…it is the second time, by accepting the traditional National Liberals within the 
Convention, [that the] National Peasant Party has contributed to the rehabilitation of 
Romanian liberalism.  After the political adventures initiated by Radu Campeanu 
which led the National Liberal Party to serve the interests of President Ion Iliescu and 
Premier Teodor Stolojan, the liberal movement could be found inside the Democratic 
Convention between 1992 and 1996, given the necessary support of Corneliu Coposu 
and our party to avoid the shattering of the liberals…  It seems that history is 
repeating.566 
But it was the National Peasants who were on the verge of shattering.  The Convention 
2000 election campaign focused on attacking their former allies the National Liberals while 
the rise of the Greater Romania Party went unnoticed.  By absenting themselves from the 
Convention, the National Liberals benefited directly from the lower electoral threshold 
applying to single parties than for electoral alliances and the 1.3 million votes won by 
Stolojan in the presidential poll may also have helped to lift the National Liberal tally.  The 
National Peasants suffered a catastrophic defeat, winning just 5% of the vote which was not 
enough to qualify for representation in parliament.567  While the Convention broke up after 
the elections and the National Peasants declined to the political fringe, the liberals used 
                                                            
566 CDR2000 si Mugur Isarescu, impreuna pe drumul cel bun al Romaniei europene, Romania Libera, 14 
October 2000, page 2. 
567 In the first round of the presidential ballot, Stolojan finished third behind Iliescu and Vadim Tudor.  He 
polled 11.8% of the vote while Isarescu, running as an independent with Democratic Convention 2000 
support won 9.5%.  In the parliamentary elections, the National Liberals won 6.9% and the Convention 2000, 
5.0%.  The threshold faced by the National Liberals as a single party was 5.0% while it was 8% for the 
Convention 2000 electoral alliance.  Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, pp. 231-241. 
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their parliamentary base as a starting point to reconstruct a centrist alternative to the Social 
Democrats, this time in alliance with the Democrat Party. 
5.8  Conclusion 
Emil Constantinescu challenges the notion that the Democratic Convention failed on the 
grounds that such analysis fails to appreciate the nature of the formation.  It was an 
electoral alliance which set itself a series of clear goals:  winning local elections in 
Bucharest and other large cities in 1991; obtaining a high vote share in the 1992 elections; 
winning the local and national elections of 1996.  From this perspective, all of the 
Convention’s objectives were achieved.568  Yet it cannot be argued by extension that a 
further objective of the Convention was to collapse under the pressure of governing to such 
an extent that it failed to win parliamentary representation in the 2000 elections and 
disappeared from Romanian politics thereafter.  It is true that few had the clear aim of 
crafting a single centre-right party from among the Convention’s members at any point in 
its history.  Apart from the anguished response of the Civic Alliance to organisational 
failure in 1998, there does not even appear to have been much discussion of the best 
organisational structure for the Convention.  From the perspective of the centre right the 
costs of the 2000 election defeat were considerable:  the loss of personnel; the loss of 
residual electoral loyalty; the need for any successor formation to re-create an 
organisational presence, particularly in areas where the National Peasant Party had been 
strong; the potential damage to centre-right policy objectives both from the loss of the 
National Peasant Party voice and the installation of a Social Democrat government.  In this 
context the inability of the Convention to sustain itself as a long-term vehicle for centre-
right politics must be seen in terms of organisational failure. 
The break-up of the Democratic Convention is frequently blamed on the strains of running 
a diverse government coalition but this does not seem to offer an adequate explanation.  
Other parties survive the experience of running broad coalitions, even in the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe – including notably the Romanian Social 
Democrats of course who led a four-way coalition with hard-line leftists and ultra 
nationalists from 1992 to 1996 and then governed at the head of an entirely different 
                                                            
568 Constantinescu, pp. 250 – 251. 
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constellation from 2000 to 2004.  It seems logical to suggest that the fusion of the member 
organisations of the Convention into a single party would have raised exit barriers but this 
was barely even contemplated before the electoral catastrophe of 2000.  The common 
explanation for this among political actors is the ideological diversity within the 
Convention.  Yet this too seems a highly contestable explanation since successful centre-
right parties across Europe (including examples such as Fidesz in Hungary and the Czech 
Civic Democrats) have succeeded precisely because they have reconciled diverse 
ideological positions from nationalism to Christian democracy and neo-liberalism to 
construct a cohesive centrist platform with a broad electoral base.   
The organisational factors that lay beneath the personal and political differences that 
plagued the Convention appear from the evidence here to relate to the different incentive 
structures facing each of the key member organisations.  The National Peasants were 
motivated to remain within the Convention framework because their leading position 
within the organisation gave them the largest share of the rewards.  At the same time their 
vote-maximising objectives combined with experience of heavy electoral defeat when 
running outside the Convention leading them to conclude that the Convention was the best 
option for achieving their goal of broadening their electoral support.  The smaller civic 
society groups remained loyal to the Democratic Convention.  There was an extensive 
cross-over of personnel with the National Peasant Party which meant there was also cross-
over of incentives and rewards but the formations themselves had lost considerable 
influence by the end of the 1990s and presumably they calculated that there was little 
further to gain from sustaining a reduced Convention through what seemed an inevitable 
spell in opposition.   
The Hungarian Democratic Union appeared to have little to gain in electoral terms from 
affiliation to the Convention.  It left the Convention in 1995 and never ran a fully integrated 
slate of candidates but this mutually beneficial accommodation with the formation helps to 
explain its continued loyalty to the Convention-led government throughout the 1996-2000 
period.  Helping to ensure the defeat of the Social Democrats was the principal motivation 
for Democratic Union membership of the Convention initially.  Thereafter the Democratic 
Union moderated its policy demands over time which meant it was content to stay within 
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the Convention-led government as long as it was best placed to deliver those policy 
demands.  Towards the end of the 1990s with the repositioning of the Social Democrats and 
the obvious electoral decline of the Convention, the motivation for remaining attached to 
the Convention lessened considerably and as a result the Democratic Union eventually 
abandoned its former coalition partners entirely to run separately in the 2000 elections – 
including, for the first time, running its own presidential candidate. 
In government the Civic Alliance became a focus for dissent.  Its determination to stand 
apart from the government combined with its high expectations to create intense pressures.  
Valerian Stan gave a foretaste of these pressures in an interview he gave in February 1996: 
No one [in the Civic Alliance] takes a salary.  What is more, and this is generally 
understood, our people do not want recompense for what they do.  They do not 
desire places in parliament or in ministries if the Convention forms a government.  
Material losses are, in the main part, compensated for by the altruism of Civic 
Alliance members.569 
Armed with this sense of moral superiority, it is hardly surprising that the Civic Alliance 
resented the realities of coalition politics. 
Combating corruption became a critical political litmus test for the Convention in 
government.  Public confidence in the government’s willingness to deal with the issue was 
rocked early by the Valerian Stan affair but the government was not able to counter the 
image of failure thanks to its own actions (or lack of them).  Convictions for corruption fell 
steadily through the government’s term from 636 in 1997 to 298 in the year 2000.570 A 
survey carried out in the spring of 2000 found that two thirds of respondents (and 70% of 
businesses) felt that all or almost all public officials were corrupt.571   
The Ciorbea government began by setting out its programme for immediate action on a 
broad front. The stabilisation programme included 28 pledges and proposals for 26 
legislative actions. Among these was just a single pledge relating directly to tackling 
                                                            
569 Interviu cu dl. Valerian Stan, presidentele Aliantei Civice, Romania Libera, 23 February 1996, page 3. 
570 Romanian government statistics quoted in Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU accession process: 
Corruption and Anti-corruption policy, Budapest, 2002, page 457. 
571 World Bank survey quoted in Open Society Institute, page 459. 
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corruption (to set up a government anti-corruption department) and four proposed bills to 
reform local government administration.  No measures were included that would directly 
address either the actions of the former Communist regime or the continued involvement of 
its agents in administration or public life.572  Perhaps the primacy given to economic issues 
in its six month stabilisation plan contributed to unease among its ideologically committed 
supporters who wanted to see early action on lustration measures. 
Sponsor organisations are an established feature of parties in European liberal democracies 
but the bonds holding the Civic Alliance to the Democratic Convention were particularly 
weak.  Their political objectives were entirely policy driven and even the delivery of their 
policy prospectus held few direct personal or group benefits for the Civic Alliance 
members.  The Civic Alliance sat outside government structures and as a result saw its 
influence reduce once the Convention gained power.  The exigencies of office holding 
meant that the 1996-2000 government was unable to deliver the radical policy demands of 
the Alliance while the Civic Alliance leadership itself was not subjected to the same 
pressures which might have mitigated their demands. 
The National Liberals saw themselves as at least the equals of the National Peasants after 
their re-formation but the decision not to join the Democratic Convention for the 1992 
election meant that the party was always the junior partner within the Convention structure.  
Joining the Convention for the 1996 elections was entirely rational given the failure of 1992 
and was facilitated by the continued presence of fragments of the liberal family within the 
Convention throughout its existence.  The National Peasants’ hold on the Convention 
weakened after the fall of the Ciorbea government and at the same time the National 
Liberals had strengthened their organisation via a series of mergers.  Thus it was equally 
rational for the party to seek a realignment of power within the Convention as the price for 
its continued membership.  Failure to achieve a satisfactory outcome left the National 
Liberals to take a hugely risky decision which paid off (just) with its survival as a 
parliamentary force after the 2000 elections.  The National Liberals’ decisions about 
membership therefore appear to have been driven entirely by calculations of electoral cost 
                                                            
572 Masuri prioritare pentru primele sase luni de guvernare, Romania Libera, 10th December 1996, page 2.   
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and reward (and the consequences for access to the benefits of office holding) rather than 
by ideology.   
The motivation for the creation of a more tight-knit organisation – even going as far as  the 
creation of a single party – was absent from the thinking of almost all the constituent parts 
of the Convention.  The Civic Alliance wished to maintain its distinct identity outside of 
the party system since this had brought it substantial influence before the Convention won 
power.  The National Peasants risked losing its leading role within the organisation and 
even the leaders of the National Liberals benefited from having a defined constituency 
within the organisation which might be lost in a merger.  The Democratic Union had won 
monopoly control of its electoral constituency and would risk losing that if its distinctive 
ethnic identity was lost – as the Social Democrats moved back into the orbit of acceptable 
coalition partners it also would risk losing the insurance policy of flexibility over coalition 
choices. 
There was also little effort made to establish a new centre-right vehicle outside the 
Convention as it declined.  Ciorbea’s National Christian Democratic Alliance was a small 
party with a narrow base which re-entered the Convention in time for the 2000 elections 
and the same is true of the Alternative Romania Party/Union of Right Forces.  Some in the 
Convention no doubt took the fatalistic view that there was nothing more that could be 
done to improve the situation – as Brian Barry points out in his critique of Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty, ‘deteriorating quality need not produce a belief that decline can be reversed, or 
perhaps even arrested’.573  So, with the costs of entry being lower for established 
formations it is unsurprising that many actors chose the option of reverting to running as 
separate parties once it became clear that the Convention could not be revived.  And with 
such limited options facing them it is perhaps equally unsurprising that so many Romanian 
voters opted instead for a radical alternative in the elections of 2000, giving Corneliu 
Vadim Tudor and his ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party such a substantial vote. 
At the root of the Convention’s failure in 2000 was its own organisational weakness.  The 
National Liberals abandoned the formation when they decided they had a better chance of 
                                                            
573 Brian Barry, Review Article: Exit, Voice and Loyalty, British Journal of Political Science, vol 4, January 
1974, page 91. 
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electoral success on their own.  The main civic society organisations gave up on the 
Convention too.  And there is no talk of foreign electoral expertise being drafted in to help 
the campaign.  Indeed, on the eve of the election even the National Peasant Party’s own 
chief press spokesman was questioning the value of the Convention.574  Fatalism overcame 
the Convention’s leadership and the bitter divisions on the centre-right led the Convention 
to spend most of its campaigning energy attacking its former allies rather than focusing on 
the dangers of a victory for Iliescu or Tudor.575  Efforts to persuade the electorate that the 
government actually had delivered on many of its promises made no impact – the electorate 
was no longer inclined to listen.576 
Sharman and Phillips argue, based on their study of Bulgaria’s Union of Democratic 
Forces, that learning and consequent consolidation by parties even in new democracies is 
problematic and slow.  Parties need time and feedback in order to learn and adapt.  
Intervening variables – particularly the degree of leadership autonomy and the degree that 
dominant factions are entrenched can block consolidation.577  The Convention had seven 
years and two election defeats to learn from but the greatest strains on the organisation 
arose when they assumed power after 1996, and then the Convention’s decline was so rapid 
there was little opportunity to adapt.  The individual parties within the alliance acted as 
equivalent to party factions – only with even stronger institutionalised gravity than less 
autonomous traditional factions and this in turn lessened the autonomy of the Convention 
leadership.  The absence of a single dominant party within the Convention and of a leader 
willing and able to drive the creation of a consolidated formation combined with strongly 
entrenched loyalty to the constituent parties and varying incentive structures for the 
different member organisations to over-come the formalised unity of the Conventions 
statutes or programmes.  As a result a ‘Democratic Convention identity’ was never able to 
establish itself as more than merely an election symbol. 
 
                                                            
574 Adrian Iorgulescu a atacat dur PNTCD, Romania Libera, 18 October 2000, page 3. 
575 La intalnirea cu membri ai GDS, Stoica a lansat noi acuzatii impotriva PNTCD, Romania Libera, 7 August 
2000. 
576 CDR-2000 a lansat programul politic si economic, Romania Libera, 9 October 2000, page 1. 
577 Jason Sharman and Robert Phillips, An internalist perspective on party consolidation and the Bulgarian 
Union of Democratic Forces, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 43, no. 3, May 2004, page 400. 
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Chapter 6 – in search of an ideology 
National Liberal and National Peasant leaders had persecuted histories.  The struggle 
between the Front and the opposition became an ethical contest.  The terminology of 
confrontation was not political it was ethical.  The supporters of the Convention 
thought it was an ethical movement too.  But when it came to power, well, politics is 
politics.  The supporters were surprised it [the Convention] was not so ethical in 
office.578  
The consolidation, growth and eventual failure of the Democratic Convention prompt four 
questions that relate to its ideological development. Did the parties that made up the 
Convention possess coherent ideological positions?  Were those ideologies so contradictory 
that they undermined the development of a more effective operational structure?  Was there 
any attempt to craft a unifying ideological position for the Convention itself as distinct 
from its constituent parties?  And if that ideological development was lacking, did it 
contribute to the Convention’s ultimate failure?  This chapter explores the ideological roots 
of the political right in Romania and the stages of development that followed the fall of 
Communism in an attempt to answer those four questions.  It begins by examining the 
ideology of the constituent members of the Convention from a historical perspective to 
determine how distinct their ideological positioning was.  It then examines how the 
Convention and its member organisations viewed five core elements of centre-right 
ideology: anti-Communism; economic reform; national unity; democracy; and attitudes to 
the church.  In each case it traces change over time and compares promise with delivery in 
an attempt to establish whether ideology acted as a glue or a solvent for the Convention.  
The chapter then goes on to look at the two prominent issues that could be said to 
characterise a Convention ideology as distinct from that of its members (by virtue of their 
salience to Convention narratives and particularly those of the Convention’s titular leader, 
Emil Constantinescu: a ‘return to the West’, and the remaking of society and the state via a 
moral crusade. 
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As set out in chapter two above, the nature of political ideology (particularly on the centre-
right) has been relatively neglected by political scientists.  However, Szczerbiak and 
Hanley have suggested that the crafting of a broad, integrative narrative that seeks to 
“reconcile liberal-capitalist modernisation with traditional moral values and specific local 
and national identities,” is an important element in explaining the success or failure of a 
centre-right formation.579  This chapter will show that the constituent parts of the 
Democratic Convention did have recognisable and coherent ideological positions that were 
not obviously in conflict with each other but that there was only a very limited attempt to 
craft a distinct ideological identity for the Convention itself; and further that while a 
number of significant actors among the Convention elite argue that ideological differences 
played a major part in explaining the Convention’s demise in practice this does not seem to 
have been the case.  Rather it was a failure of organisation and leadership which meant that 
the conditions were not created where a cohesive ideological identity could be created for 
the Convention. 
6.1  The evolution of Romania’s right ideology 
Romania lacked the experiences of intellectual dissent or regime experimentation that were 
features of Communist-era Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.580  Varujan Vosganian, 
who attempted to set out a coherent ideological position in his book on the Romanian right, 
points to the lack of Communist-era opposition as contributing to the absence of a centre-
right appeal in the post-Communist period: 
In this period [the 1990s], in Romania there was a multi-party system but a real 
pluralism did not exist.  The political forces that did exist oscillated between the 
extreme left and the centre.  The right of politics was absent.  This situation 
profoundly destabilised the forces of politics and had negative consequences for 
reform…In our country the fight against the Communist dictatorship did not exist in a 
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580 See chapter 2 above 
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structured, consistent way.  Civic, anti-Communist resistance was exiled and 
dissipated.581 
Instead, in Vosganian’s view, a group of dissidents who were opposed to Ceausescu but not 
anti-Communist took the lead in the 1989 revolution and were the only ones prepared for 
post-Communist politics.  With only a few exceptions such as Doina Cornea and Gabriel 
Andreescu, the leadership of the opposition to the National Salvation Front (and therefore 
to Communism) thus passed to the historic parties.582 
Lacking a strong resistance legend, or a home-grown political programme developed in the 
Communist years, the re-formed historic parties drew heavily on their pre-Communist past.  
Large parts of the party’s leadership had been involved in the parties before the Communist 
take-over.583  As a result, the re-formed parties’ historic identities were important reference 
points for their ideological positioning after 1989. 
The National Peasant Party had been formed from the 1926 merger of the National Party 
(which, until 1918 had been a regional party acting as the voice of the Romanian 
community in Hapsburg Transylvania and agitating for the union of the region with the 
existing Romanian state) and the Peasant Party which operated in the Regat.584  The 
Peasant Party had its roots on the radical left of politics, advocating the transfer of land 
ownership to the peasantry (and of mineral resources to the state) and administrative reform 
giving rural areas more autonomy.585  The merged party’s first political programme 
(published in 1926) had a more moderate tone calling for administrative reform, an 
expansion of public education, freedom of religious belief, agricultural reform, measures to 
encourage the development of small and medium sized businesses and the equal treatment 
of foreign and domestic capital.586 
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582 Vosganian, page 75. 
583 See chapter 5 below. 
584 National Peasant Party, PNTCD Serving Romania – a synthesis of the party’s history, Bucharest, 2002, 
page 14.  The Regat is the colloquial term for the original Romanian state formed after 1878 from the 
provinces of Walachia and Moldova. 
585 Preamble to the Peasant Party constitution, reproduced in Gheorghe Sbarna, Partidele Politice din 
Romania 1918 – 1940, Editura Sylvi, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 124 – 126. 
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Pre-war land reform together with the collectivisation of agriculture and the profound 
changes in the structure of Romanian society brought about by the Communist regime 
rendered much of the party’s early emphasis on land ownership irrelevant by 1989.587  
Instead, post-Communist party leaders focused on the legacy of Iuliu Maniu whose 
leadership of the party spanned the pre- and post-war period.  Maniu’s resistance to 
Communism was a powerful symbol but so too was his loyalty to the party.588   
Gabriel Tepelea, vice president of the National Peasant Party through the 1990s and one of 
the class of ‘seniors’ who dominated the leadership, summarises the party’s creed, the 
centrality of its stance against totalitarianism and the significance of the party’s pre-
Communist leadership: 
In 1946, in the small opening of the window for liberty, between the Fascist 
dictatorship and the Communist invasion, Iuliu Maniu felt the need to set out the four 
fundamental principles of the [National Peasant Party]: 
- Christian morals 
- Enlightened patriotism 
- Democracy 
- Social justice 
It is this synthesis of principles which remained the basis for our past political battles; 
it is at the same time, a creed which guided us through the worst years of darkness 
and suffering.589 
                                                            
587 The rapid decollectivisation of large parts of agriculture in the early 1990s also meant restitution of land 
ownership in rural areas failed to become a powerfully salient issue except for owners of large pre-
Communist era estates.  See below for more details. 
588 Romania Libera, for example carried a number of articles celebrating Maniu’s birth date on 8th January 
1997 in which the enduring relevance of his politics was set out.  In 2003, the National Peasant Party held a 
conference to mark the anniversaries of the deaths of Maniu (50 years) and Ion Mihalache (leader of the 
Peasant Party before it merged with the National Party and who died ten years after Maniu).  The conference 
drew contributions from Ion Diaconescu, Victor Ciorbea and Ana Blandiana among others.  National Peasant 
Party, Anul Comemorativ Maniu-Mihalache Sesiune de Comunicari, Bucharest, 2003.  Maniu’s portrait still 
dominates the entrance to the party’s headquarters in Bucharest. 
589 National Peasant Party, Pe Acelasi Drum, (a synthesis of National Peasant Party doctrine), Tritonic, 
Bucharest, 2000, page 10. 
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These four basic tenets of the party’s identity appear repeatedly in the National Peasant 
discourse.  The party held its first Congress of the post-Communist era in September 1991 
where it affirmed that the National Peasant’s doctrine was in essence Christian democratic, 
restating the fundamental principles of Christian morals, enlightened patriotism, democracy 
and social justice.590  Corneliu Coposu personally identifies these elements of Maniu’s 
mantra as profoundly influencing his own political beliefs.591  In January 1990, Corneliu 
Coposu set out the National Peasant Party programme as prioritising:  national security and 
integrity of borders; civil liberties and the rule of law; introduction of a market economy 
and restitution of property; welfare provision and the right to form free trades unions; free 
universities and the promotion of Christian morals; separation of powers and free elections; 
equal treatment of minorities and religions in the spirit of the Alba Iulia declaration of 
1918.592   
The party sought a centre ground between classic liberalism and socialism, in keeping with 
the image of West European Christian Democratic parties.  It declared itself to be against 
class war, xenophobia, absolute individualism, a strong and boundless state and in favour 
of tolerance for national minorities.593  Over time, the National Peasants also began to co-
opt more traditionally conservative thinking.  The party’s 1996 congress declared its aim as 
being to reconstruct society through the fundamental traditional institutions of family, 
school and church.594  Its approach drawn in terms of a moral crusade but the core of its 
identity remained uncompromising anti-Communism and the Christian-centrist roots 
inherited from Maniu: 
[our priorities are] the moral and political reconstruction of our nation, putting an 
emphasis on the traditional institutions that have served us enduringly from the past: 
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family, church and the school.  It is imperative to realize national reconciliation in the 
spirit of Christian morals.595 
While the National Peasants avoided significant divisions around ideological positions 
during the 1990s, the National Liberals were prone to frequent splits.  The divisions within 
the National Liberal Party were principally driven by personalities and differences over 
tactics (as explored in chapter 3 above) but ideological disputes did feature also.  Like the 
National Peasants, the National Liberals looked back to pre-Communist memories to shape 
post-Communist actions.  The party’s pre-war manifestos made radical calls for the 
protection of minority rights, for progressive taxation, reform of labour laws to improve 
workers rights, decentralisation and the break-up of large estates.596  In 1923, Ion Duca 
described liberal doctrine as: ‘progress in all its forms within a framework of private 
property’.597  The pre-war National Liberal Party built its support on the base of the 
emerging urban middle class in Romania and made the construction of the nation state the 
centrepiece of its approach.598  Over the post-Communist period it acquired a reputation as 
a ‘party of business’, more experienced and hard-nosed than the National Peasants but also 
less sympathetic to the needs of the wider electorate – a reputation the party became keen to 
shed.599 
At the party’s re-launch in 1990 it proposed a continuation of pre-Communist liberal 
traditions, focusing on a guarantee of individual liberties, the separation of powers, 
restoration of freedom and democracy and the guarantee of religious freedoms and minority 
rights.600  The programme adopted by the National Liberals’ Permanent Delegation in July 
1991 set as its core objective the introduction of ‘real democracy based on private property, 
the free market economy and free competition’.  To achieve this it envisaged the restitution 
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of state property; decentralised management of economic entities and the attraction of 
foreign capital.601   
These aspirations strike a rather pragmatic tone over economic policy – they did not give a 
leading place to privatisation or the ending of price subsidies, for example.602  The split 
between party leader Radu Campeanu and his opponents in the party developed an 
ideological angle in response to this cautious approach.  A small group of proponents of 
neo-liberalism gathered around the businessman Dinu Patriciu, forming the National 
Liberal Party – Youth Wing which advocated ‘Shock Therapy’ to transform Romania’s 
economy and society.603  Most of this group went on to form the Liberal Party ’93 whose 
criticism of socialism was drawn from its strident economic analysis: 
Until now, in not one part of the socialist world, not the smallest social progress can 
be found. The economies are ruined in direct proportion to the purity of the socialism 
they adopted.  Where private property was completely abolished, the ruin was 
complete… Where the taking of private property was only partial, the ruin was also 
only partial.  It was the case in Sweden, in England in the 1970s, in France in the 
1990s…604 
One commentator claimed the absence of a leader capable of crafting a distinctive liberal 
identity was the cause of their constant disunity.605  Dinu Zamfirescu, one of the leaders of 
the Liberal Party ’93 identified National Liberal vice president Viorel Catarama as an 
obstacle to the reunification of the party because of his ‘statist’ views.606 As explored in 
chapter three, above, the National Liberals lost considerable influence within the 
Democratic Convention as a result of their repeated divisions.  Yet the party, largely 
reunited by 1996 within the Convention, does not appear to have driven a particular 
ideological agenda within the formation suggesting either that its ideological position was 
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not radically different from the dominant formations or that pragmatism was the favoured 
approach, trading ideological commitments for other political benefits. 
The smaller parties within the Democratic Convention had a limited impact on its 
ideological positioning.  The historic Social Democrats left the Convention in 1995 and 
found a home more amenable to its centre-left prospectus with Petre Roman’s Democrat 
Party.607  The Civic Alliance Party proclaimed a liberal economic doctrine and prioritised 
the protection of civil and democratic rights.  At its formation it adopted the programme of 
the Civic Alliance as its own.608  The Hungarian Democratic Union had an unusual internal 
structure – attempting to represent the entire spread of political opinions within the 
Hungarian community.609  Where the Hungarian Democratic Union had an important 
impact was in acting as a brake on any radical nationalist leanings within the Convention 
(see the section on nationalism below).   
So the constituent parts of the Convention each made an attempt to create a recognisable 
ideological position for itself.  Within the Convention did these ideological positions prove 
to be contradictory when it came to the main issues that identify a centre-right formation? 
6.2 Anti-Communism 
The Democratic Convention was organisationally weak with a regularly changing 
membership but there is one thing that fractious Convention politicians agreed on – that it 
was first and foremost a coalition against Communism.  The strength of the formation’s 
anti-Communism was a source of cohesion but it was also a cause of weakness – it created 
distrust within the Convention (due to tensions over how far and how fast anti-Communist 
legislation should be introduced) and created barriers to co-operation with potential pro-
reform collaborators who carried associations with the former regime (the Democrat Party).  
In office, the Convention’s failure to enact practical measures to deal with the legacy of 
Romania’s Communist past left significant numbers of supporters feeling disillusioned and 
contributed to damaging splits. 
                                                            
607 They formed the Union of Social Democrats and contested the 1996 elections on a common platform as 
mentioned in chapter three. 
608 Un partid anticommunist, Romania Libera, 9 July 1991, page 2. 
609 Interview with Csaba Takacs, Januay 2009, Cluj. 
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The Convention’s early appeal was cast in terms of a moral crusade which invoked the 
restitution of the rule of law and the introduction of a functioning market economy as the 
means to deliver an end to the continuing dominance of a Communist-era mentality in 
politics.  The Convention’s 1992 election manifesto opened with the statement that its 
fundamental objective was to bring a complete end to the Communist system.  The change 
represented nothing less than a moral reconstruction of the nation, shedding the negative 
effects of decades of Communist dictatorship: 
The Democratic Convention represents an alliance of parties and formations which 
have a democratic vocation and which opt for a profound change in Romania through 
the construction of a state of law and a free and open market economy… 
The fundamental objective of [the Convention’s programme for government] is to end 
totally the Communist system, by clarifying understanding and changing the 
mentality, from reconstructing a state of law and from the impulse of the market 
economy, by ensuring social security, reintegrating the national territory and 
reintegrating Romania into the European orbit. 
The Democratic Convention underlines the necessity to reconstruct the natural rapport 
between morals and politics, retrieving this from under the influence of demagogy, 
cynicism and pathological thirst for power that predominated in 45 years of 
Communism and to get back to the traditional spirit of responsibility, tolerance and 
enlightened patriotism that formed the basis for the modern Romanian state.610   
The success of the National Salvation Front in retaining power after the fall of Communism 
resulted in Romania’s transition being widely seen as incomplete.  The lack of home-grown 
dissident thought and the capturing of the popular revolution by the left meant that the new 
democratic opposition came to be led by old parties – particularly the National Liberals and 
the National Peasant who had dominated Romanian politics before the Second World War 
and whose leaders had suffered exile or imprisonment by the Communist regime. 
Unsurprisingly, their anti-Communism was strident. 
                                                            
610 Democratic Convention, Platforma – Program a Conventiei Democratice, 1992. 
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The frustration at the apparent failure to remove Communist apparatchiks from power was 
made clear in the Declaration of Timisoara, published on 11th March, 1990.  Point 1 of the 
Declaration stressed that the revolution was not only against Ceausescu but against 
Communism.  Point 8, critically, stated that former Communist Party activists and members 
of the internal security services (the Securitate) should not be permitted to stand as 
candidates for election to public office.611 
From this point on the National Salvation Front came to be seen as synonymous with 
continuing Communist power.  Its activities were viewed as deliberate in re-making the 
administrative structures of the former Communist regime and in orchestrating events such 
as the inter-communal violence at Targu Mures and the attacks on student protesters in 
Bucharest’s University Square in May 1990.612  The language and tone of politics itself 
became framed more in terms of ethics than of everyday politics with opposition to the 
Front being viewed as almost a moral crusade.613 
The radicalisation of the politics of anti-Communism proved a source of weakness for the 
Convention as well as an initial cause of unity - thanks in large part to the different 
experiences of the National Liberals and the National Peasants at the time of the 
Communist take-over but also because of more contemporary fears over the exposure of 
clandestine collaboration with the former regime.  As discussed in chapter three, the 
National Peasants saw themselves as the rightful winners of the 1946 elections which had 
been manipulated to deliver an overwhelming Communist victory.614    The National 
Liberals, on the other hand, had co-operated with the new regime at the end of the war and 
the notion of pragmatic alliance making in the perceived national interest entered the 
genetic make-up of the party.615  In 1991, the National Liberals joined the Front-dominated 
interim government led by Prime Minister Theodor Stolojan, a move which drove a wedge 
between the party and the National Peasants who viewed it in terms of a betrayal.616   
                                                            
611 Declaration of Timisoara, text reproduced in Pavel and Huiu, pp. 515 – 518. 
612 Interview with Csaba Takacs. Cluj 
613 Interview with Zoe Petre. 
614 Martin McCauley (ed), Communist Power in Europe, 1944 – 49, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1977. 
615 Valeriu Stoica, Provocari, pp. 12-13.   
616 Diaconescu, pp. 88 - 92.   
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Despite the strength of anti-Communist sentiment among opposition politicians, the 
lustration process never took root in Romania.617  This was due partly to the continued 
dominance of government by the left up to 1996 (meaning that the momentum and case for 
change had been somewhat lost by the time the centre-right came to power); partly (as 
discussed in chapter three) to the incomplete nature of the Convention’s election victory in 
1996 which necessitated coalition making with the Democrats; but also, no doubt, to the 
potential political risks of exploring the pasts of a Communist Party which reportedly had 
around four million members.618  Some – most notably President Emil Constantinescu – 
also blame a continuing control over state, judicial and business apparatus exercised by a 
Front/Securitate mafia for the failure to implement reforms.619   
Co-operation across the Communist-successor/anti-Communist dividing line has clearly 
been a critical issue in the evolution of the centre-right in Romania.  The infusion of 
politics with the rhetoric of the moral crusade against Communism meant that co-operation 
with the Democrat Party, in particular, was difficult for many to accept and the party 
became a lightning conductor for criticism over divisions within the 1996 – 2000 coalition 
government.620  The academic Horia Patepievici pointed to the contrasting genealogy of the 
National Peasants and the Democrat Party – the nucleus of one party being former political 
prisoners of the Communist regime, the other being drawn principally from within its 
apparatus - as explaining Democrat resistance to progress with lustration processes.621 Yet 
the failure of the Convention to confront the issues arising from the country’s Communist 
past - particularly the publishing of records relating to public figures’ collaboration with the 
Communist regime - cannot be wholly blamed on the political manoeuvres of the Democrat 
Party.  The Convention – indeed even the two main parties in the Convention - were 
exposed to internal tensions on the issue.  As early as the 1992 election, the Convention had 
adopted the language of ‘national reconciliation’ in which to frame its plans to address 
                                                            
617 Lustration being the limiting of participation in civic life by former Communist Party members. 
618 Lavinia Stan, Lustration in Romania, the story of a failure, Studia Politica, Nemira, vol. 6, no. 1 (2006), 
pp. 135 – 156.  Stan reports one Social Democrat Deputy claiming, during a debate on proposed lustration 
laws, that more than half of the population in the country were associated with the former regime when the 
families of those who were party members were taken into account. 
619 Ucen and Surochak. 
620 Zoe Petre, for example, reports her son reacting to the creation of the coalition with the Democrats by 
saying he felt that his life-long love had betrayed him.  Interview with Zoe Petre, Bucharest, February 2009. 
621 In cautarea motivelor crizei, Revista 22, number 5 of 1998, February 1998.   
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collaboration.  The election manifesto of that year explicitly absolved the millions of 
‘passive’ party members who had not sought illicit advantage from joining the Communist 
Party and focused its attention on former activists and paid party staff who it aimed to 
exclude from public life.622 And once in power the Convention leadership showed little 
appetite for action. 
It took the initiative of National Peasant parliamentarian Nicolae Dumitrescu – against the 
wishes of his party leadership – to begin the process of legislating to open the files of the 
Communist era secret police  with the dual aims of allowing citizens to view their own files 
and to place in the public domain those of politicians and senior officials.623  The process 
of taking the legislation through parliament was subject to repeated delays and amendmen
from politicians of all sides.
ts 
                                                           
624  Horia Patepievici’s nomination by the National Peasants to 
chair the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (the body which was set 
up by the Dumitrescu legislation) was rejected by parliament and other nominees such as 
Democrat Andrei Plesu were opposed because of their former membership of the 
Communist Party.  The legislation was subjected to numerous amendments that left 
Dumitrescu himself struggling to support the final version of the bill.625  The manoeuvring 
created further delays in the process of beginning the investigations, fuelling the impression 
that the political class was deliberately dragging its feet to protect itself from exposure.626   
The Civic Alliance explicitly called for lustration laws and for the publication of the 
Securitate files of those involved in politics (together with reform of the electoral system 
and drastic action against corruption) in one of its later efforts to revive the Convention.627 
 
622 Even its stated desire to exclude Communist activists from parliament implicitly accepted that this may not 
be achieved through legislation, instead pleading with the electorate not to vote for the former Communists if 
changes were not made to electoral law.  Democratic Convention, Platforma-Program 1992. 
623 Senator Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu launched the legislation in March 1997.  A CIS poll at the end of the 
year found that 57% of respondents backed Dumitrescu’s initiative against 17% who backed the National 
Peasant leadership in their opposition to the move.  Romania Libera, 23 December 1997, page 3. 
624 Tom Gallagher, Theft, Hurst, London, 2005, pp. 187 – 192. 
625 Lavinia Stan, Lustration. 
626 Securitate Shuffle, Central European Review, 17th April 2000.  Available online at http://www.ce-
review.org/00/15/lovatt15.html accessed on 25 March 2009. 
627 Civic Alliance, Scrisoare deschisa a alantei civice catre CDR, Bucharest, May 1999.  Available at 
http://www.aliantacivica.ro/documente/Scrisoare%20deschisa%20a%20Aliantei%20Civice%20catre%20C.D.
R.%20-%2018%20mai%201999.htm, accessed 29th July 2008. 
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But the leaders of the Convention failed to respond to pressure, either from within the 
organisation or from public opinion, to drive forward the process of lustration.  President 
Emil Constantinescu criticises the intellectual elite for expecting him to act 
unconstitutionally in order to initiate the process earlier and his chief political counsellor 
Zoe Petre defends the sluggish process on the grounds that the mechanism for investigating 
and publishing the archives had to be created from scratch.628     
Despite the clear loss of credibility that the Convention suffered as a result of events like 
the dismissal of Valerian Stan and Victor Ciorbea, it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the leaders of the Convention lacked the will to follow through on their early anti-
Communist rhetoric once they had come to power, either as a result of fear of the 
consequences for their own parties or because of the realpolitik of coalition management. 
6.3  Economic reform 
Three elements dominated early debate over economic reform:  the return to its previous 
owners of property that had been nationalised by the Communist regime, privatisation of 
state-run enterprises and liberalisation of prices. The first two were fundamental to the 
Democratic Convention’s political agenda and rested on a conviction that the creation of 
respect for the right to private property was central to the new economic era and also 
reflected the direct interests of the historic opposition groups.629  The third was the subject 
of some difference of opinion between the Convention members particularly as the 
damaging effect of hyper inflation became clear.630  The restitution of land and of housing 
to pre-Communist owners was a fraught affair and one that caused a major rift between the 
Democratic Convention and the Democrat Party when in office together after 1996.  
Privatisation became an increasingly salient issue as seven years of left-dominated 
government resisted radical moves in this area.  By 1996 it formed one of the corner-stones 
                                                            
628 Both comments are taken from Revista 22’s round table on the tenth anniversary of the 1996 elections.  
Available at www.revista22.ro/alegeri_1996-3263.html, accessed on 18 February 2009. 
629 Zoe Petre identifies restitution of property, dealing with the country’s Communist past (particularly the 
opening of Securitate files) and economic reform as the three main domestic priorities for the government 
elected in 1996 (interview, February 2009, Bucharest). 
630 “Terapie soc” sau terapie ponderata, Romania Libera, 7 February 1991, page 3. 
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of the new government’s attempts to recover Romania’s reputation in the eyes of important 
external government underwriters such as the International Monetary Fund.631 
In the agricultural sector the break-up of state-run collective farms was achieved rapidly, 
almost spontaneously.  Legislation introduced in 1991, which decentralised decision 
making about land distribution to village authority level, did little more than bring the law 
into line with existing practice.632  The return of land to former owners, and particularly of 
larger parcels of land, was more problematic.  Governments through the 1990s passed a 
series of laws that returned successively larger land-holdings to their previous owners but 
even during the 1996 - 2000 period, the return of larger holdings was resisted.633 
Restitution of housing was even more politically charged.  Estimates of the number of 
homes confiscated during the Communist period range between 240,000 and 640,000.  The 
National Salvation Front government allowed tenants of apartments built in the Communist 
era to buy their homes at prices ‘equivalent to the cost of a TV.’634  Owners of the land on 
which the apartment blocks were built were eventually compensated but the question of 
what to do about those living in property that had been nationalised but had avoided the 
Communist bulldozers gave rise to bitter debate.  The issue almost brought down the 
coalition government at the end of 1997 when the minister with responsibility for anti-
corruption measures – Valerian Stan – threatened to publish a dossier that implicated 
members of the Democrat Party (and others) in the illegal exploitation of state-owned so-
called ‘protocol homes’.635  Issues of restitution were not finally resolved until the Social 
Democrats returned to power following the elections at the end of 2000, the motivation 
being demands made by the EU accession programme.636 
                                                            
631 Tom Gallagher, Theft, pp. 178 – 185. 
632 Andrew Cartwright, The Return of the Peasant, land reform in post-Communist Romania, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2001. 
633 Theodor Stolojan asserts that all the main parties agreed that land restitution was necessary but ideological 
differentiation resulted in disagreements over the nature of the process (interview, Brussels, June 2008).  Zoe 
Petre takes a rather more cynical view, claiming that the Democrats resisted the restitution of forests, for 
example, because of the profits to be gained from links to the state-run forestry company Romsilva (the party 
controlled the forestry ministry in the coalition government) (interview, February 2009). 
634 Lavinia Stan, The Roof Over Our Heads:  Property Restitution in Romania, Journal of Communist Studies 
and Transition Politics, vol. 22, no. 2, June 2006, pp. 180 – 205. 
635 Interview with Valerian Stan, Bucharest, January 2009. 
636 Lavinia Stan, Roof over our heads. 
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Despite the difficulties encountered by the Convention in pursuing a legislative programme 
for property restitution in government, there is no doubt that it formed a key part of the 
Convention’s identity.  It linked directly to the interests of some influential sponsors 
(particularly representatives of the Romanian diaspora) and it fitted with an economic 
outlook which prioritised the legal recognition of property rights as the foundation of a 
functioning market economy.  The Civic Alliance, for instance, published a detailed plan 
for economic reform, the first priority of which was to create an ‘authentic market 
economy.’  To achieve this it was necessary to put in place certain ‘inalienable conditions’:  
a radical restructuring of the system of property rights and the ending of the state’s 
monopoly in this area; constitutional guarantees of the rights of citizens’ rights to private 
property; guarantees of the right to engage freely in economic activities; ending the states 
role in direct control of economic entities; creation of institutions to aid the functioning of 
the three key markets (goods, labour and capital); the liberalisation of prices and the 
convertibility of the currency.637 
Wider economic reform was a common theme for centre-right politicians, but rapid and 
extensive liberalisation was treated warily by most in Romania.  Although a number of the 
émigrés who returned to lead the historic parties had built successful business careers in the 
west, Romania lacked a cohort of home-grown economists who were committed to the 
ideals of economic liberalisation.  Theodor Stolojan, an economist who served as Prime 
Minister in 1991 and was presidential candidate for the National Liberals in 2000 
acknowledges that it was only after a number of years of working for the World Bank that 
he came to fully appreciate the workings of the free market and the significance of private 
property in its operation.638  Political economist Liliana Pop points out that even the 
economic journal most closely associated with this school of thought – Oeconomica – still 
promoted state-led solutions.639   
Ahead of the May 1990 elections, National Liberal leader Radu Campeanu spoke of the 
importance of privatisation of industry coupled with keeping in mind social welfare needs 
                                                            
637 Reforma economica: pozitia de principiu a Alianta Civica, Romania Libera, 3 May 1991, page 3. 
638 Interview, Brussels, June 2008. 
639 Interview with Liliana Pop, London, February 2008. 
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which suggested a more cautious approach.640  The Civic Alliance warned of the dangers of 
spiralling inflation if prices were liberalised before the capacity of domestic production had 
expanded to meet demand, and called for the urgent introduction of measures of social 
protection to help the unemployed and pensioners and to provide medical insurance.641 The 
National Peasants rejected the doctrine of ‘absolute individualism’ envisaged by the 
adoption of radical liberal economic reforms.642  In its 1996 programme it referred to 
Christian Democracy’s opposition to ‘savage liberalism’ and proposed instead an economic 
and social programme based on Christian morals of solidarity, tolerance, dialogue, 
pluralism, creativity and subsidiarity.643  The economic policies it proposed prioritised 
measures to ease the pressures on private business (and particularly agriculture) rather than 
on radical moves to accelerate market liberalisation.644 
Some voices, though, were raised in favour of more radical economic solutions.  The splits 
that occurred in the National Liberal Party in the early 1990s originated over disagreements 
about strategy but the younger activists who opposed Campeanu’s approach also coalesced 
around more distinct neo-liberal policy proposals.  The manifesto of the Liberal Party ’93 
speaks of the market, the individual and (private) property being the three fundamental 
concepts of liberalism and called for a dramatic reduction in the role of the state.645  The 
Alternative Romania Party (which later became the Union of Right Forces) also agitated for 
neo-liberal reforms.  Its Manifesto of the Right, published in 1998, saw capitalism and the 
right wing of politics as synonymous and called for a freeing of the Romanian economy to 
increase the prosperity of its citizens.  It demanded a reduction in bureaucracy, equal 
treatment of foreign and domestic capital, recognition of the importance of small and 
medium sized businesses and the encouragement of initiative and risk-taking.646 
                                                            
640 Interview in Romania Libera, 24 January 1990. 
641 Civic Alliance, Carta Aliantei Civice, Bucharest, December 1990 (point 9).  Available at 
http://www.aliantacivica.ro/documente/Carta%20Aliantei%20Civice%20-
%2014%20decembrie%201990.htm, accessed 29 July 2008. 
642 Taken from the political programme adopted by the National Peasant Party at its first Congress in 
September 1991.  Scurtu, pp. 227 – 234. 
643 National Peasant Party Pe Acelasi Drum, page 14. 
644 National Peasant Party Pe Acelasi Drum,  pp. 24 – 31. 
645 Partidul Liberal 1993, Manifestul Liberal, Bucharest, October 1993. 
646 Uniunea Fortelor de Dreapta, Manifestul dreptei, Bucharest, 1998.  Available at www.ufd.ro (downloaded 
on 11 February 2009). 
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Radu Vasile, the National Peasant Party General Secretary who went on to become Prime 
Minister, identified the promotion of a middle class as a key tenet of the party’s approach.  
He reports meeting a German academic expert in Christian Democratic ideology who set 
out seven principles that constitute Christian Democracy, but it was clear to Vasile that the 
most essential was the creation of a middle class through economic policies which 
supported entrepreneurs and small businesses.647  Andrei Marga appears to have taken a 
slightly more radical line.  In an article published in the magazine Revista 22 in 1996, 
Marga links the need for decentralisation of administration (an old National Peasant theme) 
with the central need for a free market economy and, critically, the attraction of foreign 
investment to mitigate the negative impact on employment of freeing up the economy.648  
In the event perhaps neither anticipated the scale of pain that had to be borne in order to 
transform the economy.649 
The homogeneity of internal opinions regarding economics is perhaps also illustrated by the 
willingness of Convention leaders to hand over control of economic policy to non-party 
technocrats such as Finance Minister Daniel Daianu and then, in his role as Prime Minister, 
to Mugur Isarescu, a former governor of the National Bank.  The danger posed by the 
appointment of technocrats to political roles is that they have no sense of partisanship to 
inform their actions.  One of the sharpest illustrations involved Daianu: the ‘Bell 
Helicopters’ dispute.  He was dismissed in September 1998 after refusing to sanction a 
government loan to the Romanian Air Force that would allow them to buy 96 helicopters 
from US manufacturer Bell on the grounds that it would derail budget deficit targets.650  
The loan had received cabinet backing but Daianu continued to resist until the National 
Liberals backed the Prime Minister in the stand-off.651  Daianu’s stance may well have 
been grounded in sound economics but his actions showed little regard for the wider 
political interests of the government or the Convention. 
                                                            
647 Democratia Crestina nu se regaseste in actele guvernarii, Romania Libera, 23 September 1997, page 2 
648 Quoted in Andrei Marga, Iesirea din trecut, Alma Mater, Cluj, 2002, pp. 13 – 23. 
649 Real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 7.3% in 1998 and inflation ran at over 40% for the year.  GDP 
fell by a further 3.9% in the first half of 1999 with industrial output falling by 10.4% (the industrial sector 
accounted for 44% of the Romanian economy at this time.)  Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports, 
Romania Quarter 2 of 1999 (pp. 19 – 20) and Quarter 4 of 1999 (page 3). 
650 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, Romania, Quarter 3 1998, page 12. 
651 Daianu claims that only the Democrat ministers led by Traian Basescu backed him in Cabinet.  Interview 
with Daniel Daianu. 
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Once the Convention came to power, the impact of economic change became a political 
Tsunami that the governing coalition was too weak to withstand.  The social costs of the 
accelerated economic reform programme combined with other policy choices – such as the 
decision to support NATO’s blockade of Serbia – and exogenous factors such as the Asian 
financial crisis to create a political environment in which the public appetite for reform 
rapidly diminished.  In her study of the privatisation process in Romania, Liliana Pop 
quotes a series of responses to public opinion surveys that together demonstrate a cluster of 
negative attitudes to the process of marketisation and a profound absence of confidence in 
the economic situation.652  In 1999, CURS found that 53% of respondents feared they 
would lose their job in the near future.  In November 2000, CURS found than 74% of 
respondents would prefer a combination of job security and low pay to less job security and 
high pay.  Support for the swift privatisation of state owned enterprises fell from 76% in 
1991 to 46% in 1999 and the same survey found that more than 50% thought the state 
should support loss-making enterprises with direct payments. 
Throughout the second half of 2000 the government faced a run of terrible economic news: 
in May the National Investment Fund collapsed which prompted a run on the banks and 
violent demonstrations in the centre of Bucharest; in September the International Monetary 
Fund withheld the third tranche of a loan, raising fears that Romania would slip into default 
on its debt obligations; and on 8th November – less than three weeks before the elections - 
the EU published a critical report which stated that Romania did not yet have a ‘functioning 
market economy’ thanks to a lack of progress in economic reform (according to the report, 
between 30% and 40% of GDP was accounted for by the informal economy).653  By 
November 2000, the difference between those with a positive and a negative view of banks 
was -54%.  A few months later, the figure for private companies was -41%.654  The 
corrosive effect of economic challenges undermined public faith in the key institutions of 
the free market economy.  It could be argued that the Convention had been slow in the 
                                                            
652 The following figures are from Liliana Pop. 
653 All details taken from Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports, Romania July 2000 page 19, October 
2000 page 16, January 2001 page 21. 
654 All figures from Barometrul de opinie publica Mai 2004, Gallup Romania, May 2004.  Available at 
www.gallup.ro/romania/poll_ro/releases/pro040604_ro.htm.  In March 1997, 25% of voters had a positive 
opinion of banks and 59% a negative view; by November 2000 those figures had changed to +12 and -76.  
For private companies, the figures were +31 and -55 in March 1997, changing to +25 and -66 by May 2001.   
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implementation of economic reforms but it had retained its commitment to the essential 
tenets of liberalization throughout.  The public, though, by the end of the Convention’s 
term of office, were far from convinced of the benefits for themselves. 
6.4  A united nation? 
The ‘national question’ – or more accurately the Hungarian question - has played an 
important role in post-Communist Romanian politics with ethnicity forming a genuine 
cleavage within society.655  Modern Romania is more ethnically homogenous than its pre-
war counterpart but a significant ethnic Hungarian minority remains in the north western 
counties.  Fears over recidivism on one side and long maintained resentments over lost 
status and links to the motherland on the other combined to radicalise ethnic politics rapidly 
after the fall of Ceausescu. 
The Hungarian Democratic Union was formed early in 1990 by a group of ethnic-
Hungarian intellectuals based on the Transylvanian city of Cluj.656  In March, violence 
flared in the ethnically mixed city of Targu Mures.  The truth about the events in the city 
has become as much clouded by manipulation, fear and rumour as the other events in 
Romania’s troubled early transition, but they came to symbolise the potential for conflict 
between the ethnic communities.657   
Radical (Romanian) nationalists exploited fears that Hungarians wanted to reclaim the 
Transylvanian region and that demands from the Hungarian Democratic Union for 
decentralised government were a step towards autonomy which would be followed by 
secession for the counties containing a majority Hungarian population.  The issue created a 
problematic discourse for centre-right politicians who were torn between a natural (and 
popular) affinity for nationalist narratives and an awareness that not only were the 
Hungarian Democratic Union allies in the fight against continuing Communism but that 
important western sponsors expected the parties to shun radical nationalism.  This was 
                                                            
655 The wider question of Romania’s borders and relations with the Republic of Moldova in particular 
flickered into life from time to time but rarely with the intensity of the status of the Harghita-Covasna region 
of Romania where the majority of the population are ethnic Hungarians. 
656 Romania Libera, 1 February 1990. 
657 Gallagher, Theft, pp. 84 – 88. 
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reinforced by a genuine ideological commitment to minority rights that was adopted by the 
‘civic liberals’ who cleaved to the Democratic Convention via such organisations as the 
Civic Alliance. 
The historic parties felt that they could draw upon a heritage of resistance to radical 
nationalism (thanks to their opposition to Fascism) although there is an element of 
foundation myth in this since both the National Liberals and National Peasants displayed 
‘ethno-chauvinism’ in their attitudes to the creation of the Greater Romanian state.  Before 
the Second World War, both the National Liberals and the National Peasants resisted the 
more radical demands of nationalism, defending minority rights and casting nationalism in 
terms of the ‘noble’ struggle for independence.658  The National Peasants opposed 
xenophobia and promoted the notion of ‘enlightened patriotism’ in its earliest post-
Communist programmes which it later defined as: 
Love for one’s homeland; the promotion of national values; defending territorial 
integrity and asserting national sovereignty in accordance with EU and NATO 
membership; observing the rights and identity of national minorities.659 
Ultimately, a shared sense among the opposition that they were all equally victims of the 
Communist regime meant that radical nationalist instincts were suppressed on both sides of 
the ethnic divide so as to focus on the common ‘enemy’, continuing Communism in the 
shape of Iliescu and the Front.660  The Convention’s 1992 election manifesto made clear 
statements in favour of respecting the rights of minorities to maintain their own cultural 
identity (within a unitary Romanian state) and stated that: 
The Democratic Convention rejects winning political capital by manipulation of the 
national sentiments of the population by propagating suspicion and adversarial inter-
ethnic relations.661 
                                                            
658 Sbarna, pp. 76 – 77 and 155 – 160. 
659 National Peasant Party, The National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (leaflet published in 2001). 
660 As Gabor Kolumban, a vice president of the Hungarian Democratic Union, stated early in 1992, ‘we have 
made our union [the Democratic Convention] in order to defeat Communism.’  Campainia Electorala, 
Romania Libera, 10 January 1992, page 2. 
661 Democratic Convention, Platforma-Program 1992. 
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Despite this, the national question did persist in creating tensions on the centre right in the 
opposition years.  Radu Campeanu had used the perceived anti-national demands of the 
Hungarian Democratic Union as a pretext to withdraw the National Liberals from the 
Democratic Convention ahead of the 1992 elections and Csaba Takacs claims the 
Convention responded to growing nationalist ‘hysteria’ in the mid 1990s by adopting a 
more nationalist tone (and eventually forcing the withdrawal of the Hungarian party from 
the Convention – see chapter four above).662   
In the period up to 1996, opposition to the ultra-nationalists became closely linked to 
opposition to Communism with the smaller nationalist parties being cast in the role of 
client party to the Social Democrats.663  The ‘Red Quadrilateral’ government formed by 
Nicolae Vacaroiu in 1992 was two parts red (the Social Democrats and the Socialist 
Workers Party) and two parts black (the Romanian National Unity Party and the Greater 
Romania Party).  While the nationalists backed the left, on the other side of the contest the 
Hungarian Democratic Union shared the historic parties’ sense of victimhood at the hands 
of the Communist regime and were committed opponents of the Social Democrats in 
consequence.664   
The National Unity Party was the leading nationalist party until the elections of 1996.  It 
was dominated by its leader, Gheorghe Funar, radical mayor of Cluj but it also experienced 
regular bouts of internal conflict as a more moderate faction wrestled for control of the 
party.  It formed a short-lived electoral alliance with the Democratic Agrarian Party in the 
mid-1990s but its electoral prospects suffered catastrophically from the close involvement 
of its leaders in the Caritas pyramid selling scandal.665  In the 1996 elections the party fell 
behind the Greater Romania Party and eventually Funar left to join forces with Vadim 
Tudor.  The 1996 elections, though, gave few indications of the dramatic rise in support for 
Tudor and the Greater Romania Party that was to come. 
                                                            
662 Interview with Csaba Takacs.  Cluj 
663 In an article from 1996, for example, the relationship between the Social Democrats and the National 
Unity Party was described as between a landlord and a tenant.  Un partid fara viitor, Romania Libera, 5 
February 1996, page 3. 
664 Pavel and Huiu, pp. 226 – 229. 
665 Abraham, pp. 387 – 390. 
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In office, the Democratic Convention took crucial steps to diffuse the national issue, first 
and foremost by bringing the Hungarian Democratic Union into government.666  Gallagher 
has pointed out that some in the Convention feared the political impact of bringing the 
Hungarian Democratic Union into office but their joining the government passed with 
almost no domestic reaction.667  The 1996 – 2000 government introduced reforms that 
broadened access to education in Hungarian and other minority languages. 668  However, as 
mentioned in chapter 3, resistance from National Liberal and National Peasant legislators 
meant that the Convention failed to deliver on a key policy demand by the Hungarian 
Democratic Union: the creation of a state-funded Hungarian-language university.669   
Frustration at the failure to secure key policy demands prompted conflict within the 
Hungarian Democratic Union.  At the Union’s Congress of May 1999, radicals used the 
Yugoslav conflict as cause to press for greater autonomy for the Hungarian-dominated 
counties.  They launched a challenge to Marko Bela, leader of the Union, that was defeated 
by 274 votes to 157.670  The Congress went on to adopted a political programme which 
reads like a fairly mainstream centre-right appeal but which also aimed to consolidate the 
gains already made by their community:671 
• Recognition of national minorities and their equality in law as citizens 
• Realisation of a state based on the rule of law and the separation of powers 
• Constitutional guarantees of the inviolability of private property 
• The creation of a market economy 
• Restitution of church property 
• A law on minority rights based on the European model ensuring freedom to use 
minority language in public and private life 
                                                            
666 Interview with Gabriel Andreescu. 
667 Tom Gallagher, Theft, pp. 152 – 155. 
668 Interview with Virgil Petrescu, National Peasant Party education minister, 1996 – 1997, Bucharest, May 
2008. 
669 PNL vrea doar facultate in limba maghiara, Romania Libera, 11 July 1998, page 3.  National Liberal 
Deputy Sorin Stanescu, a member of the parliament’s education commission opposed the creation of the 
Hungarian language university, backing instead an amendment proposed by National Peasant and former 
education minister Virgil Petrescu. 
670 Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports: Romania, Quarter 3 1999 pp. 13 – 14. 
671 Details from Stoica, Dictionarul. 
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• The development of peaceful and fruitful inter-ethnic co-operation 
Throughout the 1990s the Convention had been unable to neutralise the nationalist right by 
capturing its electorate because of the Convention’s internal dynamics (the emphasis placed 
on minority rights by its civil society sponsors and the desire to maintain good relations 
with the Hungarian Democratic Union) and its strong policy preference for a return to 
Western ‘norms’ and membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions.  The elections of 2000 saw 
a spectacular rise in radical nationalism in the form of Corneliu Vadim Tudor.  In the local 
elections of 2000, the Greater Romania Party won less than 7% of the vote in the County 
Council poll and elected just 66 mayors nationwide (2.6% of the total).  The National Unity 
Party did even less well.672  But the presidential campaign suited Tudor’s demagogic 
style.673  While the National Peasants and the National Liberals concentrated their fire on 
each other (see chapter 3 above), Petre Roman and the Democrats were hampered by their 
association with the failings of the incumbent government.  Tudor and the Greater Romania 
Party emerged as the challenger to a return to power of Ion Iliescu and the Social 
Democrats: the Greater Romania Party won the second largest number of seats and votes in 
the parliamentary elections of 2000 and Tudor won through to the run-off ballot with Ion 
Iliescu in the presidential poll.  As the Convention 2000 formation crashed out of 
parliament and even failed to field its own presidential candidate, the failure to craft a 
position which appealed broadly to nationalist voters was exposed as a contributor to the 
Convention’s failure in the most stark way. 
6.5  Democracy – new or old? 
The notion that a centre-right formation’s attachment to democracy should be questionable 
seems incongruous but the conditions of Romania’s transition created an unusual discourse 
in this arena.  The effective capture of the transition to democracy by the National Salvation 
Front – by the left – allowed them to claim the mantle of bringers of democracy (see 
chapter 2).  Furthermore, the opposition, dominated by the historic parties, retained a strong 
attachment to the return of the monarchy and a return to the liberal constitution of 1926 
                                                            
672 Stan Stoica, Dupa ’89, page 246 
673 Gallagher, Theft, pp. 252 - 256 
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which gave the National Salvation Front a fruitful target to pursue, casting the opposition as 
anti-democratic and anachronistic.674 
The community of Romanian exiles, who had considerable influence within the National 
Peasant Party, were particularly strongly pro-monarchy. 675  Sentiment and personal ties to 
the Royal Family were no doubt important but there were more considered underpinnings 
to the position too.  Pro-monarchists saw Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy 
under a constitutional monarch as a model.676  As a result the National Peasants refused to 
support the new constitution in the referendum of December 1991.677  Ion Diaconescu was 
convinced that a Constitutional Monarchy was the best system to support Romania’s 
‘deficient’ democracy.678  Ion Ratiu had a close personal relationship with the royal 
family.679  But even the pro-democracy campaigners in the civil society groups affiliated to 
the Convention backed the setting up of a constitutional monarchy, again seeing Spain as 
the model to follow.680   
Michael Hohenzollern had abdicated as King of Romania in 1947, leaving the country for 
exile in Switzerland.  On 26th December 1989, Michael attempted to return to Romania for 
the first time since his abdication but he was refused entry by the government.  A series of 
subsequent attempts were made to persuade the government to grant Michael a visa but it 
wasn’t until the Easter of 1992 that he was allowed to visit the country.681  The event 
dominated the media over the period of the visit and for some time after it too putting the 
restitution question back onto the political agenda.682  With a republican constitution 
having been endorsed overwhelmingly just a few months before, this cannot have been 
                                                            
674 See Siani-Davies, Revolution, Chapter 6 
675 Vrabiescu Kleckner, page 25.  Kleckner was a Presidential Counsellor to Emil Constantinescu and a 
leading figure in the World Union of Free Romanians, the association of Romanian exiles based in the United 
States. 
676 Interview with Valerian Stan. 
677 The constitution was supported by 8.5 million voters with just 2.2 million against.  Preda and Soare, page 
34. 
678 Diaconescu, Revolutie, page 216. 
679 See Ratiu, various references.  
680 Interview with Valerian Stan. 
681 Diaconescu, Revolutie, pp 101 - 105 
682 Romania Libera devoted extensive coverage to the event including speculation that Michael would return 
as monarch in the future. 
208 
 
helpful to the Convention.683  The king played a further, perhaps unwitting, part in the
electoral campaign at the end of July.  The leaders of the Convention embarked upon
West European tour to reinforce their image as the anointed standard bearers of the centre-
right in Romania.
 
 a 
t the 
                                                           
684  Radu Campeanu’s National Liberals, who by this stage had lef
Convention, chose this moment to announce that they had approached King Michael to be 
their presidential candidate although whether the king was aware of the approach before the 
media were is unclear.685 
Convention politicians perceived that the formation was damaged by their support for the 
monarchy.  The possible reintroduction of the monarchy is not specifically mentioned in 
their 1992 election manifesto but as late as the 1996 campaign, Ion Iliescu’s campaign 
resurrected the issue.  As Gallagher points out, Constantinescu was quick to rule out a 
referendum after he himself had assumed office.686  Yet, less than six months earlier, 
Constantinescu had told an audience of émigrés in America that he admired the King and 
that if parliament willed a referendum which resulted in the restoration of the monarchy, he 
would be honoured to hand over power.687  Because of this continued willingness to 
contemplate a restitution of the monarchy, for the first seven years of its existence, 
Romania’s leading Communist successor party was able to attack the centre-right as a 
threat to democracy because of its constitutional views. 
Other aspects of democratic development raised potentially significant questions.  How 
should the parties contribute to the consolidation of democratic state institutions?  How 
should Romania’s newly sovereign demos respond to the prospect of ceding some of its 
power to the European Union?  How should local government structures accommodate the 
needs of a country with a substantial and geographically concentrated ethnic minority?  
How should a liberal democracy respond to the threat of electoral success for illiberal 
movements such as ultra-nationalism. 
 
683 See chapter 2 above. 
684 Conventia Democratica partener European, Romania Libera 28 July 1992, page 1. 
685 Bomba liberala, Romania Libera, 30 July 1992, page 1. 
686 Gallagher, Theft, pp. 148 – 149. 
687 Vrabiescu Klechner, page 45. 
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Thus, competing democratic discourses represented a significant political dividing line in 
Romania during the 1990s with the centre-right constrained in its ability to exploit the issue 
by the nature of the transition and its historic loyalties to the royal family.  Internal conflict 
over the issue of the monarchy, though, was limited since the Convention was largely 
united in its position.  The Hungarian Democratic Union, who might have been expected to 
resist sentimentalism for the pre-war Greater Romanian settlement, did not contribute 
significantly to the debate.  The National Liberals and the Civic Alliance were less strident 
than the National Peasants but were still supportive of the monarchy.  The two strongest 
advocates of a restoration – Ion Ratiu and Ion Diaconescu – were at least willing to tolerate 
the Convention’s pragmatic abandonment of firm commitments on restoration (or even a 
referendum on the issue) once they were in power. 
6.6  A Christian Democracy?  Religion and the Church in politics 
The politics of Christian Democracy became an integral part of the identity of the National 
Peasant Party following its admission to the international umbrella organisation Christian 
Democrat International in 1987.688  Corneliu Coposu made clandestine contact with Jean-
Marie Daillet, vice president of the Christian Democrat International, when the French 
politician was visiting Romania and he requested that the National Peasants be admitted to 
the group based on its historical commitment to Christian Democrat values.  The move was 
initiated as a means of securing international credibility for the party but it subsequently 
assimilated key Christian Democrat tenets into its ideology as it sought to modernise its 
programme.689   
Despite Coposu’s strong personal faith, the National Peasants rejected the notion that they 
were a clerical party and defined Christian Democracy as encompassing ‘real democracy’ 
(guarantees of fundamental freedoms, property rights, political pluralism and participation); 
                                                            
688 National Peasant Party, PNTCD Serving Romania.  Christian Democracy is taken to mean the West 
European model of Christian Democracy pursued by parties of that name in Germany, Italy and Scandinavia 
etc that were characterised by being broad-based parties that positioned themselves to the right of centre on 
key issues such as the economy, international relations and social policy while generally rejecting more 
strident conservative or neo-liberal outlooks.  See the works on European Christian Democracy cited in 
chapter two above. 
689 Corneliu Coposu, In Memorium.  Coposu talks of ‘consolidating the European Christian Democrat family’ 
by adding a representative of the Orthodox faith and of the fact that most of the Christian Democrat parties in 
Western Europe were in power at the time - ‘we wanted to be part of that union’. 
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Christian morals (social solidarity, mutual respect and opposition to fundamentalism) and 
an socio-economic system based on partnership, work and shared welfare.690 
The 1992 election manifesto of the Democratic Convention gave early mention to the 
Church and a desire to re-integrate the institution into the life and politics of the country as 
part of a programme to reconstruct the country on a moral basis.691  Throughout the post-
Communist period there has been an on-going debate about the role of Church figures in 
politics but research suggests that although ‘priest-politicians’ have been elected under 
various party banners, they were drawn more to the Social Democrats (because of their 
strength in local government) and to the radical right (because of its appeals based on a 
return to hierarchy, nation and Christian morals) than to the parties of the centre-right.692  
The use of religious symbolism in political appeals has occurred across the political 
spectrum and leading politicians have often been keen to stress the influence of Christianity 
over their political beliefs.693  But the explicit use of religious imagery and appeals has 
generally been more common among politicians on the far right.  Lavinia Stan indicates a 
hardening of opposition to the left among the Church leadership after 2000 (she also points 
to a significant triumph for Democratic Convention presidential candidate Emil 
Constantinescu in 1996 when he challenged Ion Iliescu directly to say whether he believed 
in God) but a political cleavage based on competing views of religion and secularism is 
difficult to discern.694 
In 1996, Tepelea stressed the foremost importance of a ‘rebirth of Christian morality’ in 
human relationships before economic reforms could be expected to benefit the nation.  
Political reforms – of the justice system; guaranteeing freedom of information; and re-
organising local administration were closely linked to achieving this objective.695 
                                                            
690 The National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (leaflet published in 2001). 
691 Democratic Convention, Platforma – Program 1992, pp. 3 – 6. 
692 Lavinia Stan, Pulpits, Ballots and Party Cards:  Religion and Elections in Romania, Religion, State and 
Society, vol. 33, no. 4, December 2005, pp. 347 – 366. 
693 In 1994, for example, former Prime Minister Petre Roman, a modernising social democrat by instinct 
whose father had been a leading member of the Communist era apparatus, claims his Christian beliefs were 
crystallised on the night of 21/22 December 1989 as he witnessed the spirit and faith of the Bucharest 
revolutionaries.  Petre Roman, Romania Incotro?, page 61. 
694 Lavinia Stan, Pulpits. 
695 National Peasant Party, Pe Acelasi Drum, pp 15-16. 
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Again, though, as with the issue of the monarchy, the potential for internal division within 
the Convention was avoided by the pragmatism of its members.  There were no discernable 
secularist ideologues in any part of Romania’s political spectrum.  The Church and its 
political adherents did not challenge the constitutional settlement and while religious 
figures spoke up in debates over restitution of property for example it did not engage in the 
active mobilisation of the congregation into the political sphere.  The lack of a significant 
political division over religion is no doubt partly due to the dominance of a single church – 
Romanian Orthodoxy – within society and the fact that it did not act as a focus for 
opposition to the regime in the Communist era as the Catholic Church in Poland did.  
Radical liberal groups have defended the Church as partners in suffering during the 
Communist years and framed their values in terms of the defence of the freedom of 
individuals to practice their religion in accordance with their conscience.696  Conservative 
politicians, seeking a return to traditional values went further in asserting that the Orthodox 
Church was the ‘spiritual leader of the Romanian people’ and demanding the affirmation of 
Christian morals.697 
Religion forms an element of the national question because of the close affiliation of the 
churches of the Hungarian community to the Hungarian Democratic Union.  The Catholic 
and Calvinist Churches were excluded from the accommodation reached between the 
Communist state and the Orthodox Church while the Greco-Roman Uniate Church was 
actively persecuted.  Restitution of property to these institutions became a significant 
element in minority politics.698  The link between religion and politics in the ethnic 
Hungarian community took on more personalised symbolism too with the continued 
involvement of Bishop Laszlo Tokes in radical politics.699 
The lack of resonance of religion as a dividing line in Romanian politics meant Christian 
Democracy remained a rather elusive concept.  It did not evolve beyond sloganising 
                                                            
696 Partidul Liberal 1993, Manifestul Liberal. 
697 Uniunea Fortelor Dreptei, Manifestul dreptei, points 7 and 8. 
698 Interview with Csaba Takacs. Cluj 
699 For more on the central role of Tokes in the revolution of 1989, see Peter Siani-Davies, Romanian 
Revolution.  In the European Parliament elections of November 2007, the Hungarian Democratic Union 
responded to the threat posed by his independent candidacy by promoting Calvinist priest and radical 
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appeals for the adoption of a Christian ethic in politics and government.  A group of five 
leading National Peasants interviewed in the wake of the party’s disastrous defeat in the 
2000 elections all referred to the need for the party to promote a Christian Democrat vision, 
but there was little attempt to define that vision more clearly. Indeed, two of the 
interviewees offer rather contradictory notions of Christian Democracy with Tudor Dunca 
suggesting the party should base its appeal on traditional values of family and authority 
while Radu Sarbu picked out decentralisation and individual liberty.700   
So, while Christian values – and in particular Christian Democracy – became an important 
part of the identity of the National Peasant Party, there was no resistance internally to its 
assimilation into the language and appeals of the Convention.  Yet, at the same time, 
Romania’s relative religious homogeneity and the lack of a strong secular tradition meant 
that there was little differentiation across the political spectrum on the issue of religion and 
so relatively little political traction to be gained from it. 
6.7  Towards a Convention ideology? 
So while the standpoints of the key Convention members did not appear to create 
significant barriers to ideological cohesion, was there a conscious attempt to craft a distinct 
ideological position for the Convention itself? 
The civil society groups that were members of the Convention were potentially the best 
engine for defining its ideological positioning thanks to their moderating role and refusal to 
play a direct role in electoral politics.  The Association of Former Political Prisoners was 
influential in radicalising the Convention’s opposition to any signs of ‘continuing 
Communism’.701  The World Union of Free Romanians had influential links with the royal 
family and promoted a pro-monarchist line within the Convention.  But the Civic Alliance 
was the most influential group, helping to craft a civic liberal identity for the Democratic 
Convention.702   
                                                            
700 Special Report on the National Peasant Party Congress, Romania Libera, 13 January 2001. 
701 Pavel and Huiu, page 114. 
702 As mentioned in chapter three, the Civic Alliance set up a Civic Academy to develop policy ideas and 
while the Alliance published a number of detailed policy papers it is not clear how substantial was the 
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The Civic Alliance’s founding declaration was published in November 1990.703  It warned 
that Romania was in danger of sinking into chaos and barbarism and asserted that the 
country needed ‘truth as well as bread’.  It supported ‘radical, realistic reform’ to avoid the 
grave situation that the country faced. Its priorities were based around the creation of a 
functioning democracy, the protection of civil liberties, an end to intolerance, corruption 
and ‘egoism’, the creation of a free press and the assurance of the right of association.  The 
development of a strong civil society was essential to achieving these aims.   
Between the elections of 1992 and 1996, the Convention suffered a series of internal 
disputes, some of which contained an ideological element.  By 1996 there was a recognition 
that the Convention needed to modernise – and moderate – its political programme if it was 
to secure the support of a broader electorate.704  During September the Convention 
campaign paid particular attention to issues affecting rural Romania (perhaps timed to 
coincide with the harvest) with a series of announcements and election rallies in the rural 
south and east of the country.705  The list of pledges made a tempting offer, including 
increased peasant pensions, accelerated restitution of agricultural property, delaying of 
agricultural taxes and increased access to credit for farmers.706 
On 27th October, the Convention launched its “Contract with Youth” at a concert in 
Bucharest.707  Promising ‘twelve solutions for the twelfth hour’, the Contract made a series 
of commitments covering economic, housing and health policies plus promises of 
investment in education infrastructure.708  The following day, Constantinescu toured 
industrial areas including the state-run Sidex steel works and promised state aid for 
‘strategic’ industries.709Each of these specific programmes was drawn from the Contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Academy’s role in the Democratic Convention’s ideological development.  The drivers appeared to be more 
personalised (in terms of the influence of individual leaders) and representational (in terms of the enduring 
significance of the Timisoara Declaration). 
703 Civic Alliance, Declaratia de Principii, Bucharest, 1990, accessed online 29 July 2008 at 
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704 Interview with Zoe Petre. 
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with Romania which had been launched in November 1995 and which had been 
consciously modeled on the US Republican Party’s Contract with America which was seen 
as delivering success for that party in the 1994 Congressional elections.  The Contract was 
a new form of manifesto which promised action in the first 200 days of a Convention 
administration.   
The first of the Contract’s twenty pledges promised the rapid restitution of property.  The 
next seven points made specific pledges to benefit peasant farmers, students, young 
families and pensioners.  Other pledges related to increased maternity benefits, tax cuts and 
investment in infrastructure improvements (such as improved street lighting in towns).710  
Most striking is the move away from the civic concerns of the early period of the 
Convention’s existence.  Administrative reform aimed at tackling corruption is mentioned 
but the anti-Communist rhetoric of the early 1990s has been sidelined.  Only the restitution 
of property retains its place of primacy as the programme seeks to connect with the direct 
economic concerns of voters rather than focus on constitutional issues and de- 
Communisation which perhaps matter more to the metropolitan elite.  None of this suggests 
a reversal of earlier commitments or that the Convention’s new programme contradicted its 
earlier positioning.  But the change of emphasis does, perhaps, go some way to setting the 
scene for the early disappointment felt by the more radical groups within the Convention 
whose expectations of the 1996 government had been framed by their activism in the early 
phase of development of the democratic opposition. 
By the end of its existence, the Convention appeared to have a coherent enough centre-right 
ideology and the Democratic Convention 2000 identified itself explicitly as existing on the 
centre-right of politics. Its fundamental values were familiar:  belief in God, democracy, 
property, the free market, tolerance, national dignity. As well as defending the out-going 
government’s record on economic stabilisation, privatisation and restitution of property the 
Convention 2000’s programme gave greater prominence to the pursuit of integration into 
the European Union.711  The formation’s priorities had changed over time but by 2000 the 
Convention had been reduced to little more than the National Peasant Party and some 
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fellow-travelling micro-parties (see chapter three above) so the significance of ideological 
cohesion by this point in its history is at the very least questionable. 
Andrei Marga perhaps came closest to setting out a vision of a Convention ideology in his 
1999 review of education reforms.  Marga had been recruited as a technocrat and, although 
he joined the National Peasants and went on to lead the party after it fell from power, he did 
not have the deep ties to the party that other, older, leaders did: 
A coalition of political forces with their roots in classic liberalism (with its ideas of 
individual liberty, a free market, political pluralism etc) remains the solution in 
Romania…  Christian Democracy, claiming for itself the territory that emerged from 
classic liberalism, can be – with the help of its principles of attachment to liberty, the 
market, a healthy political centre, subsidiarity, respect for the law, solidarity – bound 
to the major currents and synthesize the subjects necessary in today’s Romania.712 
Marga is one of the very few Convention politicians who openly contemplated the creation 
of a new party that unified the National Peasants and the National Liberals but during the 
1990s he was a marginal figure.  The one politician who could have affected the creation of 
a distinct Convention identity was its two-time presidential candidate Emil Constantinescu.  
There are two broad notions that are most closely identified with Constantinescu: returning 
Romania to the European mainstream; and the need to recast Romanian society via some 
form of moral crusade. 
6.8  Return to the West 
The notion that the revolutions of 1989 represented a ‘return to Western Europe’ for the 
states of the CEE region was a widespread theme, particularly among dissident 
intellectuals.  In the Romanian case the idea was particularly resonant, perhaps because of a 
sense of a distance further to travel.  As early as the summer of 1990, Mircea Ionescu-
Quintus, Vice President of the National Liberal Party, was prepared to support co-operation 
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with the National Salvation Front in the form of a joint parliamentary delegation to the 
Council of Europe to show that Romania, “…was, is and must be a European country.”713 
Criticism of the Ceausescu regime was commonly framed in terms of his preference for 
dragging the country further to the East and consequently towards the Third World.  The 
‘Letter of Six’ had criticised Ceausescu’s policies for wishing to drag Romania backwards 
into Asia.714  Andrei Marga is one of the few political practitioners on the centre right who 
has attempted to publish a body of works setting out his political philosophy, refers to 
‘Oriental Socialism’, clearly linking both the Ceausescu regime and Iliescu’s Social 
Democrats.  For him, entering NATO and the EU were the two main projects for 
‘reformers’ (a description he tends to use in preference to ‘centre right’ or similar labels).  
Promotion of the rule of law, democracy and the market economy were important not 
solely as ends in themselves but because they were gateways to the larger objective of 
international acceptance.715 
Ionescu-Quintus’s statement above is an indication of the fear, referred to by David 
Phinnemore, that Romania risked being stranded in a ‘grey zone’ between Western Europe, 
Russia and Asia.716  This fear was compounded by Romania’s early lack of progress in 
moves to integrate with the EU – its exclusion from the PHARE programme and from trade 
agreements in the early part of 1990 for example – caused by Western reaction to events in 
Targu Mures, the Mineriada and the lack of rapid economic reform.717 
Some progress was made by the Social Democrat-led government after 1992: in October 
1993, the European Parliament ratified an association accord with Romania and in May 
1994, Romania was given Associate Partner status by the EU.718  But there was an 
awareness that the country was lagging behind its neighbours in developing relations with 
the west.  Progress in normalising relations with Hungary and the Ukraine were important 
steps towards securing NATO and EU membership but a bilateral agreement with Hungary 
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was not signed until August 1996.719  A treaty with the Ukraine followed in June 1997 after 
Emil Constantinescu had been elected president.720 
The integration of Romania into the western world via membership of transnational 
structures was a key element of the Convention’s identity and became particularly 
associated with its leader, President Emil Constantinescu.  Constantinescu makes his own 
commitment clear: 
I pledged myself that, whether I was going to become president or not, I would do 
after the elections of November 1996, all my best to dispel the suspicions about the 
authenticity of this country’s option for her integration into NATO and the EU.721 
The commitment of Constantinescu, and of the wider Convention, to this ideal was tested 
to extremes in the late 1990s with NATOs response to the Kosovo crisis.   
At the end of 1998, Romania’s case for admission to NATO was shaken by criticism of the 
country’s progress towards reform from within the United States’ administration.722  
Gallagher sees the administration’s willingness to support NATO action against Yugoslavia 
in this context but whether or not this was the case, the events that followed brought intense 
domestic political pressure upon the government which its decision to resist indicates its 
commitment to the ideal of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures.   
In mid April, Romania denied Russia the use of its airspace for flights to Belgrade and 
granted NATO unrestricted access.  For once there was unity among the coalition partners, 
including the Democrats.  The opposition – the Social Democrats, the Romanian National 
Unity Party and the Alliance for Romania – all opposed free access for NATO flights.723  
The government also backed the oil embargo on Yugoslavia despite the potential for 
damage to the Romanian economy, a situation made worse by the NATO destruction of the 
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Danube bridges which closed a key route for Romanian trade.724  Economic considerations 
were added to sentimental attachments to Serbia as an historic ally of Romania and to fears 
of an influx of Kosovan refugees to undermine public support for the action. 
Leading figures unite in the view that the singular success of the Constantinescu presidency 
was to bring Romania back into the orbit of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  And they point 
to the government’s stance on the NATO action against Yugoslavia in response to the 
Kosovo conflict as a key indicator.725  The domestic political cost, though, was substantial, 
as Constantinescu himself ruefully noted: 
Soon after Yugoslavia is first bombed, confidence in the President, and to a lesser 
extent, the pro-NATO and pro-EU options decrease dramatically.  After the end of the 
conflict, the options in favour of NATO and the EU recover.  The 20% plunge in the 
President’s popularity has never been recovered.726 
Initially at least, the debate over the country’s place in the world appeared to offer a real 
division in Romania’s politics.  Briefly, after the fall of Communism, there was a sense that 
the new government might pursue an East-oriented foreign policy but this was effectively 
ended with the failure of the Moscow Coup in August 1991 and the subsequent break-up of 
the Soviet Union. 
Yugoslavia was a long standing regional partner of Romania and economic ties between the 
two states were close.  The political costs of support for NATO were considerable but it 
was seen as a totemic gesture in the bid to gain acceptance for Romania within the wider 
international community.  By the end of the 1990s all the main parties supported NATO 
and EU membership but it was the actions of the Constantinescu government which were 
seen as opening the doors and which set it apart from the seemingly more reluctant 
conversion of the social democrats and the far right. 
                                                            
724 Pavel and Huiu, page 367. 
725 Zoe Petre, Andrei Marga, former finance minister Daniel Daianu and Varujan Vosganian all made similar 
points in interviews – that Constantinescu’s support for NATO on the issue was good for the country in the 
long-run but had disastrous consequences in terms of popular support for the government.  It is interesting to 
note that Petre claims the support of the Democrat Party (which provided the foreign minister in the 
government) was crucial in sustaining the policy.  
726 Constantinescu, page 160. 
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6.9  The moral crusade: the transformation of state and society 
The sense that the opposition was engaged on a moral crusade ran through the core of the 
Convention’s message and suffused Emil Constantinescu’s language in particular as has 
been referred to throughout this thesis. 
In 1992, following Constantinescu’s selection as presidential candidate, the Convention 
began to set out its appeal to the electorate.  Constantinescu himself presented his campaign 
as a moral crusade aimed at transforming the outlook of Romanian citizens.727  At the 
beginning of August the Convention issued a summary of its offer to voters under the title, 
“The Romania that we wish for”.  Its stated priorities were: 
1.  Guaranteed change to be assured by laws and changes to state institutions. 
2. The lives of citizens will be at the centre of the reconstruction of society 
3. A stable economy that will ensure a decent standard of living for everyone 
4. That Romania would return to its national and European destiny728 
The first heading dealt with constitutional affairs – itself a clear indicator of where the 
Convention’s priorities lay.  It called for Romania to be run on the basis of a ‘state of law’ 
with the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.  
Parliament should be freely elected and the president should fulfil the role of moderator.  It 
called for administrative reform covering the Church, the army and local government and 
for educational reforms to rediscover Romania’s national and European spirit.  The second 
heading dealt with the need to reconstruct civil society to create a social life independent of 
the state.  Equality of opportunity would underpin a moral society and the pursuit of a 
market economy should not be equated to unscrupulous individualism. 
The Convention’s economic platform was built on the market economy but it called for 
reforms to be built upon the opening of a national dialogue involving government, 
businesses, the Trades Unions and political parties.  It called for property rights to be 
                                                            
727 Esenta campaniei mele electorale va fi idea de politica morala, Romania Libera, 15 July 1992, page 3. 
728 Romania pe care o dorim, Romania Libera, 5 August 1992, page 3. 
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guaranteed, restitution of property, market and credit reforms to encourage domestic 
investment and the opening of markets to foreign investors.  At the same time it demanded 
(unspecified) measures of social protection. 
In some ways the final heading was the most interesting since it set out a distinctive and 
moderate position for the Convention on the question of national borders that was 
consistent with its demand for the domestic rule of law and a desire to return to the 
European mainstream.  It called for peace and stability in south east Europe and the respect 
for political, religious and ethnic minorities at home.  It sought stable relations with the 
Republic of Moldova on the basis of national reconciliation, noting that any change to 
Romania’s borders must be subject to international mediation and approval: 
National reconciliation must be realised in a spirit of truth and justice but also in 
tolerance and Christian beliefs.729 
In 1996 the fight against Communism remained central to the personality and programme 
of the Convention but the mechanism for freeing Romania from the continuing influence of 
Communism was technocratic: 
How do we change this situation? [the state of the country]  With the Contract with 
Romania which was created on the basis of the study of thousands of pages 
containing hundreds of thousands of data…, containing clear and concrete proposals 
with a precise timetable and for which I assume personal responsibility.  Who will put 
these proposals into practice?  With 15,000 people who were ready to help with the 
economic programme…730 
The pledge to draft in thousands of non-partisan technocrats was driven by the conviction 
that the state bureaucracy had been captured by the supporters of the former regime.  And 
once in government the most disastrous turnaround in public attitudes was the confidence 
the public had in the Convention’s ability to tackle corruption.  In March 1997, 63% of 
voters felt the Convention government would be able to tackle corruption.  By the end of its 
                                                            
729 Romania pe care o dorim, Romania Libera, 5 August 1992, page 3. 
730 Emil Constantinescu addressing a meeting of Romanian émigrés in New York on 3rd February 1996.  
Vrabiescu-Klechner, op cit p.37. 
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term in office in November 2000, that figure had collapsed to just 4%.731  Tackling 
corruption was a key litmus test in itself but it was also an important proxy for popular 
attitudes to the evolving economic environment.  There was a widespread sense that many 
ordinary voters were suffering the effects of the economic reforms but that a privileged 
minority were getting rich unfairly thanks to corrupt privatisations.732 Low grade 
corruption, too, sapped public confidence in the new order and this problem was magnified 
by perception more than experience as the government lost momentum and control of the 
agenda.733  This, of course, made the problem even harder to resolve since to an extent the 
public appears to have formed its view of corruption based on external information rather 
than their own day to day contacts with officials, so the impact of any actual progress in 
tackling corruption would be likely to be diffuse. 
By 1999 the government’s credibility had fallen to such an extent that it fell victim to what 
virtually amounted to an attempted coup.  Miron Cozma led Jiu Valley miners in a protest 
march on Bucharest.  This sixth mineriada did not just challenge the authority of 
Constantinescu and the Convention, it challenged the authority of the institutions of 
government.  Constantinescu himself records how, on 20th January 1999, Miron Cozma 
called not just for the government’s resignation but for the establishment of Revolutionary 
Councils in its place.  It was almost a month later that the miners were finally disarmed and 
Cozma arrested.734  The first months of 1999 were intensely difficult for the government.  
On top of the miners’ protests and the pressures of the NATO action in Yugoslavia (see 
above), unions called General Strike in April and business leaders also announced a one-
                                                            
731 Gallup Romania, op cit.  The figures for whether voters felt the government was capable of tackling 
corruption changed from 63% saying yes and 28% saying no in March 1997 to 4% yes and 88% no in 
November 2000. 
732 Pop quotes a CURS survey from June 1998 which showed that 66% of people felt that privatisations were 
most often dishonest.  Only 9% felt that the Romanian population gained the most from privatisations and 
only 2% identified workers as the main beneficiaries.  Pop 2006. 
733 Liliana Pop quotes research by Alina Mungiu-Pipidi which identifies a significant gap between perception 
and experience of corruption among public officials.  She also refers to a World Bank study which showed 
just 11% of households and 27% of firms based their views of corruption on direct experience with public 
officials while the influence of the mass media was far more significant.  Pop, 2006. 
734 Constantinescu, page 150. 
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day strike, protesting against Constantinescu’s refusal to dismiss the government and 
replace it with a technocratic administration to be led by prominent businessmen.735 
Constantinescu tried to recover some stability and credibility for the government with the 
dismissal of Radu Vasile as prime minister and his replacement with National Bank 
governor Mugur Isarescu but a continuing string of crises and scandals undermined 
Isarescu’s efforts.  In the early 1990s the opposition paid little attention to the importance 
of state building: as discussed in chapter two, attacks on the government were more likely 
to challenge its legitimacy to govern than the outcome of its policies.  It could be argued 
that this delegitimising discourse allowed the same tone of debate to continue when the 
Convention was in government and thus set the scene for Cozma’s challenge to government 
authority.  Mugur Isarescu was marked out for his commitment to developing the 
credibility of state institutions.  Both Emil Constantinescu and Zoe Petre tell similar stories 
of being impressed by early signs of Mugur Isarescu’s commitment to state building.  Zoe 
Petre goes as far as to say he was the only person she heard talking of the importance of 
constructing state institutions with broad support from the political class in the wake of the 
collapse of the Ceausescu regime.736   
The ‘moral crusade’ linked many elements of the Convention’s thinking: internationalism 
and ethnic toleration, economic liberalisation and attempts to tackle corruption.  In 
particular it aimed its message at a new generation whose attitudes had not been shaped by 
Communism.  In the field of education policy for example a junior education minister in the 
Vasile government, Mircea Corneliu Fronescu, suggests that the thrust of reforms was to 
create a system aimed at producing a flexible education, personalised to the individual.737 
Virgil Petrescu describes the priorities he pursued during his ministerial tenure: 
decentralising decision making to reduce the role of the ministry; changing the allocation of 
places in high schools to make the system more equitable; the allocation of financial 
support to half a million of the poorest students to help pay for food, clothes and school 
materials; the construction of 1100 new schools; the construction of a dual language 
(Romanian and Hungarian) school campus at Baia Mare and the construction of the first 
                                                            
735 Constantinescu, page 242. 
736 Interview with Zoe Petre. 
737 National Peasant Party, Pe Acelasi Drum, pp. 74-78.  
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Ukrainian language school in the country at Sighet.738  The approach of Andrei Marga, 
Petrescu’s successor as Education minister, was even more explicitly political - he sees his 
achievements in education reform as one part of the broad modernisation agenda.739   
Yet the organisational structure of the Convention meant the member parties resisted fusion 
and Constantinescu lacked the will, vision or motivation to create a distinct political entity 
out of the Convention itself. The issues that Constantinescu himself prioritised were 
important but were not sufficient to drive the formation of an integrative centre-right 
narrative for the Convention and the most salient policy issues remained located in the 
identities of the constituent members of the formation. 
6.10  Conclusion 
The absence of a Communist-era dissident movement in Romania meant that domestic 
political thinking on the right had not established roots before the overthrow of the 
Ceausescu regime in December 1989.  Instead, the re-formed historic parties mined their 
pre-Communist pasts for an ideological identity.  This led to an exaggeration of political 
differences between the two main parties – the National Peasants and the National Liberals 
– despite their broadly similar ideological stances. 
Anti-Communism was the essential glue that united the ‘democratic opposition’ into the 
Democratic Convention after the decision of the National Salvation Front to establish itself 
as a political party. But the strength of the opposition leaders’ attachment to anti-
Communist rhetoric left it vulnerable in the face of an electorate which had a more 
pragmatic outlook.  The Convention leaders were slow to learn the lessons of their early 
defeats.  Norris and Lovenduski, in examining the heavy defeat of the British Conservative 
Party in 2001, have suggested that failures of perception on the part of political actors can 
contribute to their defeat.  Politicians misinterpret the stance of the voters on key issues as 
the Conservatives appear to have done in relation to European integration and taxation 
policy in 2001 – it was not that a wilful positioning far to the right of the median voter  
                                                            
738 Interview with Virgil Petrescu, May 2008. 
739 Andrei Marga, Anii Reformei . 
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took place, rather that those crafting the Conservative position thought the voters were 
further to the right than they actually were.740   
Norris and Lovenduski do not suggest reasons why this failure of perception might have 
arisen beyond a form of electoral myopia caused by ideological barriers but, translated into 
the Romanian context, many in the Convention were implacably anti-Communist and this 
may well have led them to assume that the wider electorate shared their sense of political 
priorities.  Leading National Liberal Valeriu Stoica claims that the National Peasants in 
particular were wedded to an outdated version of politics that divided only on 
Communist/anti Communist lines.  Even in 2000 they replayed this division despite 
Stoica’s pleas to change the mode of debate:741  
This argument over the classification Communist/anti-Communist, emotional, without 
a clear political programme, without a clear political vision created a success in 1996 
but the absence of a programme, of a political vision, of coherence also explains the 
collapse of the government from 1996 to 2000.742 
The strength of anti-Communist sentiment was also a source of tension within the 
Convention between pragmatists and fundamentalists – initially between the National 
Peasants and the National Liberals but later, in government, between those who sought 
more radical lustration measures (mainly in and around the Civic Alliance) and those 
prepared to compromise with former Frontists to retain power.  Once in office, policies 
which would have indicated a resolute ideological commitment to anti-Communism were 
not followed through and this effectively ended the Convention as an electoral force as its 
more radical supporters abandoned it.  However, this division was late in the Convention’s 
story and the earlier split between the National Liberals and the National Peasants was 
perhaps more manufactured than organic – indicating that any ideological divisions over 
attitudes to Communism could have been overcome if there had been a greater will to 
create a more deeply integrated formation. 
                                                            
740 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Why Parties Fail to Learn: Electoral Defeat, Selective Perception and 
British Party Politics, Party Politics, 2004, volume 10, number 1, pp. 85-104. 
741 Valeriu Stoica, Provocari, page 41. 
742 Valeriu Stoica, Provocari, page 38. 
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Economic reform was a further important part of the Convention’s ideological make up.  
Both the National Peasant Party and the leadership of the National Liberals took a cautious 
approach to liberalisation and proponents of ‘shock therapy’ were few in number.  This 
pragmatism was followed through into government actions but while clearly some were 
frustrated by the pace of economic reform this became more of a proxy for other issues 
(relating to lustration, corruption and frustrated personal ambition).  The historic Social 
Democratic Party did quit the Convention ahead of the 1996 elections and economic/social 
policy differences may have played a part in this decision but this ought to  have created a 
greater cohesion in the Convention’s position allowing it to operate comfortably on the 
centre right.  On the significant issues of privatisation and restitution of property, the 
Convention parties were united and their policy position was clearly distinct from that of 
their opponents. 
The role of the nation plays an interesting part in defining the Convention’s ideological 
identity.  The salience of anti-Communism helped to push the Hungarian Democratic 
Union into co-operation with the ‘Romanian’ parties that formed the Convention and this in 
turn helped to shape the Convention’s attitude to nationalism.  But the historic parties and 
the civic society groups were already pre-disposed to reject radical nationalism because of 
their liberal instincts in some cases and because of their recognition that moderation in this 
area was an important part of rehabilitating Romania into the western world.  The 
Democratic Union of Hungarian’s radicalism combined with pressures created by the 
nationalist rhetoric of the 1992 – 1996 government to eventually end the Democratic 
Union’s membership of the Convention.  But the Hungarian group maintained close links 
with the Convention which in turn resisted any temptation to turn to radical nationalism 
itself.  It is arguable that the Convention’s decision to take a moderate position in terms of 
nationalism made it easier for the extreme right to survive and prosper.  The performance of 
the Greater Romania Party in 2000 prompted western commentators in particular to look 
back through Romania’s post-Communist politics for signs of ethnic tension.  But at the 
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same time more considered analysis found the causes of the far-right’s success 
elsewhere.743 
The secondary elements that went to make up the Convention’s identity were not 
significant sources of internal division essentially because the member-groups were broadly 
united in their views.  The National Peasants adopted Christian Democratic rhetoric but 
disavowed clericalism while at the same time neither the National Liberals nor the civic 
liberals adopted secularist positions.  Inter-denominational divisions were secondary to 
ethnic identity in the divide between the Hungarian Democratic Union and the Romanian 
parties – perhaps because the Hungarian community itself was divided between Catholic 
and Calvinist faiths.  Those who were determined to promote the primacy of the Orthodox 
Church gravitated towards the Social Democrats and the Greater Romania Party leaving the 
Convention broadly united in its outlook.  The peculiar position that the centre-right found 
itself in with regards to democratisation was damaging to its electoral prospects but not a 
source of internal division.  The Convention quietly abandoned its commitment to 
restoration of the monarchy over time and the more radical monarchists were obliged to 
accept this as the price of widening the formation’s electoral base.   
Having avoided the temptation of radical nationalism and being united in its determination 
to shed the country’s Communist past, the Convention maintained a consistent position in 
respect of membership of Euro-Atlantic alliances.  The Convention’s fondness for 
technocratic solutions and for casting their appeal in terms of a moral crusade arise partly 
from the anti-party sentiments of some on the civic liberal wing of the formation but, 
despite these elements there is little sign of a deliberate construction of an ideology of the 
Convention beyond opposition to Communism.  Equally, despite the perceptions of some 
of the formation’s leadership, the ideological differences between the member parties can 
hardly be said to be so great as to cause a failure of the formation.  Instead the principal 
causes of disunity appear to lay elsewhere. 
                                                            
743 Andreescu for example asserts that extremism is boosted by five factors: the weakness of the Romanian 
state in terms of policy delivery; popular mistrust of democracy; a lack of transparency; poverty; and 
corruption.  While none of these is linked to inter-ethnic tension it is also true that each could be said to have 
been contributed to by policy failures in other areas made by the Convention.  Gabriel Andreescu, Right Wing 
Extremism in Romania, Ethno-cultural Diversity Resource Centre, Cluj, 2003. 
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So, returning to the four questions that opened this chapter, it can it be seen that the 
constituent organisations that made up the Convention did have coherent ideological 
positions.  Those positions were not necessarily contradictory although tensions were 
created over the degree of salience attached to individual issues by the different member 
organisations (for example in relation to the Dumitrescu law). 
The absence of a coherent, unified ideology (or even of a project to create one) for the 
Democratic Convention was seen by some as a significant brake on closer co-operation 
between the parties in the within it.  Thus, one senior minister in the Convention-led 
government sees the Democratic Convention as: 
…broad based with many factions, a complicated modus operandi and conflicting 
ideology.  The Convention was about opposing the Social Democrats... no one had a 
political project for the Convention.744 
Renate Weber, a leading civil society activist and president Emil Constantinescu’s closest 
adv iser, feels the formation’s breadth meant it lacked a clear identity: 
The Democratic Convention was too broad; too mixed; too many different ideologies; 
different levels of understanding of political reality.  The Convention had no 
distinctive centre-right approaches.  They did not try to support the middle class.745 
Others, such as Zoe Petre, Varujan Vosganian, Andrei Marga and President Emil 
Constantinescu, do see a distinctive ideological framework guiding the Convention that 
went beyond simply opposing the post-Communist left.  And this view is supported by 
examination of the statements of leading politicians and party documents which suggest 
that the Democratic Convention did possess the elements of an identifiable centre-right 
ideology.  However, the relative salience of those issues to the wider electorate, and the 
differing attitudes to those key issues between the Convention’s member parties, may offer 
a partial explanation of the Convention’s failure to unite more effectively: Convention 
politicians tended to prioritise what they themselves saw as important without regard to the 
                                                            
744 Interview with Daniel Daianu, Brussels, June 2008. 
745 Interview with Renate Weber, Brussels, June 2008. 
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electorate’s priorities.  The Convention’s ideological choices also meant it was unable to 
monopolise the political space on the right thereby allowing competition to grow from the 
far right in particular but also making it more difficult to compete in the centre.  Finally a 
failure of delivery on its core policy pledges (which were derived from its distinct centre-
right identity) once the Convention was in government increased the centrifugal pressures 
which the Convention’s organisational structure was unable to resist once election defeat 
loomed.  The creation of a coherent ideological identity by the end of its time in office was 
not sufficient by that stage to hold the organisation together since key parties had already 
opted out calculating that they could better achieve their objectives by other routes. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
This chapter brings together the main conclusions reached in each of the preceding 
chapters.  It goes on to compare those conclusions to the original propositions set out in 
chapter one to determine which has been confirmed and why.  The chapter then draws out 
the broader implications of those conclusions and ends with some indications of how the 
research might be taken forward. 
7.1  Summary of key findings 
The first conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that the narratives and organisation of 
the ‘democratic opposition’ were heavily influenced by the nature of Romania’s transition 
from Communism and that this had an enduring impact on the ability of the Democratic 
Convention to develop into a successful centre-right formation.  This transition was, in part, 
shaped by the nature of the Communist regime itself and in particular the absence of pre-
existing opposition structures but it was the events that followed immediately after the 
overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 that had  a more profound effect on the 
story of the Democratic Convention and the centre-right in Romania.  
Romania lacked a functioning opposition cadre such as existed in Czechoslovakia and 
Poland and it lacked a generation of reform-oriented administrators as existed in Hungary.  
The speed and violence with which the Ceausescu regime was overthrown meant that those 
apparatchiks who were finally ready to move against the leadership were pitched into a 
popular revolution, emerging as its leaders thanks to those peculiar dynamics and the 
absence of a credible alternative opposition leadership outside of the Communist Party.  
The historic parties – the National Peasant Party, the National Liberal Party and the Social 
Democratic Party - were re-constituted in the last days of 1989 and became the de-facto 
leaders of the new opposition as disquiet grew about the nature of the transition.  They were 
gradually joined in opposition by activists from the streets and longer term dissidents who 
became increasingly disillusioned with the new structures during January 1990, with the 
National Salvation Front becoming seen as a vehicle for continuing Communist power. 
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The events of January to June 1990 were particularly important.  The violence with which 
the new regime countered opposition by using the miners to break up demonstrations, the 
decision of the Front to contest the May 1990 elections and the scale of the Front’s victory 
in those elections which could only be comprehended by attributing it to electoral fraud all 
formed the mindset of the opposition in an enduring way.  These events gave rise to a sense 
of weakness against a dominant National Salvation Front.  The narrative of the ‘stolen 
revolution’ and the consequent questioning of the Front’s legitimacy as a governing 
structure, and the radicalisation of the opposition’s discourse which conflated the 
Communist regime, its instruments of repression (particularly the Securitate), the National 
Salvation Front and then the Social Democrats into a single organism, meant that its 
ousting became the dominant rationale behind moves towards co-operation across the 
opposition movement. 
Henceforth, strategic political decisions were taken by leaders of the centre-right primarily 
in the context of their perception of an ‘unfinished’ revolution whose outcome had been 
‘stolen’ from the true opponents of Communism – a viewpoint which magnified the 
significance of the contest over the revolution in the minds of opposition actors and which 
made co-operation across the divide (and coalition building) impossible for many to 
contemplate.  This had a profound effect on their ability to shape strategy for the centre-
right throughout the next decade and contributed to the acute problems they faced in 
government when forced to coalesce with a broader range of political partners; especially in 
their relations with the Democrats whose supporters should have formed part of the centre-
right coalition that the Convention was trying to forge. 
The centre-right parties felt themselves so weakened by the dominance of the Front, and 
their narrative was so radicalised by the belief that Communist power had been maintained 
after the revolution that the bulk of the elites opted for uneasy co-operation with each other 
(bolstered by forging close relationships with sympathetic non-party organisations)  rather 
than ultimately healthier competition.  Evidence from elsewhere in the CEE region, notably 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, suggests that competition between centre-right parties 
hones messages and skills and ultimately concentrates resources in such a way that the 
‘fittest’ survive to dominate the centre-right political space.  Those elites who opted for 
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competition strategies, such as the National Liberals loyal to Radu Campeanu, were pushed 
to the electoral margins because of the weight of resources invested in the co-operation 
project.  This contrasts with the (ultimately successful) strategies pursued by Fidesz in 
Hungary and the Czech Civic Democrats, who established a dominant position on the 
centre-right in their countries after having defeated or absorbed competitors who existed in 
a similar political space. 
The decision to establish the Democratic Convention in the particular organisational form 
chosen had a profound effect on the dynamics of centre right politics in an organisational 
sense.  It locked in the civic society groups and it preserved the structures of the historic 
parties, protecting them from meaningful competition against each other until the 2000 
election.  It also led to management structures that shared out voting rights equally between 
the constituent formations regardless of size or true political strength.  But this spreading of 
operational power also reinforced the perception of those competing with the National 
Peasant Party for a leading position that it – the National Peasant Party – had created a 
structure it could dominate by virtue of its links with the civil society organisations. 
In the end, the close links with civil society organisations that appeared to be the great 
source of strength and legitimation for the Convention, turned out to be a significant cause 
of its organisational weakness.  The non-party groups were excluded from direct 
participation in the structures of power in government, they were alienated by the need to 
form coalitions and they were driven by policy objectives that did not fit the more 
pragmatic concerns of the other elites in the Convention who prioritised access to office 
and the benefits that could be derived from holding government positions.  And since the 
internal dynamics of the formation meant that the leadership role was passed to a non-party 
figure in preference to one with strong links to one of the two main parties the emphasis on 
non party-building objectives became more significant. Emil Constantinescu’s description 
of the enduring political legacy of the Convention is instructive in that it confirms his view 
that the Convention succeeded because of its delivery of policy priorities despite its 
destruction as a political force (see chapter six). 
Although no serious attempt was made to develop an integrative ideological narrative in the 
way that the Czech Civic Democrats and Hungarian Fidesz appeared to do so successfully, 
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the operational objectives of the constituent parties thus became a more dominant factor in 
determining the fate of the Convention than deep-set ideological differences.  This is 
despite the widespread perception among leading Convention figures that it was the lack of 
ideological cohesion that ultimately led to the Convention’s demise.  For the Civic Alliance 
and the other civic society groups, their principal objectives were formed around the 
delivery of policy goals, particularly de-Communisation.  The Hungarian Democratic 
Union’s main objective was to secure a place in government in order to ensure the delivery 
of policy goals perceived as benefitting its (communal) electoral constituency.  The 
National Liberals and National Peasants shared operational objectives in the sense that they 
were both motivated by the desire to win elections at a national level in order to secure a 
leading place in government.  However, as the certainty of defeat in the 2000 elections 
became clearer the parties opted for different strategies to achieve that goal – in the case of 
the National Peasants it tried to resurrect the Democratic Convention but the National 
Liberals opted to fight the elections alone (or possibly in partnership with the Alliance for 
Romania). 
The perception of ideological difference was important to the leading actors in legitimising 
their continued attachment to the historic parties.  But in reality the organisations that were 
part of the Convention united around a set of ideological preferences that were broadly 
recognisable as centre-right: anti-Communism, economic reform, democracy (albeit a 
preference for a return to a pre-war constitutional monarchy in preference to a presidency), 
and a respect for Church and nation.  Tensions did exist and did contribute to splits within 
the formation, notably over the degree of autonomy that should be granted to the ethnic 
Hungarian community and over the speed and extent of de-Communisation.  In the former 
case, though, in a broad ideological sense, the desire to return Romania to the European 
mainstream far outweighed any desire to pursue more radical nationalist themes.  In the 
latter, the crisis that developed was not caused by the depth of ideological difference 
between Convention members but by the in-built structural weakness in the Convention 
which accommodated organisations with very different operational objectives. 
A failure of leadership (which itself was derived from the organisational structure of the 
Convention which favoured the choice of non-party compromise candidates for leadership 
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positions) meant that the Convention itself did not develop a distinctive ideological 
programme that was separate from its member organisations beyond the limited framework 
of President Emil Constantinescu.  In practice, while he remained committed to Romania’s 
entry to Euro-Atlantic structures and was willing to expend considerable political capital in 
demonstrating this (most notably by his support for NATO action against Serbia), his wider 
vision of an ethical revolution in Romanian society was not given concrete form by the 
Convention in government. 
7.2 Testing the propositions 
The first of the propositions was that the fusion of nationalist, pro-democracy and pro-
market philosophies into a broad integrative narrative is a necessary condition for the 
success of a centre-right party (as defined in the introduction).  It is apparent that the 
Convention achieved the creation of an operational ideology that broadly matched this 
description.  Key elements – particularly anti-Communism (and the Front and the Social 
Democrats as the perceived agents of continued Communism); a commitment to economic 
reform (albeit more cautious than the more radical proposals for ‘Shock Therapy’ that 
marked out some parties in other CEE states); and an internationalist outlook served as 
important markers that distinguished the Convention from the left and from the far right.  
At the same time the Convention’s ideological commitments may have hampered it in 
electoral terms since the left was able to exploit fears over the extent of de-Communisation 
(and also to contrast its leaders’ role in the 1989 Revolution with the Convention 
leadership’s preference for a return of the Monarchy) and because the far right was able to 
monopolise nationalist narratives that were closed off to the Convention.  It is also apparent 
that the Convention leadership lacked the will to craft a distinct ideology for the 
Convention, as distinct from the member parties, that would have allowed the Convention 
to emerge as a more cohesive organisation. 
So while the findings here tend to support the view that a broad, integrative narrative 
around identifiably centre-right themes helps to create the conditions for success for a 
centre-right party it indicates no more than that – it may be a necessary condition but it 
does not appear to be sufficient to generate enduring success. 
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The second proposition was that a unified party structure would present higher barriers to 
exit for elite actors and would thus be more likely to succeed than an electoral alliance.  
The Convention was formed as an electoral alliance and remained so throughout its 
existence but the evidence presented here suggests that it could have evolved into a unified 
party structure if its leaders had willed it.  The evidence set out in chapter five strongly 
suggests that the alliance structure – and particularly one that accommodated non-party 
formations - meant the Convention was less able to cope with exogenous pressures than it 
might have been had it been constituted as a single party.  Elite actors retained a loyalty to 
the constituent parties and that, together with their continued organisational existence, 
meant that leaving the Convention was a relatively low-cost option when it failed to either 
deliver policy objectives or appeared to be incapable of winning an election.  In addition, 
the breadth of operational objectives that were accommodated in the Convention structure 
made it difficult to reconcile the demands of the different member organisations.  A 
structure that preserved the identities of the constituent organisations also meant that 
decision making was essentially a process of balance and compromise between them.  This 
mitigated against leadership that would pursue unification and furthermore led to a 
preference for the choice of non-party candidates in leading positions – those leaders then 
being less motivated or able to pursue a party-building project. The elite-centred nature of 
the organisation also meant that there was little pressure (or reward) for local organisations 
to move towards more unified structures. 
The third proposition was that the legacy of the Communist regime and the impact of the 
transition from Communism would weaken the centre-right’s ability to cohere into a 
successful formation.Legacy explanations have featured heavily in published analysis of 
Romania’s post-Communist development. Clearly some elements of the centre-right’s 
evolution were shaped by legacy factors: most clearly the absence of a Communist-era 
domestic opposition which meant that there was no credible, ready-formed elite to take 
over the leadership of the opposition (and the post-Communist government). But there 
appears to be more significance in the violent, divisive and disputed nature of the transition. 
This polarised the political debate and led centre-right leaders to focus on issues that were 
of great importance to them but much less important to the wider electorate (and which also 
prevented broad coalition building. 
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7.3  Broader implications 
Chapter one set out a range of factors that have been identified as possible determinants of 
party performance in Central and Eastern Europe.  The general propositions set out by 
Kopecky, Mair, Webb and White can each, to some extent, be verified in development of 
the Romanian Democratic Convention.  All of the parties of the ‘democratic opposition’ 
had weaker grassroots organisations than the National Salvation Front (subsequently the 
Social Democrats); the historic parties proved more resilient – at least in terms of elite 
loyalty – than the two potential challengers that were (elite-led) later creations (the Civic 
Alliance Party and the Alliance for Romania); there was a good deal of elite and voter 
volatility over the period on the centre right; indeed, the party landscape only began to 
show signs of stabilising after the period of this study once political structures and electoral 
outcomes had begun to provide consistent feedback to actors. 
Yet these factors could potentially be applied to party competition across Central and 
Eastern Europe, where outcomes in individual countries differed markedly.  In Poland the 
centre-right began the post-Communist era with what would appear to have been 
considerable assets in the form of Solidarity, with the latter providing a strong resistance 
narrative, a cadre of experienced political leaders and a grassroots organisational structure.  
But, at least until recently, centre-right parties there proved incapable of coalescing into 
two apparently stable structures but still without a single, dominant centre-right party-type 
formation.  In Slovakia the centre right was initially marginalised by the nationalist right 
and the dominant division that occurred within the centre right was over links to the 
Church.  In the Czech Republic and in Hungary a dominant formation did appear on the 
centre right around which centre right politicians eventually coalesced and which had 
strong links to the opposition elites that led the final challenge to Communist authorities in 
those countries. 
For Romania, Kitschelt’s model predicts that the centre right would be weakened compared 
to demagogic appeals from the left and the far right and would be prone to splits and 
autocratic leadership.  All of this being heavily influenced by legacy factors – particularly 
the nature of Nicolae Ceausescu’s dictatorship – and this is reinforced by much of the 
academic analysis of post-Communist politics in Romania which also tends to be built on 
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assumptions about the importance of legacy factors.  In fact the outcomes, and the 
explanations for them, were rather more complex often rooted in what (in the context of 
discussions of lustration and de-communisation) commentators such as Welsh have 
described as ‘the politics of the (post-communist) present.’746 For example, while not 
denying the role of historical legacies in shaping post-Communist political outcomes, this 
study suggests, as we have already emphasised, that critical events that occur during the 
process of democratisation can have an enduring impact on the success or failure of centre-
right formations (although commentators like Kitschelt and Grzymala Busse would argue 
that these choices themselves are determined by Communist regime legacies). 
There was clearly an imbalance of political resources between the left and the centre-right 
in the early post-Communist years but the Democratic Convention overcame those 
weaknesses to win the elections of 1996.  It could claim to have developed the kind of 
broad integrative narrative that Szczerbiak and Hanley identify as important in successful 
centre-right formations.  But it broke up in office.The cause of its failure and ultimate 
break-up can be found in the inherent weaknesses of its organisational structure.  These 
weaknesses prevented the Convention from acquiring strong directive leadership that could 
have driven the development of a more resilient organisational structure.  Furthermore the 
organisational structure – that sought to correct a perceived imbalance in resources by 
embedding civil society groups within the Convention – built-in a lack of flexibility when it 
came to dealing with the pressures of coalition government.  As a more general finding, this 
suggests that strategies for co-operation between parties that appear attractive in the short 
term may be less effective in the long term than strategies that aim at competition between 
parties in a similar political space which may lead to one establishing dominance.  It also 
suggests that such an approach – the ‘survival of the fittest’ – will help an organisation to 
develop the adaptive skills that are essential for survival in government, particularly 
government in coalition.  
This study also raises particularly interesting questions about the links between interest 
groups and political parties in a modern setting.  Close relationships between external 
sponsor organisations and political parties are well established features of European 
                                                            
746 Helga Welsh, Dealing with the Communist Past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 48:3 (May 1996), 413-428 
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democracies be they, for example, trades union links with left-parties or connections 
between the church and Christian Democratic Parties.  In post-Communist Central and 
Eastern Europe there was initially a close relationship between the Solidarity trades union 
and Solidarity Electoral Action in Poland.  Also in Poland there were strong links between 
elements of the Catholic Church and parties such as the League of Polish Families.  But 
these relationships are the exception rather than the rule.  And, as Kirchheimer and 
Panebianco have pointed in their catch-all/electoral-professional party models, there has 
been a trend in west European democracies for parties to loosen those ties that do exist over 
recent years.  In Romania, the Democratic Convention was constructed in such a way as to 
bring civic society organisations – particularly the Civic Alliance – into the heart of the 
organisational structure.  This was done to secure legitimacy for the Convention but it 
proved to be a major source of tension once the formation had gained office since the Civic 
Alliance continued to sit outside the structures that had been set up to manage relations 
between the coalition partners in government.  The extent of integration between the civic 
society groups and the political parties in the Convention is unusual and suggests that such 
an arrangement is problematic when parties are driven by electoral concerns to broaden 
their appeal beyond the potentially narrower priorities of the interest groups that they ally 
with. 
7.4  Taking the research forward 
This study is time-limited and concentrates deliberately on organisational aspects of the 
Convention’s development.  There are a number of further areas of study that could pay 
dividends in broadening understanding of the factors shaping the development of the 
centre-right in the CEE region.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the evidence suggests that the events 
immediately following the Romanian revolution of December 1989 had a profound and 
enduring impact on the actions and outlook of centre-right political leaders.  Chapter one 
explains that this thesis views these events solely in a Romanian context.  There is a 
substantial academic literature on the role of critical junctures in shaping political 
developments, but this work does not engage with that literature because it would risk 
taking the thesis too far from its principal objective of testing the performance of the 
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Democratic Convention against Szczerbiak and Hanley’s framework.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence outlined here and the conclusions reached could form the basis of further study in 
examining the role of critical junctures.  
An additional area to explore would involve developing a richer understanding of the role 
of voter preference in driving party development.  While an extensive literature on voter 
preferences in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe exists, there is very little that 
brings together analysis of party development with analysis of voter behaviour. This is no 
doubt due to a number of factors: opinion polling in the region has not developed the level 
of sophistication that is seen in western Europe; after half a century of Communism the 
electorate was subject to very different stratification from the class-based structures which 
classic works say most commonly underpin the party systems of western Europe; and with 
fewer elections there is simply less data available.   
Voter attitudes have to be understood as an exogenous factor in the development of party 
structures but the winning of a stable constituency of voters is a key objective for a party 
that aims to satisfy the success criteria that have been used in this study. Evidence does 
suggest that for the Romanian Democratic Convention, election defeats in 1990, 1992 and 
2000 can in part be attributed to a failure to comprehend and adjust to the concerns of the 
majority of voters.  We have seen that the Convention developed an ideological framework 
that was recognisably of the centre-right but it did not show signs of developing an 
electoral strategy that was deliberately aimed at building the loyalty of particular sections 
of the electorate.  Further analysis might demonstrate how the votes of those ‘natural’ 
centre-right constituencies moved between parties over time.  This would allow analysts to 
explore whether the parties that endured on the political stage – notably the National 
Liberals and the Democrats – were able to build more stable electorates and (with relevance 
beyond the study of Romanian politics) to speculate on whether establishing those stable 
electorates helps centre-right parties to consolidate organisationally. 
A further area for potential further study is to compare the choices made and contexts faced 
by the Convention and those for the Democrat Party as a means of testing propositions 
about the factors that determine the success of centre-right parties.  The Democrats went on 
from the 2000 election defeat to change their party leader and to move into the space on the 
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centre-right of politics vacated by the disappearance of the Convention.  They did so 
successfully and in a series of elections between 2004 and 2009 they established 
themselves as the leading party in the centre-right political territory.  There are a number of 
organisational differences between the Democrats and the Democratic Convention, a 
difference in leadership structure (and in origin) and in strategic choices that make it a 
potentially informative examination in the comparative study of centre-right parties in the 
CEE region. 
The Petre Roman faction of the National Salvation Front, which evolved into the Democrat 
Party, was initially clear that its own identity lay as a social democratic party on the centre 
left of the political spectrum.747  But it was also firmly part of the anti-Iliescu opposition.  It 
appears that collaboration between the Democrat Party and the Convention was regularly 
discussed in the years after the 1992 election.748  In the autumn of 1994, Petre Roman gave 
an interview in which he dismissed any prospect of collaboration with Ion Iliescu’s party 
and indicated that the Democrats and the Convention shared a common agenda in opposing 
Iliescu.749 Roman’s vision was of a democratic opposition organisation that united the 
‘social’ forces in politics: ‘social democrats, social Christians and social liberals.’750 
But barriers to co-operation were substantial.  The fault line between the Democrats and the 
radical civic liberals was drawn early and was substantial.751  But the Democrats were first 
and foremost political entrepreneurs: they were willing to trade ideological commitments in 
return for perceived electoral benefit (as they did in 2005 by moving from a social 
democratic ideology to a centre-right one); and to deliver returns to particular 
constituencies of supporters in order to solidify that support (Zoe Petre, for instance, hints 
at the trading of government contracts with favoured businesses in the areas of forestry and 
transportation – both ministries controlled by Democrat politicians). Petre Roman was a 
committed social democrat but much of the party had a flexible approach to ideology. The 
                                                            
747 Conventia nationala extraordinara a FSN, Romania Libera, 27 July 1992, page 2. 
748 Victor Babiuc, executive Vice President of the Democrats, suggests that his party first proposed that the 
two formations work together in January 1993 and that negotiations were held intermittently in the following 
years. Interviu cu Victor Babiuc, Romania Libera, 17 July 1996, page 3. 
749 Petre Roman, Romania Incotro, pp. 67 – 68. 
750 Address to the Democrat Party’s national congress, October 1994.  Petre Roman, Romania Incotro, page 
111. 
751 See chapter 3, for example, and Zoe Petre’s report of her son’s reaction to the settling of the coalition 
government. 
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Convention might have benefitted more in the long run from a closer association with the 
Democrats despite the likely cost of losing more radical civic allies – gaining the political 
and management skills that the Democrats would have brought with them into the 
formation had they joined. 
Instead the Democrats were left outside the Convention structure and were barely tolerated 
as coalition partners in government.  After Roman’s heavy defeat in the presidential 
election of 2000 (see table 10 above), pressure grew for a change of leadership and Traian 
Basescu mounted a successful challenge for the leadership in 2001.  After negotiating a 
successful electoral alliance with the National Liberals for the elections of 2004, Basescu 
surprised observers by taking the Democrats from their position as social democrats to 
membership of the European People’s Party and a stated position on the centre right.  They 
reinforced this transformation by merging, in 2008, with elements from the National 
Liberal Party to form the Democrat Liberal Party. 
The potential explanations for the Democrats’ success are numerous.  Did they possess the 
kind of political resources that the Convention lacked in terms of its leadership (as many of 
them were from the managerial class of the former regime were they better equipped to 
adapt to the demands of electoral politics)? Was the apparently greater cohesion of their 
leadership group critical? What was the significance of their unified party structure and 
strong national leadership? A number of the contrasts in between the Democratic 
Convention and the Democrat Party suggest similarities in approach to Fidesz of Hungary 
and the Czech Civic Democrats and given the success of those parties in consolidating their 
positions it suggests that comparative study of the parties could prove informative.  One 
such difference in strategic approach which could have particular relevance in wider studies 
of party development in new democracies is the apparent choice that each of these parties 
(the Romanian Democrats, Fidesz and the Civic Democrats) made to reject strategies based 
on co-operation between parties as equals but instead to seek alliances only as the clearly 
dominant partner and preferably to compete with, defeat and/or consume potential rivals on 
the centre-right.  In other words, does the loss of short-term benefits from rejecting co-
operative working yield greater long-term benefits thanks to the ‘survival of the fittest’? 
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The final area suggested for additional study relates to the most striking organisational 
feature of the Romanian Democratic Convention but which again suggests questions that 
have much wider relevance in the field of comparative politics: the role of the civic society 
groups within the Convention.  The civic society groups – and in particular the Civic 
Alliance – were seen as an essential glue to the Convention.  They acted as a balance 
between the National Liberals and the National Peasants in particular to ensure that neither 
party completely dominated the organisational structure of the formation (although, as 
noted, the departure of the Campeanu-led National Liberals before the 1992 elections 
created a permanent imbalance between these two leading parties).  But in power the fact 
that their ideological commitment was not tempered by their leaders gaining political office 
meant that they created huge strains on the organisation.  A number of parties within the 
CEE region have close links to non-party organisations that act as sponsor organisations.  
Most notable is Solidarity in Poland but also Civic Forum in the Czech Republic.  And 
established parties in Western Europe have similarly close links to sponsor organisations: 
those between the church and Christian Democratic parties and between Trades Unions and 
parties of the left for example.  The Democratic Convention potentially adds a useful case-
study to analysis of the relationship between sponsor organisations and political parties; 
how the policy demands of those sponsor organisations are assimilated by the parties and 
reconciled with the preferences of the electorate; and whether those sponsor organisations 
can be integrated into a successful party in a modern democracy. 
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Appendix One   
Romania’s principle post-Communist political formations 
The following gives brief background information on the main parties and formations that 
operated in Romania in the first decade and a half after the fall of Communism.  It does not 
include those parties that formed the centre-right up to 2000 and whose history and 
structure is described in detail in the body of the thesis.   
The Agrarian Democrats (Partidul Democrat Agrar din Romania - PDAR)  
The party originated as an agrarian party, prioritising the development of rural Romania.  
The party was offered ministerial posts in the first Front government.  It formed a short-
lived electoral alliance with the National Unity Party before opting to fight the 1996 
election as part of a centrist alliance with the Humanist Party and an ecologist formation.  
After it failed to enter parliament in 1996, the party returned to links with the National 
Unity Party, before disappearing to the electoral margins. 
Alliance for Romania (Alianta pentru Romania - ApR)  
The party was established by reformist members of the Social Democrats in a reaction to 
electoral defeat in 1996.  Teodor Melescanu, who served as foreign minister in the first 
post-Communist government, was the party’s presidential candidate in 2000.  Following a 
disappointing performance in that election, the Alliance travelled rapidly on the road to 
social liberalism, eventually merging with the National Liberals. 
The Democrat Party (Partidul Democrat - PD) 
The genesis of the Democratic Party was the split between Prime Minister Petre Roman and 
President Ion Iliescu.  Petre Roman, as Romania’s first post-Communist prime minister 
placed himself at the head of a group of social democratic modernisers keen to initiate rapid 
reform and opposed to conservative ‘perestroikistii’ who wished for a more evolutionary 
approach.752  Tensions between Roman and Iliescu led eventually to the former’s sacking 
                                                            
752 See Petre Roman, Libertatea ca Datorie. 
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and the group around Roman split from Iliescu in 1992 although they retained the National 
Salvation Front name, subsequently transforming into the Democratic Party. 
At its foundation the Democratic Party declared that it was a social democratic party on the 
centre left and that its fundamental principles were republican, democratic, in favour of 
social justice, equality of opportunity, liberty and social solidarity.753  The party affiliated 
to the Socialist International and to the Party of European Socialists. 
                                                           
In the period 1993-95, the Democrats progressed through a series of alliances and mergers 
with smaller social democratic parties, emerging ultimately as part of the Union of Social 
Democrats (Uniunea Social Democrata - USD) with the ‘historic’ Social Democratic Party 
– winning 13% of the vote in the 1996 General Election and becoming the third largest 
parliamentary group.  Dismantling all remnants of the former communist regime had 
continued to be a central theme of Petre Roman’s political rhetoric and the Union of Social 
Democrats entered the government as coalition partner to the Convention under an accord 
which aspired to a ‘rapid transition to a market economy, conditions essential for the 
integration of Romania into Euro-Atlantic structures’.754  
In both 2000 and 2001, the Democrats’ national council reaffirmed its social democratic 
credentials (the latter motion being proposed by new party leader, Basescu).  In 2002, the 
party’s annual conference adopted a resolution which forbade any form of pre- or post- 
election collaboration with the Social Democrats. By 2000 just 5% of Democrat members 
of parliament claimed to have held leadership positions in the PCR – compared to a quarter 
of Social Democrat and almost a third of Greater Romania Party parliamentarians.755 In 
2003, the Democrats concluded an electoral pact with the National Liberals – the Truth and 
Justice Alliance (Alianta DA).  By 2005, the party had travelled sufficiently far from its 
social democratic origins to apply for membership of the centre-right European People’s 
Party and to re-cast itself as a ‘Popular Party’.756 
 
 
753 See Scurtu, Enciclopedia.  
754 Scurtu, Enciclopedia, page 194. 
755 Survey data from Laurentiu Stefan, page 123. 
756 Reported in Cadran Politic magazine, July/August 2005. 
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Ecologists 
Numerous ecologist formations have made an appearance on the political stage, including 
the Ecologist Movement (MER), the Ecologist Party (PER), the Ecologist Federation (FER) 
and the Green Alternative (AVE).  Only one has gained parliamentary representation in 
more than one election contested alone and only one has done so as part of a wider electoral 
alliance (the Ecologist Party won a handful of seats in 1992 and 1996 as part of the CDR).  
Ethnic Minority Formations 
The allocation of guaranteed parliamentary seats to ethnic minorities has led to competition 
between a plethora of tiny parties outside of the Hungarian ethnic group.  The deputies 
elected as minority representatives have tended to offer consistent support to the 
government of the day and have played an insignificant role in national politics. 
The Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare - PRM) 
Many western observers watched with horrified fascination as the Greater Romania Party 
reached the apex of its electoral success in the General Election of 2000.  Eighty-four 
Greater Romania Party deputies were elected – making it easily the second largest 
Parliamentary grouping, and the party leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, made the run-off 
ballot in the Presidential election.757   
Tudor is a hugely significant part of the Greater Romania Party story.  Famously the ‘court 
poet’ to the Ceausescu regime, he launched a stridently nationalist newspaper Romania 
Mare in the summer of 1990 and a year later established the Greater Romania Party.  The 
party entered parliament in 1992 with the election of 16 deputies and formed another leg of 
the Red Quadrilateral by providing parliamentary support to the government.  It won 5.5% 
of the vote in 1996. 
None of this served to signal the spectacular success achieved in the elections of 2000.  
However, after securing such a significant presence in Parliament and a third of the vote in 
                                                            
757 Gallagher has gone as far as to call the PRM the most successful ‘anti-system’ party in Eastern Europe, 
although this appears to overlook both the fleeting nature of the electoral breakthrough in 2000 and the 
success of anti-democratic nationalist parties in Slovakia and the former Yugoslav states.  Gallagher, Greater 
Romania Party. 
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the second round of the Presidential election, the party was unable to sustain its 
momentum.  It won just 8.9% of the vote in local elections in 2004 and failed to win the 
mayorality of any major city.758  Later in the year it fell back to 13% in the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies and Tudor finished third in the presidential poll. 
There is some dispute around how exactly to classify the Greater Romania Party within the 
constraints of a traditional left-right spectrum.  Gallagher, for example, has raised the 
question of how appropriate a far right designation is for the party.  The party has had a 
turbulent relationship with the post-Communist left but it is clear that they have sought 
mutually beneficial accommodation at times.  Not only have they served together in 
government but have also explored other forms of political co-operation.  There are also 
indications that the Greater Romania Party draws support more heavily from voters who 
define themselves as left wing than those who define themselves as on the right.759   
But there are four distinct factors separating the party from the left and indicating that it 
should be categorised as on the nationalist right.  The party’s particularist standpoint means 
that it has no over-arching internationalist theme to Tudor’s discourse and the party leader 
is happy to identify with the national chauvinism of the Ceausescu regime.  Its principal 
historical reference point is the pre-war proto-fascist Iron Guard movement and it was 
formed as a new and independent nationalist movement after 1989 – numerous Communist 
apparatchiks joined the party but it did not inherit the political or physical assets of the 
former ruling party.  Its interpretation of the ‘December Events’ of 1989 differs from the 
post-Communist left, seeing the overthrow of Ceausescu as being a foreign-co-ordinated 
coup. Its economic policy also conflicts with leftist visions of economic and social progress 
- although it does promote extensive state intervention in the economy it sentimentalises the 
rural peasantry over urban industrialism and attaches great importance to ‘blood and soil’ 
rhetoric. 
 
                                                            
758 Centrul de Analize si Studii Politice (CASP), Factori determinanti pentru rezultantul alegerilor generale 
2004, Bucharest November 2004. 
759 Mungiu Pippidi, page 110.  Despite this evidence, polling indicates that in the presidential election of 
2004, 85% of voters who backed Tudor in the first round of voting switched to the centrist Basescu in 
preference to Social Democrat candidate Adrian Nastase (www.IMAS.ro). 
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Humanist Party (Partidul Umanist Roman - PUR)  
It was formed in 1991 as a social-liberal party by media tycoon Dan Voiculescu.  Its low 
level of popular support has been offset by the utility of Voiculescu’s media holdings 
making it an attractive coalition partner.  The party served as a government coalition 
partner with the Social Democrats from 2000.  It ran on a joint electoral ticket with the 
Social Democrats in 2004 and commenced coalition negotiations with the party before 
Traian Basescu won the presidential run-off at which point it switched to backing a 
coalition led by the Truth and Justic Alliance.  In 2005, the party re-branded completely as 
the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator - PC), claiming the heritage of the historic 
Conservative Party, adopting a distinctively nationalist/conservative programme.   
The National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvarii Nationale - FSN) 
Initially a broad alliance of interests and individuals that formed the first post-Ceausescu 
government, the FSN’s decision to constitute itself as a party and contest the elections of 
May 1990 is a defining moment in Romania’s post-Communist politics.  Following the 
dismissal of Petre Roman as Prime Minister, the Front split.  The Roman faction retained 
the name National Salvation Front, while the Iliescu-led formation evolved via the 
Democratic National Salvation Front (Frontul Democratice de Salvarii Nationale – FDSN) 
into the Social Democratic Party (see below). 
Although this unusual genesis suggests a bluring of political boundaries, it is widely 
accepted that the National Salvation Front under the leadership of Ion Iliescu falls 
comfortably within the category of ‘Communist Successor’ parties.  Lavinia Stan provides 
evidence of wholesale transfer of Communist Party political assets to the Front at local 
level.760 Lewis has no difficulty in categorising the Front as a communist successor party 
while acknowledging its role as providing the leadership of the revolution.761   
 
 
                                                            
760 Lavinia Stan, Leaders & Laggards, page 43. 
761 Lewis, Political Parties, page 28 
257 
 
The National Unity Party (Partidul Unitatii Nationale a Romanilor - PUNR) 
The nationalist stance of Ceausescu regime, together with concerns about the political role 
of the Hungarian minority and the future of Soviet Moldova created a fertile political space 
for nationalist parties in post-Communist Romanian politics.   
Of the two principal formations, the National Unity Party had the least ambiguously 
nationalist genesis.  It was formed in Transylvania soon after the events of December 1989 
in response to perceived threats to national integrity from a politically united and rapidly 
organising Hungarian minority.  It was fuelled by popular mythology around foreign 
interference in the downfall of the Ceausescu regime and was founded effectively as the 
‘political wing’ of the nationalist cultural organisation Romanian Hearth (Vatra 
Romaneasca). 
The party won a little over 2% of the vote and 9 seats in Parliament in the elections of 
1990.762  In 1992 it trebled its vote share and elected 30 deputies – entering a left-
dominated coalition government in August 1994 which became known as the ‘Red 
Quadrilateral’.763  By 1996, though, the National Unity Party had been eclipsed by the 
Greater Romania Party giving rise to splits within the party over strategy.  The party’s 
charismatic leader Gheorghe Funar was ousted and the new leadership attempted to 
reposition it with a more centrist appeal.764  Funar and his supporters responded by leaving 
the party for the Greater Romania Party.  The National Unity Party did not survive as a 
viable electoral entity after the split and dropped below the electoral threshold in 2000.   
The Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat - PSD) 
Whatever the ambiguities over the origins of the National Salvation Front, it moved to 
position itself as a mainstream party on the democratic left and there is a direct mechanical 
and ideological progression from the Front, through the Party of Social Democracy in 
                                                            
762 Essex University 
(www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexElections.asp?country=Romania&election=ro90cd)  
763 Janusz Bugajski, Political parties of Eastern Europe – A Guide to Politics in the Post Communist Era, 
Center for Strategic & International Studies, New York, 2002. 
764 Gheorghe Funar is an unabashed nationalist and was mayor of Cluj-Napoca until defeated in 2004.  His 
mayorality was marked by acts designed to provoke and humiliate the Hungarian minority in this ethnically 
divided city such as a ban on bi-lingual shop signs and restrictions on Hungarian cultural associations.  
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Romania (PDSR) to the PSD. 765  After Iliescu’s split with Petre Roman, those loyal to 
Iliescu (most of the Front hierarchy) formed the Democratic National Salvation Front to 
support Iliescu’s re-election campaign in 1992.  The party was re-named the PDSR in 1993 
and then later as the Social Democratic Party – PSD. 
The Social Democrats’ regular use of nationalist rhetoric and choice of coalition partners is 
a complicating factor when it comes to positioning the party.  The party governed in co-
operation with the left wing Socialist Workers and with two nationalist parties after 1992.  
A formal political pact was concluded with the stridently nationalist Greater Romania Party 
at the beginning of 1995 but the Social Democrats withdrew from it in October of that year 
before the alliance could be tested in an election.  The superficial reason for the collapse of 
the pact was a bitter row over lustration, but Deletant points out that the pact had met a 
chilly reaction from Western governments and the Iliescu government was concerned with 
the impact on its attempts to move closer to the EU and to the United States.766 
The Social Democrats’ current incarnation was created from a merger with the smaller 
(historic) Social Democratic Party.  The principal attraction of the merger was the 
international affiliations of the smaller partner.  The union led the enlarged Social 
Democrats into membership of the mainstream associations of the European left - the 
Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists.  Throughout the period, the 
Social Democrats were one of the most successful political formations in post-Communist 
Central and Eastern Europe with a large membership, strong local government base and 
having topped the poll (in one guise or another) in the first round of every presidential 
election from 1990 to 2004.Socialist Workers Party (Partidul Socialist al Muncii - PSM)  
The Socialist Workers Party operated as representatives of unreformed communism and 
was initially led by Ilie Verdet (Prime Minister of Romania from 1979 – 1982). It has not 
had representation in the national parliament since 1996 but it maintained a presence in 
local government. The party split in 2003 with one faction taking the name Socialist 
Alliance Party. 
                                                            
765 In March 1991, the Front’s National Convention adopted a motion entitled ‘A future for Romania’ which 
reaffirmed the Front’s adherence to social democratic doctrine.  Scurtu, page 73. 
766 Dennis Deletant in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (eds), Post-Communist Romania, Palgrave, 
Basingstoke, 2001, page 49 
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The Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat - PSD) 
Whatever the ambiguities over the origins of the National Salvation Front, it moved to 
position itself as a mainstream party on the democratic left and there is a direct mechanical 
and ideological progression from the Front, through the Party of Social Democracy in 
Romania (PDSR) to the PSD. 767  After Iliescu’s split with Petre Roman, those loyal to 
Iliescu (most of the Front hierarchy) formed the Democratic National Salvation Front to 
support Iliescu’s re-election campaign in 1992.  The party was re-named the PDSR in 1993 
and then later as the Social Democratic Party – PSD. 
The Social Democrats’ current incarnation was created from a merger with the smaller 
(historic) Social Democratic Party.  The principal attraction of the merger was the 
international affiliations of the smaller partner.  The union led the enlarged Social 
Democrats into membership of the mainstream associations of the European left - the 
Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists.  Throughout the period, the 
Social Democrats were one of the most successful political formations in post-Communist 
Central and Eastern Europe with a large membership, strong local government base and 
having topped the poll (in one guise or another) in the first round of every presidential 
election from 1990 to 2004. 
Other pragmatic-centrist parties 
Although formed as a social democratic vehicle, the Alliance for Romania (Alianta pentru 
Romania - ApR) fits most comfortably in the centre-populist category.  The party was 
established by reformist members of the Social Democrats in a reaction to electoral defeat 
in 1996.  Teodor Melescanu, who served as foreign minister in the first post-Communist 
government, was the party’s presidential candidate in 2000.  Following a disappointing 
performance in that election, the Alliance travelled rapidly on the road to social liberalism, 
eventually merging with the National Liberals. 
The Humanist Party (Partidul Umanist Roman - PUR) is probably best placed in the same 
category of centre-populist parties.  It was formed in 1991 as a social-liberal party by media 
                                                            
767 In March 1991, the Front’s National Convention adopted a motion entitled ‘A future for Romania’ which 
reaffirmed the Front’s adherence to social democratic doctrine.  Scurtu, page 73. 
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tycoon Dan Voiculescu.  Its low level of popular support has been offset by the utility of 
Voiculescu’s media holdings making it an attractive coalition partner.  The party served as 
a government coalition partner with the Social Democrats from 2000.  It ran on a joint 
electoral ticket with the Social Democrats in 2004 and commenced coalition negotiations 
with the party before Traian Basescu won the presidential run-off at which point it switched 
to backing a coalition led by the Truth and Justic Alliance.  In 2005, the party re-branded 
completely as the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator - PC), claiming the heritage of 
the historic Conservative Party, adopting a distinctively nationalist/conservative 
programme.   
The Greater Romania Party (Partidul Romania Mare - PRM) 
Many western observers watched with horrified fascination as the Greater Romania Party 
reached the apex of its electoral success in the General Election of 2000.  Eighty-four 
Greater Romania Party deputies were elected – making it easily the second largest 
Parliamentary grouping, and the party leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, made the run-off 
ballot in the Presidential election.768  
Tudor is a hugely significant part of the Greater Romania Party story.  Famously the ‘court 
poet’ to the Ceausescu regime, he launched a stridently nationalist newspaper Romania 
Mare in the summer of 1990 and a year later established the Greater Romania Party.  The 
party entered parliament in 1992 with the election of 16 deputies and formed another leg of 
the Red Quadrilateral by providing parliamentary support to the government.  It won 5.5% 
of the vote in 1996. 
None of this served to signal the spectacular success achieved in the elections of 2000.  
However, after securing such a significant presence in Parliament and a third of the vote in 
the second round of the Presidential election, the party was unable to sustain its 
momentum.  It won just 8.9% of the vote in local elections in 2004 and failed to win the 
                                                            
768 Gallagher has gone as far as to call the PRM the most successful ‘anti-system’ party in Eastern Europe, 
although this appears to overlook both the fleeting nature of the electoral breakthrough in 2000 and the 
success of anti-democratic nationalist parties in Slovakia and the former Yugoslav states.  Gallagher, Greater 
Romania Party. 
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mayorality of any major city.769  Later in the year it fell back to 13% in the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies and Tudor finished third in the presidential poll. 
There is some dispute around how exactly to classify the Greater Romania Party within the 
constraints of a traditional left-right spectrum.  Gallagher, for example, has raised the 
question of how appropriate a far right designation is for the party.  The party has had a 
turbulent relationship with the post-Communist left but it is clear that they have sought 
mutually beneficial accommodation at times.  Not only have they served together in 
government but have also explored other forms of political co-operation.  There are also 
indications that the Greater Romania Party draws support more heavily from voters who 
define themselves as left wing than those who define themselves as on the right.770   
But there are four distinct factors separating the party from the left and indicating that it 
should be categorised as on the nationalist right.  The party’s particularist standpoint means 
that it has no over-arching internationalist theme to Tudor’s discourse and the party leader 
is happy to identify with the national chauvinism of the Ceausescu regime.  Its principal 
historical reference point is the pre-war proto-fascist Iron Guard movement and it was 
formed as a new and independent nationalist movement after 1989 – numerous Communist 
apparatchiks joined the party but it did not inherit the political or physical assets of the 
former ruling party.  Its interpretation of the ‘December Events’ of 1989 differs from the 
post-Communist left, seeing the overthrow of Ceausescu as being a foreign-co-ordinated 
coup. Its economic policy also conflicts with leftist visions of economic and social progress 
- although it does promote extensive state intervention in the economy it sentimentalises the 
rural peasantry over urban industrialism and attaches great importance to ‘blood and soil’ 
rhetoric. 
                                                            
769 Centrul de Analize si Studii Politice (CASP), Factori determinanti pentru rezultantul alegerilor generale 
2004, Bucharest November 2004. 
770Mungiu Pippidi, page 110.  Despite this evidence, polling indicates that in the presidential election of 2004, 
85% of voters who backed Tudor in the first round of voting switched to the centrist Basescu in preference to 
Social Democrat candidate Adrian Nastase (www.IMAS.ro). 
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Appendix two 
Post-Communist Romania – Constitutional framework771 
Romania’s constitutional and legal system draws heavily on the French model.  It operates 
a bi-cameral parliament in a semi-presidential framework.  Parliament and President have 
until now been chosen in coterminous elections, although this is set to change with the 
presidential term recently extended to five years while the parliamentary term remains at 
four. 
The first post-Communist parliament from 1990-1992 effectively operated as a constituent 
assembly in drawing up a new constitution.  Despite the obvious potential for division, 
given the country’s heavily contested exit from Communism and the presence of a 
significant ethnic minority population, there has been relatively little dispute over the 
constitutional settlement.  A referendum was held in December 1991 which backed the 
proposed constitution by a very large margin.  Since that time there have been relatively 
few changes to the provisions affecting the form of government institutions and the 
electoral system, although the threshold for parliamentary representation was raised in time 
for the 2000 election. 
The lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, is elected from closed party lists 
with county-based constituencies.  A national vote threshold of 5% for parties and 8% for 
electoral alliances operates.  A number of seats are reserved for parties representing ethnic 
minorities and independent candidates are entitled to stand if they can gather the support of 
5% of their chosen constituency’s electorate.  Seats in each constituency are allocated in 
proportion to the votes polled in the county, surplus votes and unallocated seats are then 
pooled nationally and re-allocated according to each party’s national vote share.  The same 
system of seat allocation is used for the Senate, although with fewer seats.772  A Central 
                                                            
771 Information taken from Abraham and from Preda and Soare. 
772 Law 373 of 24 September 2004 for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, available at 
www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=58521 .  The previous election law of 1992 stipulated a 
threshold for seats of 3% nationwide both for parties and alliances.   
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Election Bureau is constituted for each election and is responsible for over-seeing the 
administration of elections and publishing results. 
Table 20: Allocation of deputies and senators by constituency, 2004 
Constituency No. of 
deputies 
No. of 
senators 
 Constituency No. of 
deputies 
No. of 
senators 
Alba 6 2  Hunedoara 7 3 
Arad 7 3  Ialomita 4 2 
Arges 9 4  Iasi 12 5 
Bacau 10 5  Ilfov 4 2 
Bihor 9 4  Maramures 7 3 
Bistrita-
Nasaud 
5 2  Mehedinti 4 2 
Botosani 7 3  Mures 8 4 
Brasov 9 4  Neamt 8 4 
Braila 5 2  Olt 7 3 
Buzau 7 3  Prahova 12 5 
Caras-
Severin 
5 2  Satu Mare 5 2 
Calarasi 5 2  Salaj 4 2 
Cluj 10 4  Sibiu 6 3 
Constanta 10 4  Suceava 10 4 
Covasna 4 2  Teleorman 6 3 
Dambovita 8 3  Timis 9 4 
Dolj 10 5  Tulcea 4 2 
Galati 9 4  Vaslui 7 3 
Giurgiu 4 2  Valcea 6 3 
Gorj 6 2  Vrancea 6 2 
Hargita 5 2  Bucuresti 28 12 
*One deputy allocated for every 70,000 residents, one senator for every 160,000 
 
Mayors and councils for each of almost 3,000 communities are also elected on four year 
cycles.  An upper tier of local government is based on 41 counties (judet).  Bucharest elects 
a city mayor and a general council plus six district mayors and councils.  Also following 
the French system, each county has a prefect nominated by central government responsible 
for overseeing the legality of local authority decision making and providing a link with the 
centre.773 
                                                            
773 See Lavinia Stan, Leaders and Laggards. 
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Appendix three 
Interviewees 
Gabriel Andreescu, briefly a member of the governing council of the National Salvation 
Front, then a notable human rights activist, in particular leading the Group for Social 
Dialogue. 
Petru Biturca, local party office holder with the National Peasant Party, Mures County. 
Lucia Briscan, local party office holder with the National Peasant Party, Mures County. 
Daniel Daianu, Finance Minister 1997-8 and then National Liberal Party MEP. 
Iulia Huiu, academic author and National Liberal European Parliament candidate. 
Andrei Marga, Education Minister, 1997 – 2000 and leader of the National Peasant Party, 
2000 – 2001. 
Dan Motreanu, General Secretary of the National Liberal Party. 
Liviu Muresan, Executive President of Eurisc Foundation, Member of Parliament 1990 – 
1992 and defence adviser to the government 1996 – 2000. 
Zoe Petre, senior advisor to President Emil Constantinescu. 
Virgil Petrescu, Education Minister, 1996 – 97. 
Alice Ratyis, campaigns adviser to Democratic Convention, 2000. 
Valerian Stan, human rights activist, national secretary of the Civic Alliance and anti-
corruption minister, 1996-1998. 
Csaba Sogor, Member of the European Parliament (Hungarian Democratic Union) 
Theodor Stolojan, Prime Minister, 1991 – 1992.  National Liberal candidate for the 
presidency, 2000. 
Csaba Takacs, Executive President, Hungarian Democratic Union. 
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Horia Terpe, Director of Centre for Analysis and Development of Institutions, adviser to 
Valeriu Stoica. 
Varujan Vosganian, leader of the Union of Right Forces and (National Liberal) Finance 
Minister, 2004 – 8. 
Renate Weber, human rights activist, member of the Civic Alliance and National Liberal 
MEP. 
Rodica Zaharia, civil society activist. 
The thesis was also discussed with the following academics: 
Florin Abraham (Ovidiu Sincai Institute) 
Ionut Ciobanu (University of Bucharest) 
Liliana Pop (London Metropolitan Univesity) 
Laurentiu Stefan (American Embassy, Bucharest) 
 
 
 
